SCMR 1989

1989 PLP 980 (SCMR)

UMAR DIN — Petitioner Versus GHULAM NAB1 and others — Respondents

Jurisdiction / Court
High Court
Decided Date
N/A
Honorable Judges
Aslam Riaz Hussain, Muhammad Afzal Zullah and Saad Saood Jan, JJ
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1989 PLP 980 (SCMR)
Forum / Court High Court
Bench Members Aslam Riaz Hussain, Muhammad Afzal Zullah and Saad Saood Jan, JJ
Parties UMAR DIN — Petitioner Versus GHULAM NAB1 and others — Respondents
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1989 PLP 980 (SCMR)?

This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1989 PLP 980 (SCMR)?

The case was heard and decided by the High Court bench comprising: Aslam Riaz Hussain, Muhammad Afzal Zullah and Saad Saood Jan, JJ.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1989 PLP 980 (SCMR) (UMAR DIN — Petitioner Versus GHULAM NAB1 and others — Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Representation

  • Ch. Oamaruddin Khan Meo, Advocate‑on‑Record for Petitioner.
  • Riaz Anwar, Advocate Supreme Court and Rana MA. nadri, Advocate on‑Record for Respondents.
  • S.D. Oureshi, Advocate Supreme Court for the State.

Judgment & Decree

MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.‑‑Grievance has been made in this Criminal Original Contempt Petition against the respondents that they are responsible for filing a suit to reagitate a matter which stood earlier conclusively decided by this Court when it refused to grant leave to appeal in Ibrahim and three others v. Umar Din and four others (C.P.LA. No.352 of 1983). The respondents having failed before the Settlement Authorities had challenged their orders before the High Court in Writ Petition which was dismissed. Their review application was also dismissed with some observations. They came up to the Supreme Court for grant of leave to appeal which was refused. They then filed a civil suit without disclosing that their leave to appeal petition had been dismissed by the Supreme Court. When the petitioner brought all the facts and circumstances before the learned trial Judge, the plaint was rejected with costs. The respondents have filed appeal and are pursuing the same with the plea that the earlier decisions up to the Supreme Court did not create any bar to the re‑agitation of the matter before the civil Court. We have heard the learned counsel from both the sides and have also perused all the relevant orders. The respondents had failed on the question of relationship of Umar Din with Nizam. This was the main question regarding which the respondent had filed writ petition, which was dismissed and the orders of the Settlement Authorities were upheld. It is true that the High Court did not give its own independent finding m the exercise of writ jurisdiction with regard to the said relationship and it was so stated in the review order passed by the High Court. But the total effect of the dismissal of the writ petition was that the respondent‑side had failed to get any relief from the High Court on this question, which, by virtue of the judgment of the High Court then stood concluded. The judgment of the High Court, as analysed above, was affirmed by the Supreme Court. If the respondents would have been properly advised, they should not have filed a civil suit to re‑agitate the same question of relationship between Umar Din and Nizam. The rejection of their plaint, therefore, in so far as the merits are concerned, could not be considered as exceptionable. The filing of the appeal by the respondents against the rejection of the plaint for the same reasons would not be justified. If only these considerations are kept in view it would seem as if they have committed contempt of Court. But on account of certain observations made by the High Court in the review order the respondents could be given benefit off reasonable doubt in so far as the question of mens rea underlying the so‑called contemptuous act is concerned. Hence, they cannot be punished for contempt of this Court with regard to the proceedings up to the filing of the appeal. However, now that the entire matter had been discussed in this Court at considerable g length, and the respondents have been made to realise that both the orders of the High Court and the order of the Supreme Court when read together would have the effect of creating a bar for them to file a civil suit as they did, their continuance with the appeal and pursuing it further would constitute contempt of this Court. It is held and ordered accordingly with the result that although the respondents by extension of benefit of doubt are not punished for contempt, their appeal cannot proceed any further. With the foregoing observation, this petition for contempt of Court, is dismissed. M.BA./U‑18/S Petition dismissed.