1990 PLP 3 (SCMR)

(b) Punjab Pre‑emption Act (I of 1913)‑‑ ‑‑‑S.22(4)‑‑‑Zar‑e‑Panjum, deposit of‑‑‑Respondent furnish d security notwithstanding omission by the Court to pass proper order under S.22(1)‑‑ Held, intent and purpose of law stood satisfied‑‑‑Otherwise too, if , here was no direction for deposit nor for furnishing of the security, no occasion would arise for contravention of such direction so as to be visited by the penalty under S.22(4). Mian Sher Alam, Advocate Supreme Court, and S. Abid Nawaz, Advocate‑on‑Record (Absent) for Petitioner. M. Munir Piracha, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No.l. Nemo for the Remaining Respondents. Date of hearing: 23rd May, 1989. MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.‑‑Leave to appeal has been sought by Vendees' side; against the dismissal by the High Court, of their Regular First Appeal against a pre‑emption decree in favour of the respondents' side. Only two questions now remain to be resolved. One, whether the so called deficiency in court‑fee on the asking of the petitioners be made a ground for rejection of plaint; and whether the reliance of the High Court on the case of Siddique Khan and 2 others v. Abdul Shakur Khan and another (P L D 1984 S C 289) was justified; (2) whether, the acceptance by the trial Court of security bond without any order of deposit of the Zar‑e‑Panjum and/or without any direction for submission of such a bond could be made a ground for non‑suiting the plaintiffs' side under subsection (4) of section 22 of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act. Learned counsel in the behalf tried to argue that the security had become insufficient. After some arguments the learned counsel had to admit that in the facts and circumstances of this case the exact amount of deficiency in court‑fee not having been determined there was no case of default in this behalf nor it could be treated as a contumacious act. Thus, the High Court rightly rejected the petitioners plea in this behalf by invoking the view laid down it the case of Siddique Khan. On the second question also the learned Judge in the High Court gave cogent reasons not to non‑suit the plaintiffs under section 22(4) obviously because notwithstanding the assumed omission by the Court to pass proper orders under section 22(1) the intent and purpose of the law stood satisfied by furnishing of the security. Otherwise too in the circumstances of this case if there was no direction for deposit nor for furnishing of the security, no occasion would arise for contravention of such direction so as to be visited by the penalty under section 22 (4). Regarding the reduction in the value of the security suffice it to observe that the Court "not having specified any amount" there was no contravention by the plaintiffs' side. In any case the question of adequacy of the security was for the trial Court and on this ground alone the impugned judgment could not be set aside. In the light of the foregoing discussion there is no force in this petition, leave to appeal therefore is refused. M.A.K /M-920/S Leave refused.