1970 PLP 76 (SCMR)
MUHAMMAD SHARIF KHAN AND 4 OTHERS - Petitioners Versus BOARD OF REVENUE, WEST PAKISTAN, LAHORE
| Citation | 1970 PLP 76 (SCMR) |
| Forum / Court | High Court |
| Bench Members | N/A |
| Parties | MUHAMMAD SHARIF KHAN AND 4 OTHERS - Petitioners Versus BOARD OF REVENUE, WEST PAKISTAN, LAHORE |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1970 PLP 76 (SCMR)?
This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1970 PLP 76 (SCMR)?
The case was heard and decided by the High Court bench comprising: N/A.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1970 PLP 76 (SCMR) (MUHAMMAD SHARIF KHAN AND 4 OTHERS - Petitioners Versus BOARD OF REVENUE, WEST PAKISTAN, LAHORE). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Representation
- Muhammad Sadiq Choudhury, Advocate Supreme Court instructed by Maqbool Ahmad Rana, Attorney for Petitioners.
- Nemo for Respondents.
- Date of hearing : 11th July 1969.
Headnotes / Summary
(On appeal from the judgment and order of the High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore, dated the 2nd July 1968, in Writ Petition No. 472-R of 1965). Supreme Court Rules, (1956), O. XIII, r. I and Constitution of Pakistan, (1962), Art. 58(3)-Delay in filing petition for Special Leave to Appeal Condonation prayed for on ground that counsel did not inform petitioner in time about dismissal of his writ petition by High Court Held : even if counsel was at fault other side could not be deprived of valuable right accruing by lapse of time-Despite engagement of counsel client not absolved of his duty of keeping in touch with progress of his case-Delay not condoned.
Judgment & Decree
HAMOODUR RAHMAN, C. J.‑This petition is barred by 133 days and the only explanation for this delay that has been given in the petition for condonation is that the learned counsel engaged to appear in the Writ Petition in the High Court did not give to the petitioners any intimation of either the date of the hearing fixed or of the result of the case, till the 18th November 1968. It was only after this that the petitioner came to Lahore, applied for copies and ultimately filed a petition for special leave to appeal on the 11th January 1969. It is contended that if limitation is reckoned from the 18th November 1968, the petition will be in time. But this cannot be done. Limitation begins to run from the date of disposal of the writ petition on the 2nd July 1968. The petitioners cannot absolve themselves of their own responsibilities by throwing the blame on their learned counsel for the delay. Even assuming that their counsel was at fault, it is the petitioners who are to suffer and not the other side to whom a valuable right has accrued by the lapse of time. We are not prepared to accept that a client's responsibility ceases after he has briefed a counsel to appear on his behalf. It is his duty to keep in touch with his counsel and to find out the progress of his matter. If he cannot go personally, it is hiss duty to make proper arrangements for timely information to be conveyed to him by either the counsel or his clerk. The petitioners have not stated if they took any such steps. In the circumstances we are not prepared to accept their bald statement that their counsel did not give them any information about the result of their writ petition till the 18th of November 1968. This petition is, accordingly, dismissed as being barred by time. Petition dismissed.