1984 PLP 1313 (PLC(CS))
FAUJI SUGAR MILLS Versus MUSHTAQ AHMAD
| Citation | 1984 PLP 1313 (PLC(CS)) |
| Forum / Court | Labour Appellate Tribunal Punjab |
| Bench Members | N/A |
| Parties | FAUJI SUGAR MILLS Versus MUSHTAQ AHMAD |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1984 PLP 1313 (PLC(CS))?
This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1984 PLP 1313 (PLC(CS))?
The case was heard and decided by the Labour Appellate Tribunal Punjab bench comprising: N/A.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1984 PLP 1313 (PLC(CS)) (FAUJI SUGAR MILLS Versus MUSHTAQ AHMAD). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Representation
- Lt.‑Col. Ismatullah for Appellant.
- M. A. Hamid Awan for Respondent.
- Date of hearing : 28th February, 1984.
Headnotes / Summary
Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑ ‑‑ S. 25‑A‑Scope‑Grievance petition against dismissal for miscon duct‑Domestic enquiry found defective‑Permission for fresh enquiry‑Discretion of Labour Court‑Back benefits on reinstate ment always depending upon result of fresh enquiry if permitted and conducted.
Judgment & Decree
Lt.‑Col. Ismatullah for Appellant. M. A. Hamid Awan for Respondent. Date of hearing : 28th February, 1984. The two cross‑appeals captioned above arise from the decision, dated 2nd November, 1983 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No. 3, Lahore at Ferozewala, whereby the grievance petition of Mushtaq Ahmad (hereinafter to be called as the respondent) for his rein statement in service was accepted without allowing him back benefits. Fauji Sugar Mills (hereinafter to be described as the appellant) has chal lenged the direction o: reinstatement in service of the respondent, whereas the respondent in his appeal has claimed back benefits. Since both the appeals arise from the same decision, they are being disposed of together through this single judgment.
2. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the respondent that since charge sheet Exh. R. 2 was not delivered and had come back and now the period for giving charge‑sheet has expired, no fresh enquiry can be held. The address given on the letter was the same that was available with the appellant. Since the report was that the addressee was not found on the address, it meant that that the respondent had changed his residence with out informing the respondent about his new address. In these circumstances the letter could not be sent again and it would be deemed that legally the charge‑sheet was served. No new charge‑sheet is to be given and only a copy may be supplied. Apart from it, the other charge‑sheet Exh. P. 10 is admitted by the respondent. He did send the reply and that on recovery he would submit reply. Since charge‑sheet Exh. R. 10 was served, enquiry can be held.
3. The other argument of the learned counsel for the respondent is that according to the second charge‑sheet Exh. R. 10, the allegation is that the respondent issued pass book to a fictitious person, so such act does not amount to misconduct. The line of his argument is that by such an act no loss to the business of the appellant could occur. The argument is devoid of force. The Mills has known a capacity to admit sugarcane and to produce sugar. So, agreements to purchase the sugarcane are made and pass books are issued to the growers for the supply of the quantity entered therein. When the required quantity is completed further, agreements to purchase sugar are stopped. Since the pass book was issued to a fictitious person, it means that the sugarcane mentioned in the pass book was not to be supplied. But for the issuance of the disputed pass book, some agree ment with some other growers would have been made for the said quantity of sugar‑cane. So, the mills suffered to the extent of the quantity of sugar‑cane mentioned in the disputed pass book and thus due to the wrongful act of the respondent the appellant suffered and the act amounts to misconduct.
4. It was the discretion of the learned lower Court to allow fresh enquiry. Since enquiry was defective, fresh enquiry was rightly allowed. When fresh enquiry is permitted, back benefits always depend, upon the result of the enquiry. So, such a direction of the learned lower Court is just and proper.
5. As a result, both the appeals are dismissed. A. E. Appeals dismissed.