P L D 1966 (W (PLP)

In the circumstances of the case, the case of the prosecution is not likely to be prejudiced by the petitioner being allowed bail. The Court, therefore, confirmed the interim order of bail before arrest already passed by it. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)

S. 161, read with Prevention of Corruption Act (II of 1947), S. 5(2)‑Wrong orders passed by officers in exercise of judicial or quasi judicial functions‑Not ordinarily made subject‑matters of cases of corruption or criminal misconduct. The wrong orders passed by an officer in the exercise of his judicial or quasi judicial functions are not ordinarily trade the subject‑matters of cases of corruption or criminal misconduct. The corruption or criminal misconduct of such an officer has to be established independently of the character of the orders passed by him in his capacity as a judicial or quasi‑judicial officer, and this for a very good reason. A judicial officer cannot bring to bear on the matter before him an independent judgment if he works under a sense of fear that his possibly wrong orders are liable to be construed as indication of corruption or criminal misconduct on his part. Besides, while dishonesty or corruption is not necessarily inferable from a wrong judicial order, a perfectly correct order might be passed by a corrupt judicial or quasi judicial officer after accepting a bribe. Mahmud Ali Kasuri and M. S. Baqir for Petitioner. Khalid Mahmood Pasha for the State. I have heard the parties' counsel. The petitioner is a Member of the National Assembly and as such obviously a, person of social and political importance. Such a person' is not likely to lower himself in the estimation of the public at large and especially his constituents by becoming an absconder. 2. In the course of his arguments, learned counsel for the State referred to the circumstance that the petitioner had passed a wrong order in review on the 9th of March 1961 after he had already passed a different order in appeal on the same day. Learned counsel for the State further referred to the circumstance that on a writ petition filed by Mst. Ghulam Fatima, (one of the parties to the dispute before the petitioner in his capacity as the Additional Settlement Commissioner) the High Court pronounced the order passed by the petitioner (as Additional Settlement Commissioner) in review as wrong and as against the provisions of section 21(1)(b) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. These circumstances the learned counsel for the State utilized in support of the position of the prosecution that the case under section 161, P. P. C. and section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, registered against the petitioner, originated with the wrong order passed by the petitioner in his capacity as the Additional Settlement Commissioner. I do not want to prejudice the prosecution case against the petitioner by saying anything having reference to the merits of the case as: Indeed, I do not know what evidence the prosecution has at its disposal in support of its case. But I might mention that the wrong orders passed by an officer in the exercise of his judicial or quasi judicial functions are not ordinarily ‑made the subject‑matters of cases of corruption or criminal misconduct. The corruption or criminal misconduct of such an officer has to be established independently of the character of the orders passed by him in his capacity as a judicial or quasi judicial officer, and this for a very good reason. A judicial officer cannot bring to bear on the matter before him an independent judgment if he works under a sense of fear that his possibly wrong orders are liable to be construed as indication of corruption or criminal misconduct on his part. besides, while dishonesty or corruption is not necessarily inferable from a wrong judicial order, a perfectly correct order might be passed by a corrupt judicial or quasi‑judicial officer after accepting a bribe. Learned counsel for the State has, however, stated that the prosecution case does not entirely rest on the circumstances of a 'wrong order having been passed by the petitioner. Therefore, it is that I have remarked in the beginning that I do not want to express any opinion on the merits of the case, because it is possible that independently of the circumstance of the petitioner having passed a wrong order, the prosecution is in possession of some strong evidence connecting the petitioner with some corrupt practices. In the circumstances of the case, however, I do think that the case of the prosecution is not likely to be prejudiced by the petitioner being allowed bail. I, therefore, confirm the interim order of bail before arrest already passed by this Court. S. Q. Petition allowed.