1994 PLP 973 (SCMR)
MUHAMMAD RAUF and 10 others‑‑‑Petitioners Versus MUHAMMAD ABBAS and another‑‑‑Respondents
| Citation | 1994 PLP 973 (SCMR) |
| Forum / Court | Supreme Court of Pakistan |
| Bench Members | Shafiur Rahman and Saleem Akhtar, JJ |
| Parties | MUHAMMAD RAUF and 10 others‑‑‑Petitioners Versus MUHAMMAD ABBAS and another‑‑‑Respondents |
| Primary Law | Constitution of Pakistan (1973)‑‑‑ |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1994 PLP 973 (SCMR)?
This judgment primarily cites: Constitution of Pakistan (1973)‑‑‑ as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1994 PLP 973 (SCMR)?
The case was heard and decided by the Supreme Court of Pakistan bench comprising: Shafiur Rahman and Saleem Akhtar, JJ.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1994 PLP 973 (SCMR) (MUHAMMAD RAUF and 10 others‑‑‑Petitioners Versus MUHAMMAD ABBAS and another‑‑‑Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- Izharul Haque, Advocate Supreme Court and Tanvir Ahmad, Advocate‑on‑Record for Petitioners.
- Ch. Muhammad Aslam, Advocate‑on‑Record and Ch. Khurshid Ahmad, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No.1.
- Date of hearing: 20th November, 1993.
Headnotes / Summary
(On appeal from the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench dated 13‑2‑1993 passed in RSA 9/1987‑BWP). ‑‑‑‑Art. 185(3)‑‑‑Petition for leave to appeal‑‑‑Concurrent findings of two Courts below‑‑‑Interference by High Court‑‑‑Guidelines supplied‑‑‑Conclusion drawn by Trial Court and First Appellate Court was proper, reasonable and same could not be assailed on the ground that evidence had been misread or mis-appreciated‑‑‑Such conclusion could reasonably and by proper appreciating evidence be drawn and had rightly been drawn by Courts below‑‑‑High Court had correctly not interfered with findings of fact by Courts' below which was fully supported by evidence on record‑‑‑Such concurrent finding of fact could not be disturbed merely on ground of mis-appreciation or misreading of evidence, but could be challenged only if it was based on extraneous considerations not supported by the facts on record and was result of surmises and conjectures‑‑‑If no error of law or defect in procedure had been committed in coming to finding of fact, High Court was bound by such finding‑‑‑Where evidence to sustain finding existed on record then even if the High Court comes to conclusion that a different finding could be given on basis of such evidence it would not be, a ground for interference‑-‑Leave to appeal, was refused in circumstances.
Judgment & Decree
SALEEM AKHTAR, J.‑‑‑The petitioner seek leave to appeal against the judgment of the learned Judge in Chambers of the High Court whereby the second appeal filed by them has been dismissed.
2. Respondent No.l filed suit for declaration pleading that he did not execute any power of attorney in favour of Naik Muhammad, respondent No.2 and did not sell the property in dispute to the petitioners and that the said power of attorney was a forged document and he continues to be the owner of the land. The petitioners contested the suit and pleaded that their predecessor -in‑interest had purchased the property under a registered sale‑deed which was executed by respondent No.2 as attorney of respondent . No. l who had a registered power of attorney in his favour from respondent No.l. The learned trial Court after considering the evidence of both the parties came to the conclusion that the power of attorney was forged and was not executed by respondent No.l and consequently suit filed by him was decreed. The petitioners filed appeal before the District Judge, which was dismissed. They then filed second appeal, before the High Court which was also dismissed by the impugned judgment.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that all the Courts have ignored the evidence of defence witnesses and have not properly, appreciated the documentary and oral evidence on record. He has particularly referred to the statement of D.W.3, who according to the petitioners was Lambardar at the relevant time and had supported the petitioners by stating that the power of attorney was executed by respondent No.l. We have examined the judgments of all the Courts below and find that the learned trial Court has fully discussed the testimony of all the witnesses. With regard to D.W.3 it was observed that he cannot be relied upon as Mst. Nazir Begum, the predecessor‑in‑interest of the petitioners was his sister. It was on account of close relationship and on appreciation of documentary as well as oral evidence that the learned trial Court rejected his evidence and decreed the suit. This finding was upheld in the first appeal as well as in the second appeal. We find that the conclusion drawn by the learned trial Court and the learned First Appellate Court is proper, reasonable and cannot be assailed on the ground that the evidence has been misread or misappreciated. Such conclusion can reasonably and by properly appreciating the evidence could be drawn and has rightly been drawn by the. Courts. The learned Judge in Chambers of the High Court could not have interfered with the concurrent finding of fact by two Courts below which are duly supported by the evidence documentary as well as oral. It may be noted that such concurrent finding of fact cannot be disturbed merely on the ground of misappreciation or misreading of evidence. Such finding can be challenged only if it is based on extraneous considerations not supported by the facts on record and is result of surmises and conjectures. If no error of law or defect in procedure has been committed in coming to finding of fact, the High Court is bound by such finding. If there exists on record evidence to sustain the finding, then even if the High Court comes to the conclusion that a different finding could be given on the basis of such evidence it will not be a ground for interference. We do not find any force in the petition and refuse to grant leave. AA./M‑1873/S refused.