P L D 1966 (W (PLP)

INAMULLAH KHAN, C. J.‑This is a Letters Patent Appeal against the order of Mushtaq Hussain, J. dated the 17th of Janu ary 1965. It would be useful, in order to consider the contentions of the learned Advocate, to reproduce the order of the learned Single Judge:‑ Submits that the Deputy Settlement Commissioner passed his order dated 24th February 1964 in exercise of powers con ferred upon him under section 30 (2) of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 by the C. S. C. but it was subject to appeal and revision. This is not so and it has been so laid down in P L D 1965 S C

261. Dismissed."

2. Learned Advocate for the appellants raised three points before us.

3. In the first place, the learned Advocate contends that there is a distinction between the provision of section 31 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, (hereinafter called the Act) and section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act (hereinafter called Land Act) 1958, with the result that the principle laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Jalal Din v. Muhammad Rafiq etc. (P L D 1965 S C 261) would not be applicable. It is not necessary to reproduce the provisions of sections 31 and 30 of the two Acts. It will be sufficient to state that the distinction between the two provisions is that while the Chief Settlement Commissioner has power under section 31 of the Act to delegate even his revisional power to any of the Settlement Authorities this he cannot do under the Land Settlement Act. On this distinction, Mr. Altaf Sikandar, the learned Advocate for the appellants, contended that the principle laid down in Jalal Din's case by the Supreme Court could not be applicable to the provisions of the Land Settlement Act. The distinction no doubt is there, but so far as the present case is concerned, it is not of any material consequence. Under section 30, the bar on the power of delegation of the Chief Settlement Commissioner is only in respect of appeals, revision and review. In the present case, the Chief Settlement Commissioner has delegated his power in respect of section 10 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, and not in respect of his power, under Chapter VI of the Land Act. Section 10 reads as under:‑ "If the Chief Settlement Commissioner is satisfied that an allotment has been obtained by any person by means of fraud or false representation then without prejudice to any other penalty to which such person may be liable, the Chief Settle ment Commissioner may pass an order canceling the allotment or reducing the area of the land allotted or such other order as be may deem fit." This power is not one of the powers conferred on the Chief Settlement Commissioner under Chapter VI of the Act. In this view of the matter, we are clearly of the opinion that the principle t laid down by the Lordships of the Supreme Court in Jalal Din's case would apply with all force to the circumstances of the presew case.

4. In the second place, it was contended by the learned Advocate that the impugned order was passed on 24th of February 1964, while the Chief Settlement Commissioner delegated his power in respect of section 10 of the Act on 5th of June 1964. In order to verify the contention of the learned Advocate, we gave notice to Major Ishaq Muhammad Khan, the learned Advocate who appears for Settlement Authorities, for today. He has appeared before us and produced the relevant notifications. It would appear from the notification dated 20‑3‑1962, that the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Mr. Ahsanuddin, delegated his power, under section 10 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 to cancel allotment obtained by means of fraud or false representation to the Deputy Commissioners in their capacity as Deputy Settlement Commissioners. The impugned order was passed by the Deputy Commissioner on 24th Feb ruary 1964. In these circumstances, we would hold that the impugned order was passed in exercise of the delegated authority from the Chief Settlement Commissioner.

5. Lastly, it was submitted that the appellants were not given reasonable opportunity to be heard by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner. We have considered the contention of the appel lants. There is not much force. In the first place, this point was not taken before the learned Single Judge. The learned Advocate, however, states that this point was taken before the learned Single Judge. It, however, appears from the perusal of the order of the learned Single Judge that the learned Advocate, at that stage, was sure of his ground that the Deputy Settlement Commissioner had passed the order as a Deputy Settlement Commissioner and not as delegatee from the Chief Settlement Commissioner and, therefore, he did not press this point before the learned Single Judge. In the second place, it appears from the order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner that the appellants had not appeared before him in spite of notice. The relevant observation reads as under:‑ "The appellants (respondents) are present with their counsel but the respondents (the appellants before us) are absent in spite of notice." The learned Advocate for the appellants submits that the appellants before us were fraudulently served. We cannot, at this stage, investigate this fact. No other point was urged. The appeal is dismissed in limine. K. B. A. Appeal dismissed.