1995 PLP 933 (SCMR)
NAZIR AHMED and others‑‑‑Petitioners Versus MUHAMMAD DIN and others‑‑‑Respondents
| Citation | 1995 PLP 933 (SCMR) |
| Forum / Court | Supreme Court of Pakistan |
| Bench Members | Saad Saood Jan, Actg CJ. And Manzoor Hussail Sial, J |
| Parties | NAZIR AHMED and others‑‑‑Petitioners Versus MUHAMMAD DIN and others‑‑‑Respondents |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1995 PLP 933 (SCMR)?
This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1995 PLP 933 (SCMR)?
The case was heard and decided by the Supreme Court of Pakistan bench comprising: Saad Saood Jan, Actg CJ. And Manzoor Hussail Sial, J.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1995 PLP 933 (SCMR) (NAZIR AHMED and others‑‑‑Petitioners Versus MUHAMMAD DIN and others‑‑‑Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Representation
- Shaukat Ali Mehr, Advocate Supreme Court and Ch. Mehdi Khan Mehtab, Advocate‑on‑Record for Petitioners.
- Nemo for Respondents.
- Date of hearing: 10th May, 1994.
- 4. In support of this petition learned counsel for petitioners contended that the decree dated 20‑3‑1968, was neither got executed by Mst. Rano nor by her successors the same had become in‑executable after lapse of 6 years from the date of the decree. He, however, was unable to controvert the fact that the petitioners got correction of the decree ‑in 1983 and got sanctioned Mutation No. 238 dated 18‑5‑1983, the suit, therefore, instituted by the respondents was within tim8. The petitioners neither denied the compromise reached between the parties nor the consent decree based thereon entitling Mst. Rano, the predecessor‑in‑interest of the respondents to inherit 1/8th share of the land, they, therefore, cannot legally agitate that either the decree was in‑executable or the suit was barred by time.
- 5. After hearing learned counsel for petitioners we are convinced that the petitioners' claim is absolutely unfounded in law as well as on merits. In our view, the unanimous decision of all the Courts below is unexceptionable.
Headnotes / Summary
(On appeal from the judgment of the Lahore High Court, dated 21‑12‑1992, in C.R. 265‑D/1992/BWP.). Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑O. XXIII, R. 3‑‑‑Constituticn of Pakistan (1973); Art. 185(3)‑‑‑Compromise between parties culminating into consent decree whereby plaintiffs' predecessor was declared to be owner of 1/8th share of land in question‑‑ Defendants subsequently got the decree modified and mutation was sanctioned in their favour in respect of entire land‑‑‑Plaintiffs entitlement to 1/8th share was decreed by all the Courts including the High Court‑‑‑Defendants neither denied compromise reached between the parties nor the factum of consent decree based thereon entitling plaintiffs' predecessor to inherit 1/8th share of land‑‑‑Defendants, therefore, could not subsequently agitate that either the decree based on compromise was inexecutable or that suit on basis of same was barred by time‑‑‑Concurrent decisions of all the Courts below was unexceptionable‑‑‑Leave to appeal was refused in circumstances.
Judgment & Decree
MANZOOR HUSSAIN SIAL, J: ‑‑The petitioners seek leave to appeal against judgment dated 21‑12‑1992, of the Lahore High Court, whereby Civil Revision No. 265‑D of 1992/BWP, filed by them was dismissed.
2. The relevant facts giving rise to this petition are that one Ibrahim the predecessor‑in‑interest of the petitioner instituted suit in the year 1968, seeking declaration to the effect that he was exclusive owner of land measuring 95 Kanals and 2 Marlas in Chak No. 37/BC, Tehsil and District Bahawalpur. The suit was compromised with Ismail and Qasim the predecessor‑in‑interest of the respondents and a consent‑decree was passed on 20‑3‑1968, whereby he was declared to be owner of the aforesaid entire land except 1/8th share of Mst. Rano `the widow of aforementioned Muhammad Qasim. The parties did not get executed the aforesaid decree and in the meantime Ibrahim as well as Mst. Rano died. In the year 1983, the petitioners got the aforesaid decree modified as certain Khasra numbers had been duly recorded therein and Mutations Nos. 238 and 239 were sanctioned in favour of the petitioners in respect of the entire land. It was claimed by the petitioners that Mst. Rano had surrendered her share in their favour.
3. The respondents/plaintiffs after having learnt that the petitioners have got mutated the entire land in their favour instituted suit claiming that they were entitled to inherit 1/8th share of‑the land owned by Mst. Rano as per compromise deed and the consent‑decree passed on 20‑3‑1968. The petitioners contested the suit but the learned trial Judge decreed the same on 31‑10‑1989. The petitioners challenged the aforementioned judgment and decree in appeal which was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Bahawalpur, on 27‑10‑1992 and revision dismissed by the High Court on 21‑12‑1992, as aforementioned. Hence this petition for leave to appeal.
4. In support of this petition learned counsel for petitioners contended that the decree dated 20‑3‑1968, was neither got executed by Mst. Rano nor by her successors the same had become in‑executable after lapse of 6 years from the date of the decree. He, however, was unable to controvert the fact that the petitioners got correction of the decree ‑in 1983 and got sanctioned Mutation No. 238 dated 18‑5‑1983, the suit, therefore, instituted by the respondents was within tim
8. The petitioners neither denied the compromise reached between the parties nor the consent decree based thereon entitling Mst. Rano, the predecessor‑in‑interest of the respondents to inherit 1/8th share of the land, they, therefore, cannot legally agitate that either the decree was in‑executable or the suit was barred by time.
5. After hearing learned counsel for petitioners we are convinced that the petitioners' claim is absolutely unfounded in law as well as on merits. In our view, the unanimous decision of all the Courts below is unexceptionable.
6. The upshot of the above discussion is that this petition is without merit and is accordingly dismissed. AA./N‑390/S Leave refused.