1990 PLP 791 (PLC)

TANZIL‑UR‑REHMAN, J.‑‑Exemption application is granted for the time being subject to all just exceptions.

2. This is a petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The facts leading to the above petition, briefly stated, are that the petitioner was employed as a Gangman in the Engineering Department of respondent No.3. The petitioner, while in the employment of respondent No. 3, Karachi Port Trust, was issued show‑cause notice and charge‑sheet in connection with an alleged theft and misconduct. The petitioner participated in the departmental enquiry wherein the alleged two charges levelled against him were proved. He was addressed a communication dated 14th November, 1983 by respondent No. 3 to the effect that "enquiry proceedings were conducted in accordance with the K.P.T. Officers and Servants Efficiency and Discipline Rules. The enquiry officer has found him guilty of the above charges. The Competent Authority has, therefore, sanctioned his removal from K.P.T. Service with immediate effect." The petitioner thereupon riled an appeal against the said removal which was rejected by the Federal Government. A memorandum dated 5th July, 1984 (Exh. AW‑1/6) was sent to the petitioner on the address given by the petitioner in his memo. of appeal. The petitioner, however, gave notice of grievance dated 28th July, 1986 under section 25‑A of the industrial Relations Ordinance, 1909 to respondent No‑33 and thereafter filed an application in the Labour Court. Respondent No.3 filed their reply statement to the said application, wherein a preliminary objection, inter alia, was taken that "the grievance notice is time‑barred, therefore the present application is not maintainable:" The learned Labour Court No. 1 by its order dated 31‑10‑1988 upheld the said objections and the application was dismissed. The petitioner against the said order filed an appeal before respondent No.1, Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal at Karachi. The Tribunal by its decision dated 8‑8‑1989 upheld the order of the Labour Court and dismissed the appeal, holding that "the grievance notice and consequent application filed by the petitioner was time‑barred and has rightly been rejected by the Labour Court:" It is against this decision that he petitioner has chosen to file the above petition. Mr. Muhammad Majeed Jeelani, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner did not receive the memdorandum dated 5th July, 1984, rejecting the appeal by the Federal Government. It was only on receipt of letter dated 9th July, 1986 received from respondent No.3 that he came to know of the rejection of his appeal. This submission seems to be incorrect and wrong. The letter dated 9th July, 1986 referred to by the petitioner's counsel is not an intimation as to the rejection of the appeal but, rejection of some application made by the petitioner to respondent No.

3. This view is fortified by the details given in the order of the learned Labour Court. At page 57 of the said order a number of the applications including of 20‑3‑1985 and 15‑6‑1985 have been referred. In the first application a request was made that his removal from service be converted into compulsory retirement, whereas in the second application the petitioner requested for payment of his legal dues. Nowhere in the said applications it has been stated that his appeal was pending or that the decision on the appeal Exh. AW‑1/6 has not been communicated to him. Had the appeal been pending, there was no occasion for his writing to the Chairman, respondent No.3 for conversion of his removal to compulsory retirement and payment of legal dues. The grievance notice after lapse of about two years and consequent application to the Labour Court was clearly an afterthought. The learned Labour Court and the Appellate Tribunal both have held that the decision dated 5‑7‑1984 was communicated to the petitioner for which they have given cogent reasons with which we are in respectful agreement and have no reason to take a different view. In any case, it is a pure question of fact whether the notice of rejection of appeal was communicated to the petitioner in July, 1984 or July, 1986. We cannot go into the factual enquiry while exercising our constitutional jurisdiction. There is no assertion as to the existence of jurisdictional defect or its exercise without lawful authority. No other plea was raised before us by the learned counsel for the petitioner. We, therefore, find no force in the petition, which is dismissed in limine. M.Y.H./B‑160/K