1990 PLP 583 (PLC)

2. It is in this context, what Mr. Muhammad Hussain has said, in the notice of grievance that what he has testified before Labour Court, has been referred by the counsel for the respondent: "It is incorrect that I had never come to the mill from 22‑1‑1986, until I was dismissed on 15‑3‑1987. I do not know if I had given any Shekaiti Khat, after my dismissal. But I had given my grievance notice. I do not know what is the grievance notice because I am not literate. It is correct that I had not made any complaint in my grievance notice regarding the charge‑sheet. I do not remember if I had written in my grievance notice that my employment in the mill terminated on 23‑2‑1987. I was removed from employment on 23‑12‑1986. I do not know if I have not stated in my application that I was removed from employment on 23rd December, 1986."

3. Firstly, the applicant has shown uncertainty of the date of notice or even the context of the notice, what the grievance notice means.

4. If the Court understands that the witness, is not educated in the sense, to be confused, what the notice is, otherwise, in the notice, the language he himself has drafted or drafted by somebody else, the question still arises whether the cause of action, for the purpose of redress is to challenge the charge‑sheet or to have the grievance of the removal of the office‑bearers as the grievance.

5. If section 25‑A, I.R.O. is the statutory provision, laying a stress that the worker will serve notice of grievance on the employer and come to the Court of law for redress, in respect of that grievance, the obvious object underlying this proviso is, that only that grievance which he entertains, for the purpose of jurisdiction, that is the present cause of action. Difficulty is no more felt by the Court, if the time limitation would not have been in that statutory provision, as this provision exceptionally unknown in matter of limitation, like other provisions, the grievance, would have been taken, in the broader concept, means any grievance.

6. What the counsel has stressed that the grievance understood in law means, personal grievance relating to the cause of action that is to challenge the charge‑sheet and not that cause of action of the removal of the trade unionists which is their grievance. So according to counsel section 25‑A being the provision relating to particular grievance as understood in its legal meaning.

7. The Court may also take the view, supposing, that this technicality may lead to absurdity and injustice, because every worker, comes in the Court of law for redress and the Court of law also is to see, whether the grievance is legitimate or false or frivolous. The provision of section 25‑A, I.R.O., by its very language, has stressed on limitation as well, for bringing the grievance: It otherwise means, that the limitation, right, once accrues in law, to the side of the respondent, the grievance of the worker, therefore, if it relates to the cause of action, which is not his personal cause of action, if the application is entertained on the assumed jurisdiction, it can equally react on the denial of justice to other side, who in the concept of law enjoys the same jurisdiction regarding limitation to be availed.

8. The letter of 24‑3‑1987 and its reference in letter of 11‑4‑1987 by the employer, is the cause of action to be examined what the Court has observed that the grievance entertained is of the union's office‑bearers and not of his personal grievance, on which there is a legal stress a/s 25‑A, I.R.O.

9. In consequence, the application is dismissed on point of limitation which is purely question of law. A.E./1232/Lb.S ?????????? Application dismissed.