1994 PLP 679 (SCMR)

(On appeal from judgment/order of Peshawar High Court dated 12‑3‑1991 in C.R. No. 85 of 1990). ‑‑‑‑O.I, R.10‑‑‑Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 185‑‑‑Appeal before Supreme Court‑‑‑Concurrent findings of fact of three Courts below‑‑ Appellant's claim as to ownership of land in question was rejected by all the Courts below after considering evidence on record‑‑‑Nothing was pointed out to justify interference with concurrent findings of fact‑‑‑Appellant having no interest, whatsoever, in property in question, her prayer that she be made a party in dispute was rightly refused‑‑‑Appellant, however, had also filed a separate suit to seek declaration with regard to her claim to land in question‑‑ Appeal was dismissed in circumstances. M. Aman Khan, Advocate Supreme' Court with Nur Ahmad Khan, Advocate‑on‑Record for Appellant. Sh. Wazir Muhammad, Advocate‑on‑Record for Respondents. Date of hearing: 18th October, 1993. SAAD SAOOD JAN, J.‑‑‑This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment dated 12‑3‑1991 of the Peshawar High Court whereby the revision petition preferred by the appellant was dismissed.

2. The appellant is the wife of Muqaddar Khan, respondent No.3. On 24‑9‑1974 Muqaddar Khan obtained a consent decree against one Muneeb Khan in respect of land measuring 109 kanals and 9 marlas, situate in village Barbat of Tehsil Peshawar. Later, he was involved in some criminal case. To avoid prosecution he absconded. On 14‑1‑1982 Nasrullah Khan, respondent No.2, acting as next friend of Muneeb Khan, filed an application under section 12(2), Civil Procedure Code, for setting aside the consent decree on the ground that at the relevant time Muneeb Khan was of unsound mind and the said decree had been obtained by Muqaddar Khan through misrepresentation and fraud. On 29‑5‑1982 while this application was still pending the appellant moved the trial Court for being impleaded as a party to the proceedings. She stated that by a deed dated 1‑9‑1977 Muqaddar Khan had given the disputed property together with some more land to her by way of dower. The learned trial Court dismissed the application. The appellant filed an appeal before the District Judge, Peshawar. The learned District Judge accepted the appeal and remanded the matter back to the trial Court for a fresh decision after recording evidence. In pursuance of the order of remand the trial Court recorded the evidence of the parties. In support of her claim that the land in dispute formed part of her dower she produced an unregistered document and two witnesses. One was her attorney; he was an attesting witness. The other was the scribe of the document. The learned trial Court held that the evidence produced before him was entirely insufficient to support her claim to the ownership of the land in dispute. Accordingly, he dismissed the application. The appellant filed an appeal before the District Judge. After re‑appraising the evidence the learned District Judge affirmed the findings of the trial Court and dismissed the appeal. The appellant then filed a revision petition in the High Court. The High Court once again considered the evidence and then re affirmed the findings of the learned District Judge and the trial Court. The appellant has now come in appeal to this Court.

3. After hearing the learned counsel for the appellant we are not satisfied that a case for interference with the judgments of the Courts below has been made out. The claim of the appellant that the land in dispute belonged to her had been rejected by all the three Courts after considering the evidence brought on the record. There is no reason why their concurrent finding be interfered with. That being so, she had no interest whatsoever in the property in dispute; consequently, her prayer that she should be made a party to the proceedings was rightly refused. It may be mentioned that she has also filed a separate suit to seek a declaration with regard to her claim to the land in dispute. However that may be, we find no merit in this appeal which is hereby dismissed but with no order as to costs. AA./M‑1896/S Appeal dismissed.