2002 PLP 713 (YLR)

Ch. Shahid Tabassam for Respondents Nos. 1 to

7. Ishfaq Ahmad Chaudhry for the State. Date of hearing: 10th April, 2002. Through this appeal Mst. Maqsoodan Bibi appellant has called in question the order dated 31‑7‑2000 passed by the learned Judge, Special Court (Suppression of Terrorist Activities), Gujranwala whereby respondents Nos. 1 to 7 were acquitted on the basis of a compromise between the parties in case F.I.R. No.570 registered at Police Station Sadar, Kamoke on 238‑1998 for offences under sections 324/334/452/148/149, P.P.C. The allegation against respondents Nos. 1 to 7 was that at flout 9‑30 a.m. on 22‑8‑1998 they had trespassed into the house of the present appellant after forming an unlawful assembly and had launched a murderous assault upon the present appellant and had chopped the appellant's nose off.

2. It is available on the record that on 8‑10‑1998 the present appellant had sworn an affidavit before Chaudhry Muhammad Rafique, Judicial Magistrate, Gujranwala wherein she had categorically maintained that on account of intervention of the respectables of the area the appellant had affected a compromise with the accused party whom she had forgiven in the name of Allah Almighty. She had further deposed in the said affidavit that she was no longer interested in prosecuting the accused persons and she had no objection to their admission to bail or acquittal. The record further shows that on 21‑10‑1998 the learned Judge, Special Court (Suppression of Terrorist Activities), Gujranwala was seized of a bail application of some of the accused persons and on that date the present appellant as well as her brother Muhammad Ashraf complainant had both entered appearance before the said Court in person and had stated that they had pardoned the accused persons. On the said date the present appellant had sworn another affidavit before the said learned Court confirming the factum of her compromise with the accused persons. The order passed by the said Court on 21‑10‑1998 expressly referred to personal presence of the present appellant before that Court on that date. Subsequently on 31‑7‑2000 respondents Nos. 1 to 7 herein submitted an application before the learned trial Court seeking their acquittal on the basis of the compromise having been effected between the parties. On the said date Muhammad Ashraf complainant was present before the learned trial Court in person and the State was represented by an Assistant Public Prosecutor. After giving notice to the State regarding the application submitted by respondents Nos.1 to 7 herein the learned trial court acquitted respondents. Nos. 1 to 7 in this case on the basis of the compromise. That order passed by the learned trial Court has been assailed by the present appellant (the injured victim) before this Court through the present appeal. However, Muhammad Ashraf complainant (the appellant's brother) has not challenged that offer.

3. In support of this appeal it has beer, argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant had never entered into any compromise with the accused persons and, therefore, the acquittal of the said accused persons recorded by the learned trial Court on the basis of a compromise warrants setting aside by this Court. As against that the learned counsel for respondents Nos. 1 to 7 has referred to various documents available on the record to establish that on more than one occasion the present appellant had confirmed the factum of her having entered into a compromise with the accused persons. He has further maintained that once a compromise is effected between the parties the same cannot be resiled from by them. The learned counsel for the State has maintained that the State has felt satisfied with the acquittal of respondents Nos. 1 to 7 on the basis of a compromise and this is why the State has not challenged their acquittal.

4. After hearing the learned counsel I for the parties and going through the record it has emerged as an established fact that the present appellant had not only sworn an affidavit before a Magistrate on 8‑10‑1998 but had also sworn another affidavit before the learned trial Court on 21‑10‑1998 wherein she had maintained that she had already entered into a compromise with the accused persons and she had no objection to their admission to bail as well as acquittal. The order passed by the learned Judge, Special Court (Suppression of Terrorist Activities), Gujranwala on 21‑10‑1998 clearly shows that the present appellant was present in person before the said learned Court and she had confirmed the factum of compromise before that Court on that date. Presumption of correctness is attached to judicial record and the learned counsel for the appellants remained unable to dislodge or rebut the said presumption through any material whatsoever.

5. It is settled law that once a compromise has been effected in a criminal case and the same has been acted upon then such a compromise cannot be allowed by the Court to be resiled from. A reference may be made in this regard to the cases of Kumarasami Chetty v. Kuppusami Chetty and others (AIR 1919 Madras 879), Ram Richpal v. Mata Din and another (AIR 1925 Lahore 159), Thangtoo Barai and another v. Emperor (AIR 1930 Allahabad 409), Mt. Rambai wife of Bahadursingh v. Mt. Chandra Kumari Devi (AIR 1940 Nagpur 181), Godfrey Meeus v. Simon Dular (AIR (37) 1950 Nagpur 91), Prithvi Bhagat and another v. Birju Sada (AIR 1962 Patna 316), Syed Sabir Hussain Shah and another v. Syed Iftikhar Hussain Shah and another (1995 MLD 563), Syed Iftikhar Hussain Shah v. Syed Sabir Hussain Shah and 2 others (1998 SCMR 466) and Mukhtar Ahmad and 3 others v. The State (1999 PCr.LJ 1107).

6. For what has been discussed above I have failed to find any occasion to interfere with the acquittal of respondents Nos. 1 to 7 recorded by the learned trial Court and, therefore, this appeal is hereby dismissed. N.H.Q./M‑1153/L Appeal dismissed.