1993 PLP 569 (PLC(CS))
ABDUL KHABEER Versus NATIONAL TILES AND CERAMICS LTD., KARACHI
| Citation | 1993 PLP 569 (PLC(CS)) |
| Forum / Court | Labour Appellate Tribunal Sindh |
| Bench Members | Agha Ali Hyder, Appellate Tribunal |
| Parties | ABDUL KHABEER Versus NATIONAL TILES AND CERAMICS LTD., KARACHI |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1993 PLP 569 (PLC(CS))?
This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1993 PLP 569 (PLC(CS))?
The case was heard and decided by the Labour Appellate Tribunal Sindh bench comprising: Agha Ali Hyder, Appellate Tribunal.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1993 PLP 569 (PLC(CS)) (ABDUL KHABEER Versus NATIONAL TILES AND CERAMICS LTD., KARACHI). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Representation
- Faiz Ghangro for Appellant.
- Faseehuddin Ahmed for Respondents.
- Date of hearing: 17th February, 1993.
Headnotes / Summary
Industrial dispute‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑ Termination of service‑‑‑Reinstatement of employee‑‑‑Services of employee who was working in factory as Refractory Mason, were terminated by employer on ground that post on which employee was working had been abolished due to completion of factory‑‑‑On employer's own showing employee had been working in factory even after completion of factory in some other capacity, though nature of his new duties had not been specified‑‑‑Question of abolition of post of employee could not arise after 5 years of alleged completion of factory‑‑‑Mere statement that post on which employee was working having been abolished, was not enough‑‑‑Employer was in the wrong to terminate services of employee who was ordered to be reinstated, in circumstances.
Judgment & Decree
DECISION This appeal calls in question the order of the Labour Court, Hyderabad dismissing the . application filed by the appellant for his reinstatement in service.
2. The circumstances in which this appeal has arisen, briefly put, are as follows.
3. It was alleged that the petitioner was working as a Refractory Mason in the respondent factory. His services came to be terminated on 13‑12‑1990 on the ground that the post of the Refractory Mason had been abolished. He was invited to collect his dues, if any, and a month's salary in lieu of notice. The petitioner sent a grievance notice but with no result, culminating in the filing of the petition. All the allegations came to be denied in the reply filed on behalf of the respondents.
4. The petitioner was his own witness and one Syed Baqar Imam, the Administrative Officer of the factory., appeared on behalf of the respondents.
5. The Labour Court coming to the conclusion that the respondent was justified in terminating the services of the petitioner, as the post had been abolished, dismissed the petition.
6. The petitioner in his evidence maintained that his services had been terminated because he had declined to appear as a witness on behalf of the management in a domestic enquiry against the General Secretary of the Union. The fact that the domestic enquiry was in progress against the General Secretary has not been denied by Syed Baqar Imam. The further allegation of the petitioner that even the job he was holding earlier had been filled up by another person however came to be denied. Before adverting to the same let us see as to what happens to be the rival version.
7. It had been consistently the stand of the respondents that once the factory had been completed and the kiln had been set up in 1985 the job of the refractory mason was over, and the appellant was being retained since 1985 on sheer humanitarian grounds.
8. The position, therefore, that emerges is, that on the showing of the respondents themselves from 1985 onwards the appellant had been working in some other capacity, though the nature of his duties has not been specified. That being the situation the question of the abolition of the post of the refractory mason could not arise in 1990, and therefore the very basis of the termination of the services of the appellant dissolves into the thin air. If he was working elsewhere was he the junior most. After all the provisions of Standing Orders Ordinance will still have to be reckoned with. .
9. At a later stage it came to be mooted out that the company was undergoing losses and therefore some measure of economy had to be adopted. No construction was even attempted to be placed on this averment at its proper place and time i.e. before the Labour Court. However Assessment Orders of the last three years, after the arguments had been completed here, was submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents. It is a belated effort and not tested by cross‑examination. However, these Assessment Orders show that the Company is in a good state of health and there is every sign of its further improvement. This is in. spite of the fact that all the relevant record had not been produced before the Income Tax Authorities and the veracity of the papers produced had been doubted.
10. A bland statement that the post of Refractory Mason had been abolished is not enough. It had ceased to exist, in 1985. The talk of economy is also make‑believe, signifying nothing. I am afraid, the contention of the appellant that he had been thrown out of pique may not be wrong. Be that as it may, the respondents were manifestly in the wrong to have terminated the services of the appellant. I will, therefore, vacate the order and allow the appeal. However the appellant will not be entitled to any back benefits, as at no stage commencing from the grievance notice till his evidence, he had mentioned that he was jobless. H.B.T./2175/Lb‑S Appeal allowed.