PLC 1990

1990 PLP 693 (PLC)

DIRECTOR, THAL JUTE MILLS LTD., MUZAFFARGHAR and others Versus BARJEES QADIR ALI KHAN

Jurisdiction / Court
Labour Appellate Tribunal Punjab
Decided Date
Appeal No. MN‑128 of 1989/Pb., decided on 28th June, 1989.
Honorable Judges
Sardar Muhammad Abdul Ghafoor Khan Lodhi, Appellate Tribunal
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1990 PLP 693 (PLC)
Forum / Court Labour Appellate Tribunal Punjab
Bench Members Sardar Muhammad Abdul Ghafoor Khan Lodhi, Appellate Tribunal
Parties DIRECTOR, THAL JUTE MILLS LTD., MUZAFFARGHAR and others Versus BARJEES QADIR ALI KHAN
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1990 PLP 693 (PLC)?

This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1990 PLP 693 (PLC)?

The case was heard and decided by the Labour Appellate Tribunal Punjab bench comprising: Sardar Muhammad Abdul Ghafoor Khan Lodhi, Appellate Tribunal.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1990 PLP 693 (PLC) (DIRECTOR, THAL JUTE MILLS LTD., MUZAFFARGHAR and others Versus BARJEES QADIR ALI KHAN). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Representation

  • Syed Iqbal Ahmad Gilani for Appellants.
  • M.R. Haider for Respondent.
  • Date of hearing: 27th June, 1989.

Headnotes / Summary

(a) Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑‑ ‑‑‑S. 25‑A‑‑‑West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968), S.O. 12(3)‑‑‑Termination of service‑‑‑Explicit reason for termination of service has to be given in the order‑‑‑Mere reason "service no longer required" cannot by any stretch of imagination, be taken to be explicit reason. (b) Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑‑ ‑‑‑S. 25‑A‑‑‑West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968), S.O. 12‑‑‑Removal from service‑‑‑Some amount paid to workman as ex gratia, held, would not estop workman from. challenging order of his removal from service though receiving of benefits like gratuity and encashment of leave account which cannot be paid during subsistence of service, may estop workman from challenging order of his termination. (c) West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968)‑‑ ‑‑‑S. 2(i)‑‑‑Workman‑‑‑No evidence available to the effect that it was employee's duty to sanction or recommend leave or recommend annual increment or make report against other employees‑‑‑In absence of any such evidence of supervisory duties of employees it could not be said that employee was not a workman‑‑ Merely because employee used to check work done by a person, it could not be said that employee was doing supervisory duties. (d) Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑‑ ‑‑‑S. 38‑‑‑Employer did not raise objection before Trial Court that employee was not "workman'‑‑‑Question whether' employee was a "workman" being a question of fact could not be raised at appellate stage.

Judgment & Decree

This is an appeal directed against the decision dated 12‑1‑1989 recorded by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No. 9, Multan, whereby the grievance petition of the respondent was accepted directing his reinstatement in service without back benefits, if the respondent refunds the amount of ex gratia received by him at the time of termination of his services.

2. The ground given for the termination of service is `no longer required'. Since Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 applies to the appellant, as envisaged by Standing Order 12(3), explicit reason for termination of service was to be given and the reason `no longer required' cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be taken to be an explicit reason. The explicit reason is that which does not require any other reason. Still question arises why the services of the respondent were no longer required. Thus this is no reason for termination and, therefore, the order of termination was violative of Standing Order 12(3).

3. Learned Counsel for the appellants has argued that the respondent was estopped from challenging the order of his termination since he had in full and final settlement of his dues received his wages, Rs.15,000 were paid to the respondent as ex gratia vide Exh. R‑

1. It is not mentioned in the said document that the respondent had received the amount in full and final settlement of the dispute. Apart from it, some amount paid as ex gratia does not estop a worker from challenging the order of his removal from service. The benefits which cannot be paid during the subsistence of service, such as notice pay, gratuity, encashment of leave account may estop the workman from receiving them from challenging the order of his termination. No such amount was received by the respondent, therefore, he was entitled to bring grievance petition for his reinstatement.

4. The other point argued before me is that the respondent is not covered by the definition of workman, inasmuch as his duties were supervisory and wages were more than Rs.800 per month and that he was not performing any manual work. There is no evidence of supervisory duties. The respondent did not admit that some persons were working under him and were under his supervision or control. Merely checking of the work done by a person does not amount to supervising him. If it is held so, then the auditors would become supervisors of all the departments which maintain account. There is no evidence that the respondent used to sanction leave or recommend leave or annual increment, or make report against any employee. So far as the definition of workman given in Standing Order 2(i) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 is concerned, there is no objection in the written statement that the respondent is not covered by the definition given therein. Since there was no such objection, therefore, the respondent did not lead any evidence. At the appellate stage such a question which involved a question of fact also cannot be raised. The learned lower Court thus rightly directed the reinstatement of the respondent in service.

5. As a result of the observations made above, the appeal fails and is dismissed. H.B.T./691/Lb. P Appeal dismissed.