SCMR 1972

1972 PLP 409 (SCMR)

MESSRS MOHAMMAD AKBAR MOHAMMAD AFZAL — ‑Petitioner Versus INCOME‑TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL‑Respondent

Jurisdiction / Court
High Court
Decided Date
Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 221 of 1972, decided on 2nd November 1972.
Honorable Judges
N/A
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1972 PLP 409 (SCMR)
Forum / Court High Court
Bench Members N/A
Parties MESSRS MOHAMMAD AKBAR MOHAMMAD AFZAL — ‑Petitioner Versus INCOME‑TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL‑Respondent
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1972 PLP 409 (SCMR)?

This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1972 PLP 409 (SCMR)?

The case was heard and decided by the High Court bench comprising: N/A.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1972 PLP 409 (SCMR) (MESSRS MOHAMMAD AKBAR MOHAMMAD AFZAL — ‑Petitioner Versus INCOME‑TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL‑Respondent). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Representation

  • S. M. Zamir Zaidi, Advocate instructed by S. Wajid Hussain, Advocate‑on‑Record for Petitioner.
  • Nemo for Respondent.
  • Date of hearing ; 2nd November 1972.

Headnotes / Summary

(On appeal from the order of the Lahore High Court, Lahore, dated 2nd December 1971, passed in P. C. R.No. 177 of 1971). Incometax Act (XI of 1922), S. 66(2)‑Question whether sum in question represented income of assessee firm‑A question of factHigh Court, held, rightly declined to interfere with decision of Incometax authorities on point.

Judgment & Decree

ANWARUL HAQ, J.‑The petitioner‑firm functioning under the name and style of M/s. Mohammad Akbar Mohammad Afzal and dealing in fruit is aggrieved by the refusal of the Lahore High Court to require a reference under section 66(2) of the‑ Incometax Act, 1922, for the assessment year 1959‑

60. The relevant facts are that in the return submitted by the firm for the year in question a sum of Rs. 30,000 was shown as credit balance in the name of Mohammad Younis Kelawala, on account of the sale proceeds of goods sent by the said Mohammad Younis on behalf of his father to this Company. In elaboration of this statement it is stated by the learned counsel for the peti tioner that Wilayat Ali, the , father of Muhammad Younis Kelawala, used to send bananas from Dacca to Lahore, and his son, Younis, used to export them to India, and that in this connection Wilayat Ali was even convicted for a violation of the Foreign Exchange Regulations. The question before the Income tax Officer was whether Mohammad Younis Kelawala was acting on behalf of the petitioner‑firm and, therefore, the sum of Rs. 30,000 standing to his credit in the accounts of the Company in fact represented the income of the Company itself, or whether the said Mohammad Younis was acting on behalf of his father, Wilayat Ali, and therefore, this amount of money was nothing more than the sale proceeds of goods sent to the firm and sold by it on his behalf. The Incometax Officer, after considering the material placed, before him, came to the conclusion that Mohammad Younis Kelawala was not acting on behalf of his father Wilayat Ali and that the sum in question in‑fact represented the income of the assesses‑firm. Aggrieved by this decision of the Incometax Officer, the petitioner took the matter in appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and then to the Appellate Tribunal, but the plea was rejected. The High Court has taken the view that the question raised before it was patently a question of fact and therefore it could not interfere. It is contended in support of the petition that there has been a material irregularity on the part of the Income‑ax authorities inasmuch as they have failed to 'take account of the fact that Wilayat Ali, the father ‑of Mohammad Younis Kelawala, was carrying on business of smuggling fruit to India as is evidenced by his conviction under the Foreign Exchange Regulations. It appears to the learned counsel that this conviction of Wilayat All was sufficient, more or less by itself, to substantiate‑the plea taken by the petitioner‑firm that Mohammad Younis Kelawala had been acting in this matter on behalf of his father Wilayat Ali, and not on behalf of the petitioner‑firm. The contention has only to be stated to be repelled. No elaborate reasoning is needed to see that the question involved in this case is obviously a question of fact and, as such, not amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court, under section 66(,2) of the incometax Act. The petitioner's application was rightly rejected by the High Court. The present petition also fails and is hereby dismissed. ‑‑ Petition dismissed.