1990 PLP 233 (PTD)

S.S. SODHI, J‑‑The m matter here concerns the refusal by the Income‑tax Officer to grant registration to the assessee‑firm as sought by it. The Income‑tax Officer refused registration to the assessee‑firm for the assessment year 1972‑73 holding that it had failed to comply with the terms of the notice issued to it under section 142(1) of the Income‑tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). This order was upheld in appeal by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The contention raised before the Tribunal thereafter was that the assessee had lost its books of account in transit and a first information report with regard to it had also been lodged with the police and later when the Income‑tax Officer asked for the subsidiary books, the assessee, by his affidavit of December 6, 1974, stated that those books too had been lost in transit alongwith the main books. The argument, therefore, being that as the assessee had not complied with the provisions of this notice due to reasonable; cause, there was no justification for refusing registration to the firm. This was opposed on behalf of the Revenue on the plea that it had not been established that the assessee had been prevented by any reasonable and sufficient cause from complying with the provisions of section 142(1.) of the Act and that the Income tax Officer had, therefore, rightly exercised his discretion and powers in refusing registration to the assessee. The Tribunal upheld this view. It is in this factual background that the following question came to be referred to this Court for its opinion. "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal erred in holding that the Income‑tax Officer rightly used his discretion to refuse registration to the assessee‑firm for non‑production of the books of account leading to an ex parte assessment ?" In the context in which the question posed has been referred to this Court, it can, by no means, be construed as a question of law. The matter here concerns the exercise of discretion by the Income‑tax Officer, to grant or withhold registration to the assessee‑firm by taking into account relevant facts. The exercise of such discretion clearly raises no question of law in the present case. Faced with this situation, counsel for the assessee sought to contend that the matters raised under section 142(1) of the Act are separate and distinct from those under section 144 thereof and, therefore, the Income‑tax Officer was required to deal with both these matters separately. This again is a contention wholly devoid of merit as the record would show that the Income‑tax Officer has indeed dealt with these matters separately, though both the matters were decided on the same day. There is no error in this as held in C.I.T. v. Jekisondas Bhukandas (1967) 66 ITR 515 (Guj), and both the powers can be exercised simultaneously by the Income‑tax Officer. The reference is accordingly answered in the negative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Z.S./711/T Reference answered in negative.