1980 PLP 431 (CLC)

MUHAMMAD HASSAN SINDHER. J.-This is a second appeal by Muhammad Hussain tenant under subsection (4) of section 15, the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance VI of 1959, to challenge judgment of learned appellate authority (Additional District Judge Gujranwala) dismissing as barred by time the first appeal by the present appellant.

2. The solitary question calling for decision in this appeal is what is the "time requisite" under section 12, Limitation Act. which should be excluded in computing the period of limitation of 30 days for filing the appeal before learned District Judge.The respondent (landlady) applied before learned Rent Controller, Gujranwala for order of eviction against the appellant. The application was accepted on 6th April, 1977. Applica tion for supply of copy was made by the appellant on 9th of May, 1977. Copy was prepared on 27th June, 1977 and delivery was obtained through a counsel or his clerk on 8th of August, 1977. The appeal was filed on 1st September, 1977 when the Courts re-opened after annual summer vacation of one month. Limitation for filing the appeal before learned District Judge expired on 25th July, 1977 if the period only intervening the date of application for copy and the date of preparation of copy were excluded, as "time requisite" under section 12 referred to above. Objection raised by the respondent that the appeal was out of time was evalued by learned Additional District Judge implying that the "time requisite" could not be extended to the date when delivery of copy was obtained by the appellant. Consequently. the appeal was dismissed as patently barred by time.

3. It was argued on behalf of the appellant that the entire period intervening the date of application for copy and the date of delivery should be excluded under section 12, Limitation Act, in computing limitation for the appellant was not given a specific date for delivery of copy. The contention fails for a variety' of reasons. The finding as to the "time requisite" for obtaining copies which should be excluded under section 12, A is a finding of fact, which could riot be displaced in second appeal.) Reference be made to the judgments in Barn Singh and others v. Thakar Singh and others (A I R 1922 Lah. 423) and Ram Saronp v. Zo!irairarmal and others (A I R 1923 Lah. 696). The "time requisite" is the period from toe day when the application for copy is made and the day on which copy was prepared and this period could not be extended to the date of delivery unless it *was found to have been occasioned by reasons of carelessness of the office in giving wrong informa tion to the applicant as to the date. etc. on which copy would be ready or in giving no information at all. There is nothing to show that the appellant had made any effort to collect the copy before 8th August, 1977. "Time requisite'' does not mean the time actually required but the time properly required for obtaining copies. The period which need not have elapsed if the applicant had taken reasonable and proper steps to obtain the copy could not. therefore, he regarded as "requisite" under section 12, Limitation Act. Reference be advantageously made to the judgment in Din Mohammad v. Ahdid Maieed (P L D 1967 Lah. 653) if at all any authority were needed in support of the above view. It was held by my lord the Chief Justice that period beyond the date of Pnaration of a copy could not be taken into account under section 12. if no reasons were shown for obtaining copy when it was ready in the office. There is also nothing to show much less establish the further contention of the appellant that he was given a wrong date for obtaining delivery of copy or that the copy was prepared on 8th August, 1977 the day when delivered to the appellant and the date of preparation was stated falsely as 27th .tune, 1977. The appellant was allowed four months' time by the learned Controller to hand over vacant possession of the house which expired on 6th September, 1977. It appears that the appellant felt complacent and did not bother himself to obtain copy from the office as he could not be thrown out in execution of order of learned Controller until expiry of first week of September, 1977.

4. In the result, I bold that the decision of learned appellate authority on the question of "time requisite" could not be challenged in second appeal and on merits also, the contention of the appellant that "time requisite" in this case would mean the period commencing from date of application for copy till the date for delivery of copy, was not sustainable on facts nor in law. The appeal was rightly rejected by learned appellate authority on the score of limitation. K. M. A. Appeal dismissed.