PLD 1996

P L D 1996 Karachi 506 (PLP)

and Works Department, Government of Sindh‑‑‑Appellant Versus Messrs UNITED CONTRACTORS LTD. ‑‑‑Respondent

Jurisdiction / Court
Decided Date
High Court Appeal No. 141 of 1995, decided on 2nd April, 1996.
Honorable Judges
Wajihuddin Ahmed and Abdul Majid Khanzada, JJ
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation P L D 1996 Karachi 506 (PLP)
Forum / Court
Bench Members Wajihuddin Ahmed and Abdul Majid Khanzada, JJ
Parties and Works Department, Government of Sindh‑‑‑Appellant Versus Messrs UNITED CONTRACTORS LTD. ‑‑‑Respondent
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in P L D 1996 Karachi 506 (PLP)?

This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case P L D 1996 Karachi 506 (PLP)?

The case was heard and decided by the bench comprising: Wajihuddin Ahmed and Abdul Majid Khanzada, JJ.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: P L D 1996 Karachi 506 (PLP) (and Works Department, Government of Sindh‑‑‑Appellant Versus Messrs UNITED CONTRACTORS LTD. ‑‑‑Respondent). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Representation

  • K.M. Nadeem, Lddl. A.‑G. Sindh for Appellant.
  • Date of hearing: 2th April 1996

Headnotes / Summary

Contract Act (IX of 1872)‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑ S. 2(h) ‑‑‑ Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972), S.3 ‑‑‑ Intra‑Court Appeal‑‑ Contractual rates ‑‑‑ Repair and renovation contracts for repair of roads had been successfully completed ‑‑‑ Authorities slashing agreed rates and unilaterally prepared curtailed final bill ‑‑‑ Contractor challenging such reduction in Court‑‑ Plaintiff's (Contractor's) suit was decreed by High Court ‑‑‑ Validity ‑‑‑ High Court apart from other eKidence examined report of Superintending Engineer wherein it was conceded that there could not be any subsequent change in rates for any reason and that plaintiff had objected to such reduction which in opinion of Superintending Engineer was valid ‑‑‑ Authorities had examined only one witness who besides being not personally conversant with facts, did not even know about report of Superintending Engineer ‑‑‑ Evidence from plaintiff side having remained unrebutted, High Court had correctly decreed suit ‑‑‑ As for award of 10 per cent. interest on the amount decreed was concerned, authorities objection to same was unfounded in view of the fact that contract in question had been successfully completed in 1971, while payment in relations thereto remained due before Court up to 26‑2‑1995, when judgment was rendered and interest in question, was awarded ‑‑‑ High Court, in Intra‑Court Appeal took judicial notice that over the years the average rate of inflation in economy had been more than 10 per cent, annually which was the rate at which purported interest had been allowed ‑‑‑ Judgment and decree being just and proper, appeal against the same was not warranted in circumstances. Qazi Faiz Isa Respondent

Judgment & Decree

WAJIHUDDIN AHMED, J.‑‑The dispute involved in this. appeal pertains to two contracts, executed by the respondent/plaintiff on 15‑3‑1971 and 29‑4‑1971. Such were repair and renovation contracts pertaining the roads and both were successfully completed on 10‑12‑1971 and 16‑12‑1971. The dispute, which Was brought before the Court in 1975 through Suit No.23 of 1975 ' pertained to the 7th and 8th running bills which were slashed, the agreed rates staying unilaterally curtailed in the final bill. Relevant to the running bills it was admitted, according to the judgment of the learned Single Judge, that the plaintiff/respondent raised protest, but such was deferred and later on rejected. The learned Additional Advocate‑General Sindh, however, says‑that such protest pertained to only one running bill and not to both, Be that as it may, though the learned Additional Advocate‑General, Sindh, in support merely relies on an assertion in para. 13, of the plaint in such context, which does not imply what is contended, the fact remains that the learned Single Judge also examined the report of the Superintending Engineer B&R, G.M. Guddu Barriage, Hyderabad, dated 15‑1‑1972 (Exh.5‑A/46), where it was conceded that there cannot be any subsequent change in the rates for any reason and that the plaintiff‑firm had objected. to such reduction which, in the opinion of the Superintending Engineer, was valid. This curtailment of rates being the basis of the reduction in the two running bills, it is obvious that such reduction was not conceded by the plaintiff/respondent, let alone accepted. It is also noteworthy that the appellant /defendant examined only one witness and such witness besides being not personally conversant with the facts, did not even know about the above report of the Superintending Engineer. The evidence from the side of the plaintiff/respondent having remained unrebutted, the. learned Single Judge was right in decreeing the suit, allowing the reduced figure in the 7th and 8th running bills and adding the balance figure in the final bill, bringing forth the total of Rs.392,419.71. Besides the above the only other question raised by the learned Additional Advocate‑General, Sindh, is that. the learned Single Judge was in error in allowing interest at 10% per annum on the decretal amount for the period the claim had remained due minus the grace period, conceded by the learned Single Judge. It is relevant to observe that these were two contracts, which were successfully completed way back in late 1971, payment in relation to which had remained due before the learned Single Judge up to 26‑2‑1995, when the judgment was rendered and all that the learned Single Judge did, was to allow interest at 10% per annum, which too regrettably is not acceptable to the appellant/defendant. We are of the view that hardly any interest has been allowed by the learned Single Judge for we take judicial notice of the fact that over the years the average rate of inflation in the economy has been more than 10% annually which is the rate at which the purported interest has been allowed and such grant, therefore, does not, in effect, qualify as interest at all. The depreciation in the value of money, something the learned Single Judge was almost regretful not to have allowed by way of an equaliser and which, modestly, he termed 15 times over the period, in real terms, could have been more than 50 times, if only the value of gold was reckoned, which could not have been an irrelevant factor since, for a long time, the world economies had been ruled by the gold standard. As it is, only 10% per annum purported interest was decreed and such as discussed appears to unexceptionable, hardly qualifying as interest. In the above circumstances, there has been no merit in this appeal and we dismiss it with costs. The miscellaneous applications also, which are listed today, stand disposed of having served their respective purposes. A.A./P‑20/K Appeal dismissed.