2004 PLP 791 (MLD)
TAUHEED JAN‑‑‑Appellant Versus UMAR BAKHTIAR, ADVOCATE, PESHAWAR‑‑‑Respondent
| Citation | 2004 PLP 791 (MLD) |
| Forum / Court | N.‑W.F.P. Bar Council Tribunal |
| Bench Members | Justice Muhammad Qaim Jan Khan, Chairman, Muhammad Alam Khan and Saeed Akhtar, Members |
| Parties | TAUHEED JAN‑‑‑Appellant Versus UMAR BAKHTIAR, ADVOCATE, PESHAWAR‑‑‑Respondent |
| Primary Law | Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act (XXXV of 1973)‑‑‑ |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 2004 PLP 791 (MLD)?
This judgment primarily cites: Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act (XXXV of 1973)‑‑‑ as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 2004 PLP 791 (MLD)?
The case was heard and decided by the N.‑W.F.P. Bar Council Tribunal bench comprising: Justice Muhammad Qaim Jan Khan, Chairman, Muhammad Alam Khan and Saeed Akhtar, Members.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 2004 PLP 791 (MLD) (TAUHEED JAN‑‑‑Appellant Versus UMAR BAKHTIAR, ADVOCATE, PESHAWAR‑‑‑Respondent). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- Syed Yunas Jan for Appellant.
- Muhammad Iqbal Swati for Respondent.
Headnotes / Summary
‑‑‑‑S.41‑‑‑Jurisdiction of Bar Council‑‑‑Scope‑‑‑Jurisdiction of North‑West Frontier Province Bar Council under S.41 of Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, 1973 and the Rules framed thereunder, were not only limited to the professional misconduct, but also other conduct of an Advocate which was amenable to jurisdiction of the Bar Council‑‑‑Not only the conduct relating to the profession, but if the same was remotely connected to legal profession of an Advocate, that would also come within the purview of S.4I of Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, 1973‑‑‑Summary dismissal of complaint was also not tenable because serious allegations contained in the complaint, in the present case, were denied by Advocate which could only be thrashed out by leading pro and contra evidence‑‑‑Order dismissing complaint summarily by Members of Disciplinary Committee, was set aside and case was remanded to be decided afresh on merits after affording parties opportunity of leading evidence and chance of hearing. AIR 1934 Lah. 251(G) and Ali Rehman v. Sohail Hassan Qaiser Advocate 2000 MLD 1518. ref. Tariq Javed, Deputy Advocate‑General.
Judgment & Decree
Muhammad Iqbal Swati for Respondent. Tariq Javed, Deputy Advocate‑General. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD QAIM JAN KHAN (CHAIRMAN).‑‑‑Tauheed Jan Appellant/Complainant filed a complaint in the N.‑W.F.P. Bar Council against Umar Bakhtiar respondent praying therein that the father of the respondent and the appellant had a land dispute for distribution/possession of land and the respondent being an Advocate has taken the law into his hands and is always using abusive language, threatening the complainant and his minor son for dine consequences. Besides also he has so many times attempted rind threatened the appellant/complainant with fire‑arms.
2. The N.‑W.F.P. Bar Council initiated proceedings against the respondent and the respondent submitted his written statement and took a preliminary objection regarding the non‑existence of plenary jurisdiction of the Disciplinary Committee of the N.‑W.F.P. Bar Council. The learned Members of the Disciplinary Committee after hearing the arguments and considering the data available on the record vide order, dated 19‑10‑2002 dismissed the complaint of the appellant and hence the present appeal.
3. We have heard Mr. Yunas Jan counsel for the appellant and Mr. Muhammad Iqbal Swati Advocate for the respondent as well as Mr. Akhtar Naveed Deputy Advocate‑General.
4. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the summary dismissal of the complaint by the learned Members of the Disciplinary Committee was not warranted under the law and the learned Members of the Disciplinary Committee ought to have afforded opportunity to the appellant to substantiate the allegations by producing evidence. On the other hand the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that as the issue was with respect to the existence or non‑existence of the jurisdiction of the Disciplinary Committee of N.‑W.F.P. Bar Council and also the question that whether jural relation of counsel and client was existing between the parties were legal points, which do not require the recording of evidence. Learned Deputy Advocate‑General also whemently contended that the sum dismissal of the complaint was uncalled for.
5. We have given our due consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case and also to the legal points involved in the case. A bare perusal of the complaint would show that serious allegations of misconduct have; been leveled against the respondent in the complaint filed by the appellant, if proved, would definitely constitute a case of misconduct.
6. The jurisdiction of N.‑W.F.P. Bar Council under section 41 of the Legal Practitioner and Bar Council Act and the Rules framed thereunder is not only limited to the Professional misconduct but also other conduct of an Advocate which is amenable to the jurisdiction of the N.‑W.F.P. Bar Council. It is not only the conduct relating to the profession but if the same is remotely connected the legal profession of an Advocate the same will come within the purview of section 41 of the Legal Practitioner anal Bar Council Act, 1973. Reliance in this respect is placed on in the matter of Barrister Advocate reported in AIR 1934 Lahore page 251(G). This view is further argumented in the case titled Ali Rehman v. Sohail Hassan Qaiser Advocate reported in 2000 MLD 1518.
7. The summary dismissal of the complaint is also not tenable because serious allegations contained in the complaint were denied by the respondent which could only be thrashed out by leading pro and contra evidence.
8. In view of the facts and circumstances narrated above we accept this appeal, set aside the impugned order of the Members of the Disciplinary‑Committee and remand the case back to them with direction to decide the same on merits after affording the parties an opportunity of leading evidence and chance of hearing. H.B.T./1002/P Case remanded.