2007 PLP 1266 (YLR)
Mst. NAZIA and another — Petitioners Versus THE STATE and 6 others — Respondents
| Citation | 2007 PLP 1266 (YLR) |
| Forum / Court | Lahore |
| Bench Members | Tariq Shamim, J |
| Parties | Mst. NAZIA and another — Petitioners Versus THE STATE and 6 others — Respondents |
| Primary Law | Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance (VII of 1979) |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 2007 PLP 1266 (YLR)?
This judgment primarily cites: Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance (VII of 1979) as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 2007 PLP 1266 (YLR)?
The case was heard and decided by the Lahore bench comprising: Tariq Shamim, J.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 2007 PLP 1266 (YLR) (Mst. NAZIA and another — Petitioners Versus THE STATE and 6 others — Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- Muhammad Rashid Ahmad for Petitioners.
- Justin Gill for Respondents Nos.2 and 3.
- 2. The learned Additional Advocate General submitted that the petitioners could not seek quashment of proceedings in a petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution and that challan in the case had been submitted after due investigation in which the petitioners were found to be fully involved in the case-and the trial was in progress, hence, the petition was liable to be dismissed.
- 4. A perusal of the F.I.R. reveals that prima facie offences under section 11 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 and section 380, P.P.C. are made out against the petitioners. The allegations levelled in the F.I.R. do not appear to be without any basis. Further, the challan in the case has been submitted in the trial Court where the trial is in progress. Thus, to the extent of quashment of F.I.R. the prayer made in the petition has lost its relevance as the petitioners can now avail other alternate remedies available to them under the law. The objection raised by the learned Additional Advocate General carries weight, inasmuch as, in writ petition proceedings pending before the learned trial Court cannot be quashed.
Headnotes / Summary
S.11
Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S.380
Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199
Constitutional petition
Quashing of F.I.R.
F.I.R. had revealed that prima facie offences under S.11 of Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 and S.380, P.P.C. were made out against petitioner/accused
Allegations levelled in F.I.R. did not appear to be without any basis
Challan in the case had . been submitted in the Trial Court concerned
Prayer made by petitioner for quashing of F.I.R., in circumstances had lost its relevance
Petitioner could avail other alternate remedies available to them under the law
Even otherwise, allegations levelled in impugned F.I.R. and denial of the same by petitioners, necessarily required holding of an inquiry into disputed questions of fact
Such exercise could not be undertaken by High Court in proceedings under Art.199 of the Constitution
Petition was dismissed. Col. Shah Sadiq v. Muhammad Ashiq and others 2006 SCMR 276 ref. Muhammad Arif Bhinder Addl. A.-G. for the State with Muhammad Jamil, A.S.-I.
Judgment & Decree
TARIQ SHAMIM, J.
Through this petition, the petitioners seek quashment of case F.I.R. No.249 dated 24-6-2006 for offences under section 11 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 and section 380, P.P.C. registered at Police Station Chhanga Manga, District Kasur, inter alia on the ground that petitioner No.2 has contracted marriage with respondent No.2 on 17-6-2006, hence no offence in terms of section 11 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, and section 380, P.P.C. was made out against the petitioners; that Nikah Khawan Maulvi Muhammad Junaid had sworn affidavit to the effect that he had performed Nikah ceremony of petitioner No.2 with respondent No.2 on the aforesaid date; that a similar affidavit was sworn by respondent No.2 stating that she had embraced Islam and had married petitioner No.2 with her own free consent being sui juris and that the said respondent had appeared before the Illaqa Magistrate as well and had got her statement recorded accepting the factum of her marriage and refuting the allegations of her abduction or her forced conversion to Islam.
2. The learned Additional Advocate General submitted that the petitioners could not seek quashment of proceedings in a petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution and that challan in the case had been submitted after due investigation in which the petitioners were found to be fully involved in the case-and the trial was in progress, hence, the petition was liable to be dismissed.
3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
4. A perusal of the F.I.R. reveals that prima facie offences under section 11 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 and section 380, P.P.C. are made out against the petitioners. The allegations levelled in the F.I.R. do not appear to be without any basis. Further, the challan in the case has been submitted in the trial Court where the trial is in progress. Thus, to the extent of quashment of F.I.R. the prayer made in the petition has lost its relevance as the petitioners can now avail other alternate remedies available to them under the law. The objection raised by the learned Additional Advocate General carries weight, inasmuch as, in writ petition proceedings pending before the learned trial Court cannot be quashed.
5. Even otherwise, the allegations levelled in the impugned F.I.R. and denial of the same by the petitioners necessarily required holding of an inquiry into disputed questions of fact. Such exercise cannot be undertaken by this Court in proceedings under Article 199 of the Constitution. Further, the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Col. Shah Sadiq v. Muhammad Ashiq and others (2006 SCMR 276) has held that quashment of F.I.R. would amount to short-circuiting the normal procedure of law as provided under Cr.P.C. and Police Rules and that the accused have more than one alternate remedies available under the Cr.P.C.
6. No occasion has, thus, been found for interference in the matter by this Court. The petition is, therefore, dismissed. H.B.T./N-3/L Petition dismissed.