PLC 1994

1994 PLP 628 (PLC)

GHEE CORPORATION Versus CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF TRUSTEE and others

Jurisdiction / Court
Lahore High Court
Decided Date
Writ Petition No. 2306 of 1992, decided on 20th March, 1994.
Honorable Judges
Ihsan‑ul‑Haq Chaudhry, J
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1994 PLP 628 (PLC)
Forum / Court Lahore High Court
Bench Members Ihsan‑ul‑Haq Chaudhry, J
Parties GHEE CORPORATION Versus CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF TRUSTEE and others
Primary Law Employees' Old‑Age Benefits Act (XIV of 1976)‑‑‑
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1994 PLP 628 (PLC)?

This judgment primarily cites: Employees' Old‑Age Benefits Act (XIV of 1976)‑‑‑ as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1994 PLP 628 (PLC)?

The case was heard and decided by the Lahore High Court bench comprising: Ihsan‑ul‑Haq Chaudhry, J.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1994 PLP 628 (PLC) (GHEE CORPORATION Versus CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF TRUSTEE and others). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Laws Cited

Employees' Old‑Age Benefits Act (XIV of 1976)‑‑‑

Representation

  • Dr. Syed Shaukat Hussain for Petitioner.
  • MA. Yayee for Respondents.
  • Dates of hearing: 19th and 20th March, 1994

Headnotes / Summary

‑‑‑‑Ss. 9 & 46‑‑‑Payment of contribution ‑‑‑Exemption‑‑‑Ghee Corporation which was registered under Employees' Old‑Age Benefits Act, 1976 had claimed that it being a statutory Body; was not liable to pay contribution‑‑ Corporation was a private limited company and could not be held as statutory body in view of the fact that it was not a creation of statute, but was registered as a private company‑‑‑All units of Corporation, even otherwise had already been registered with Institution and contribution was being paid by it without any objection‑‑‑Corporation while moving Government for exemption had accepted its liability to be registered under the Act, and thus could not be allowed to wriggle out of its admission. Javid Iqbal v. Federal Investigation Agency PLD 1986 Lah. 424; Amrutlal Chunilal v. Dattatrays Pandurang AIR 1981 SC 487; Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. and another v. Brojo Nath Ganguly and another AIR 1986 SC 1571 and The Gujarat State Financial Corporation v: M/s. Lotus Hotels (Private) Ltd. AIR 1983 SC 848 ref.

Judgment & Decree

MA. Yayee for Respondents. Dates of hearing: 19th and 20th March, 1994 The petitioner through this Constitutional petition has prayed that the notice dated 25‑3‑1989, the impugned orders dated 29‑4‑1989, 24‑4‑1990 and 19‑10‑1991 passed by the respondents .may be declared null and void.

2. The relevant facts are that the petitioner was registered under the Employees' Old‑Age Benefits Act of 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1976) and. it was directed of pay the contribution but the petitioner notified that it is not liable to pay because it is a statutory body. Thereafter, it agitated the matter before the respondents Nos. 1 to 3 but without success. Now the same question has been raised in the present petition, which was admitted to hearing and notices were issued to the respondents, who have entered appearance and contested the petition.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner in support of the petition argued that the Ghee Industry in the country was nationalised through The Hydrogenated Vegetable Oil Industry (Control and Development) Act (LXV of 1973) (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1973) and all the assets of the Ghee Mills vested in the Federal Government. Thereafter, the petitioner was registered as a private limited Company to run Ghee Industry in the country. It is argued although it was registered as Private Company yet it is a statutory body for all intents and purposes a 100 per cent. shares vested in the Federal Government. It has own service rules which fully cater for the needs of the persons employed by it. The learned counsel also referred to section 5 of the Act LXV of 1973. The learned counsel in this behalf has referred to the judgments reported as Javid Iqbal v. Federal Investigation Agency PLD 1986 Lah. 424; Amrutlal Chunilal v. Dattatrays Pandurang (AIR 1981 SC 487); Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. and another v. Brojo Nath Ganguly and another AIR 1986 SC 1571 and The Gujarat State Financial Corporation v. M/s. Lotus Hotels (Private) Ltd. AIR 1983 SC 848.

4. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents argued that the petitioner is a private limited company, therefore, fully covered by the Employees' Old‑Age Benefits Act, 1976. It is added that the other State‑run companies like PTV and State Cement Corporation of Pakistan are registered with the respondent Institution and paying contribution. It is further added that in any case the petitioner could have applied for exemption under section 46 of the Act of 1976. The arguments are concluded with the submission that the petitioner is taking contradictory position as to its status.

5. The learned counsel for the petitioner while summing up the arguments submitted that the petitioner has already moved for exemption under section 46 of the Act of 1976 as back as August, 1982 but the Federal Government has taken no decision.

6. I have given my anxious consideration to the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the precedent cases as well as the provisions of law. The judgments relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner are not relevant to the controversy. It is not possible to hold that the petitioner is a statutory body in face of the fact that it was not creation of statute but was registered as a private company. This is an admitted fact between the parties that all the units of the petitioner had already been registered with the institution and contribution is being paid without any objection. The petitioner while moving the Federal Government for exemption accepted its liability to be registered under the Act of 1976, therefore, cannot be allowed to wriggle out of its admission.

7. The upshot of the above discussion is that there is no merit in this petition. The same is dismissed with no order as to costs. H.B.T/G‑226/L Petition dismissed.