PLC(CS) 1981

1981 PLP 691 (PLC(CS))

SHAHID RABBANI Versus MESSRS HOECHST PAKISTAN LTD., KARACHI

Jurisdiction / Court
Labour Appellate Tribunal Sind
Decided Date
N/A
Honorable Judges
N/A
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1981 PLP 691 (PLC(CS))
Forum / Court Labour Appellate Tribunal Sind
Bench Members N/A
Parties SHAHID RABBANI Versus MESSRS HOECHST PAKISTAN LTD., KARACHI
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1981 PLP 691 (PLC(CS))?

This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1981 PLP 691 (PLC(CS))?

The case was heard and decided by the Labour Appellate Tribunal Sind bench comprising: N/A.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1981 PLP 691 (PLC(CS)) (SHAHID RABBANI Versus MESSRS HOECHST PAKISTAN LTD., KARACHI). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Representation

  • The services of the appellant, who was appointed on probation as Assistant Store Keeper in the respondent establishment, vide their letter, dated 8th March, 1979, and whose period of probation is said to have been extended on two occasions, were terminated with effect from 16th August, 1979, vide letter of even date issued by the respondent establishment. The appellant challenged the order of his termination of services before the learned Fifth Labour Court which has dismissed his grievance petition on the ground' that the appellant was not confir med or permanent workman and hence his service could be validly terminated by the respondent establishment. I have heard Mr. Iqbal Anwar Advocate, the learned counsel for the appellant whose main con tention was that upon the completion of three months period of proba tion the appellant ceased to be a probationer and consequently the authorities to the cases of Glaxo Laboratories v. Industrial Tribunal (1961 P L C 362) and Muhammad Sidique Javed v. Government of West Pakistan (P L D 1974 S C 393) upon which the learned Labour Court has relied would not be applicable in the instant case. There is undoubtedly considerable force in the contention of the learned counsel. According to clause (c) of Standing Order 1, ."a 'probationer' is a workman who is provisionally employed to fill a permanent vacancy in a post and has not completed three months service therein ". It is thus clear that upon completion of three months' service a probationer will cease to fall within the above definition. It is important to notice that satisfactory completion of three months', ser vice is not essential requirement of the definition except where a proba tioner claims to have become a permanent workman. In the instant case, although the appellant had completed three months' service as a probationer, his work was not found satisfactory and accordingly he was given two chances to improve his work, first by, the letter, dated 17th June, 1979, and the second, by the letter, dated 17th July, 1979. In both these letters it was explicitly indicated that the appellants performance of work had not been found satisfactory and hence his probationary period was being extended. The extension of the probationary period after the completion of three months' service by the appellant may not have had the effect of the appellant continuing to serve as a proba tioner, in view of the definition of probationer contained in Standing order 1, but since the appellant had not satisfactorily completed his proba tionary period he cannot rightly claim to be a permanent workman, in view of the definition of permanent workman in Standing Order 1. It has been held by their Lordships of Supreme Court in the case of P. I. A. v. Sind Labour Court No. V (P L D 1980 S C 323) that a workman cannot become permanent workman solely on ground of having been in employ ment for more than nine months. There is still less force in the claim of a workman to have become permanent when he has not satisfactorily completed the period of probation though he may have been conti nued in employment thereafter. The question as to how a workman was to be considered, whose period of probation had been extended beyond the period of three months specified in Standing Order 1, was examin ed by a Division Bench of the Karachi High Court in the case of Deutache Dampschiefahrts Gesellachaft 'Hansa' v. Muhammad Aqail and others (P L D 1979 Kar. 409) where it was held as follows :‑‑
  • Mr. Nizam Ahmed, the learned counsel for petitioners, contended that though the petitioner had by letter dated 27th December, 1979 purported to extend the respondents period, this letter in fact amounted to fresh employment of the respondent No. 1 for which a fresh period of probation was prescribed. We are afraid we cannot read a letter which expressly does not terminate the services of respondent No. 1, but extends his probationary period, as a fresh letter of appointment. So that as it may the question that arises for our consideration is whether or not the respon dent became a permanent employee of the petitioner on the expiry of his first period of probation. Under Standing Order 1 the res pondent would have become a permanent workman only on satisfactory completion of the probationary period of three months and since he had not completed this period to the satisfaction of the employer he did not become permanent. Furthermore in the present case the respondent No. 1 had accepted the extension of his probationary period, by accepting the petitioner' s letter dated 17th December, 1971: When the petitioner did not confirm the respondent after the extended probationary period, it was not only acting in terms of the letter dated 17th December, 1971 but even in law it was not obliged to confirm him."

Judgment & Decree

Glaxo Laboratories v. Industrial Tribunal 1962 P L C 362 and Muhammad Sidique Javed v. Government of West Pakistan P L D 1974 S C 393 ref. P.I. A. v. Sind Labour Court No. V P L D 1980 S C 323 and Dtutache Dampschifahri Gesellschaft Hansa v. Muhammad Aquil and others P L D 1979 Kar. 409 rel. Iqbal Anwar for Appellant. Date of hearing: 9th December, 1980. The services of the appellant, who was appointed on probation as Assistant Store Keeper in the respondent establishment, vide their letter, dated 8th March, 1979, and whose period of probation is said to have been extended on two occasions, were terminated with effect from 16th August, 1979, vide letter of even date issued by the respondent establishment. The appellant challenged the order of his termination of services before the learned Fifth Labour Court which has dismissed his grievance petition on the ground' that the appellant was not confir med or permanent workman and hence his service could be validly terminated by the respondent establishment. I have heard Mr. Iqbal Anwar Advocate, the learned counsel for the appellant whose main con tention was that upon the completion of three months period of proba tion the appellant ceased to be a probationer and consequently the authorities to the cases of Glaxo Laboratories v. Industrial Tribunal (1961 P L C 362) and Muhammad Sidique Javed v. Government of West Pakistan (P L D 1974 S C 393) upon which the learned Labour Court has relied would not be applicable in the instant case. There is undoubtedly considerable force in the contention of the learned counsel. According to clause (c) of Standing Order 1, ."a 'probationer' is a workman who is provisionally employed to fill a permanent vacancy in a post and has not completed three months service therein ". It is thus clear that upon completion of three months' service a probationer will cease to fall within the above definition. It is important to notice that satisfactory completion of three months', ser vice is not essential requirement of the definition except where a proba tioner claims to have become a permanent workman. In the instant case, although the appellant had completed three months' service as a probationer, his work was not found satisfactory and accordingly he was given two chances to improve his work, first by, the letter, dated 17th June, 1979, and the second, by the letter, dated 17th July, 1979. In both these letters it was explicitly indicated that the appellants performance of work had not been found satisfactory and hence his probationary period was being extended. The extension of the probationary period after the completion of three months' service by the appellant may not have had the effect of the appellant continuing to serve as a proba tioner, in view of the definition of probationer contained in Standing order 1, but since the appellant had not satisfactorily completed his proba tionary period he cannot rightly claim to be a permanent workman, in view of the definition of permanent workman in Standing Order

1. It has been held by their Lordships of Supreme Court in the case of P. I. A. v. Sind Labour Court No. V (P L D 1980 S C 323) that a workman cannot become permanent workman solely on ground of having been in employ ment for more than nine months. There is still less force in the claim of a workman to have become permanent when he has not satisfactorily completed the period of probation though he may have been conti nued in employment thereafter. The question as to how a workman was to be considered, whose period of probation had been extended beyond the period of three months specified in Standing Order 1, was examin ed by a Division Bench of the Karachi High Court in the case of Deutache Dampschiefahrts Gesellachaft 'Hansa' v. Muhammad Aqail and others (P L D 1979 Kar. 409) where it was held as follows :‑‑ Mr. Nizam Ahmed, the learned counsel for petitioners, contended that though the petitioner had by letter dated 27th December, 1979 purported to extend the respondents period, this letter in fact amounted to fresh employment of the respondent No. 1 for which a fresh period of probation was prescribed. We are afraid we cannot read a letter which expressly does not terminate the services of respondent No. 1, but extends his probationary period, as a fresh letter of appointment. So that as it may the question that arises for our consideration is whether or not the respon dent became a permanent employee of the petitioner on the expiry of his first period of probation. Under Standing Order 1 the res pondent would have become a permanent workman only on satisfactory completion of the probationary period of three months and since he had not completed this period to the satisfaction of the employer he did not become permanent. Furthermore in the present case the respondent No. 1 had accepted the extension of his probationary period, by accepting the petitioner' s letter dated 17th December, 1971: When the petitioner did not confirm the respondent after the extended probationary period, it was not only acting in terms of the letter dated 17th December, 1971 but even in law it was not obliged to confirm him."

2. As in the reported case of Muhammad Aquil the appellant had accepted the extension in his probationary period. In any case, he is to be considered only a temporary workman and not confirmed or as permanent workman. Now, as provided in clause (2) of Standing Order 12, the services of a temporary workman can be terminated at any time without notice. This was precisely what has been done by the respondent establishment. No doubt, even the service of temporary workman cannot be terminated on the ground of misconduct without following the prescribed procedure in Standing Order 15, as provided in clause 5 of Standing Order 12, but the services of the appellant were nor terminated on the ground of misconduct but only on the ground that hip work had not been found to be satisfactory. In other words, he had nor come upto the mark. This does not constitute misconduct for the purposes of Standing Order 15 Consequently, the provisions of either clause (5) of Standing Order 12 or Standing Order 15 are not attracted in this case.

3. For the reasons discussed by me above, I am of the view that the services of the appellant were terminated by the respondent establishment in accordance with the law and that his grievance petition was rightly rejected by the learned Labour Court. I would accordingly, dis miss this appeal. Appeal dismissed,