1975 SCMR 157 (PLP)

ABDUL KADIR SHAIKH, J.

‑This petition for special leave to appeal from the order of a Single Judge of the Lahore High Court dated 8th October 1973 was presented on 25th February 1974, and is time‑barred by 41 days, taking into consideration the requisite period spent on obtaining certified copy of the order, from 5th November 1973 to 13th December 1973. Explanation for the delay is that petitioners were not informed of the date when the copy would be ready, and it is submitted that time‑lag between l3th December 1973 when the copy was ready and 26th January 1974, on which day petitioners received it, "be exempted in calculating the period of filing the petition for Special Leave to appeal". In other words, that period be computed as the time requisite for obtaining copy within the meaning of section 12(2) of the Limitation Act. In Pramatha Nath Roy v. Lee (AIR 1922 P C 352) their Lordships of the Privy Council observed that in determining what is the requisite time referred to In section 12, subsection (2) of the Limitation Act, the conduct of the appellant must be considered, and "no period can be regarded as requisite under the Act, which need not have lapsed if the appellant had taken reasonable and proper steps to obtain a copy of the decree or order". In Jeji Bhoy N. Surty v. T. S. Chettyar (AIR 1928 P C 123) their Lordships again emphasized as follows;-- "'The word 'requisite' is a strong word; it may be regarded as meaning something more than the word 'required'. It means 'properly required'. It means 'properly required' and it throws upon the pleader or counsel for the appellant the necessity of showing that no part of the delay beyond the prescribed period is due to his default. But for that time which is taken up by his opponent in drawing up the decree, or by the officials of the Court in preparing and issuing the two documents, he is not responsible." It is well settled that the time requisite for obtaining copy of order within the meaning of section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908 means only the interval between the date of application for supply of copy and the date when it is ready for delivery. Even during this interval, due diligence on the part of the litigant is required by law, and no delay, unless such as was caused by circumstance over which he had no control and which he could not by due diligence be avoided, can form part of time "requisite" for obtaining the copy. The time between the date on which he the copy is ready for delivery, and the date on which the applicant chooses to take delivery thereof is not a portion of the time "requisite" for obtaining a copy. The question then is whether the delay be condoned under the pro visions of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908. In this behalf it would be seen that the order of the High Court having been announced on 8th October 1973, petitioners had sixty days to file this petition, excluding the time requisite for obtaining copy of the order. They are presumed to know that delay of each day, after expiry of the prescribed period of limitation, unless satisfactorily explained, is fatal. They made application for supply of copy on 5th November 1973. By then 28 days had already lapsed. The copy was ready on 13th December 1973, after 39 days, the last date for filing this petition, therefore, was the 15th January 19'

4. However, the petitioners received the copy on 26th January 1974 and by then the period of limitation had already expired. This should have been enough warning that no further time is to be lost, and instead of filing the petition immediately thereafter, they did not file it until 25th of February 1974. There is no explanation for this delay, the petition is, therefore, dismissed as time‑barred. Leave refused.