2004 PLP 531 (YLR)
ABDUL RAUF SHAH — Petitioner Versus THE STATE through Advocate General/Public Prosecutor, Muzaffarabad — Respondent
| Citation | 2004 PLP 531 (YLR) |
| Forum / Court | Shariat Court (AJ&K) |
| Bench Members | Syed Manzoor Hussain Gillani, C J |
| Parties | ABDUL RAUF SHAH — Petitioner Versus THE STATE through Advocate General/Public Prosecutor, Muzaffarabad — Respondent |
| Primary Law | Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 2004 PLP 531 (YLR)?
This judgment primarily cites: Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 2004 PLP 531 (YLR)?
The case was heard and decided by the Shariat Court (AJ&K) bench comprising: Syed Manzoor Hussain Gillani, C J.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 2004 PLP 531 (YLR) (ABDUL RAUF SHAH — Petitioner Versus THE STATE through Advocate General/Public Prosecutor, Muzaffarabad — Respondent). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- Syed Mujjahid Hussain Naqvi for Petitioner.
- THE STATE through Advocate General/Public Prosecutor, Muzaffarabad---Respondent
- 2. The learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner contended that as petitioner has fulfilled the requirements of section 337, Cr.P.C., hence he is entitled to be acquitted. The learned counsel referring subsection (2) of section 339-A contended that it was within the powers of the Court to acquit an approver at any time after the trial begins if he admits and fulfils conditions of pardon. According to Advocate as the accused has fulfilled the conditions, he is entitled to be acquitted. The learned counsel placed reliance upon AIR 1938 PC 266, PLD 1956 FC 7 and AIR 1940 Nagpur Court 1977:
- 3. The learned Advocates appearing for the State and complainant contended that the accused cannot be acquitted unless the trial of the case is concluded. They further contended that the accused has changed his position as is evident from his applications sent through Jail Authorities, hence he is not entitled to any concession. They also referred to a judgment of the Shariat Court dated 1-4-2003 whereby bail is refused to him.
- 4. After hearing the learned Advocates for the parties I have gone through the record of the case, and law relied upon by the learned Advocates for the parties.
- 5. The petitioner was disallowed bail by the Shariat Court vide its order dated 1-4-2003 on the ground that under subsection (3) of section 337, Cr.P.C. he is to remain in custody till determination of the trial. The contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioner is that as the accused has admitted his earlier statement and he has complied with the condition on which he was tendered pardon, hence he is entitled to be acquitted. The relevant provision on which the learned Advocate relies is as follows:--
- 11. Hence, the trial Court has not committed any illegality in passing the impugned order. The authorities of law referred by the learned. Advocate for the petitioner have no relevance in view of the facts of the present case.
Headnotes / Summary
S. 339-A
Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.302/460
Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance (VI of 1979), S.17(4)
Tender of pardon to accomplice and his acquittal
Approver was an accused who had accepted to become a witness of the occurrence against other accused person being an accomplice in the case and he was to be kept in Mention until the termination of the trial-- Since for all practical purposes the approver was to remain as an accused till the conclusion of the trial, he was entitled to acquittal within the terms of S.339-A, Cr. P. C. before the final judgment in the case for the reason of his being approver and not for the reason that he was not guilty
Trial Court had rightly disallowed the request of accused for acquittal under S. 339-A, Cr. P. C.
Impugned order did not suffer from any illegality-- Revision petition was dismissed accordingly. AIR 1938 PC 266; PLD 1956 FC 7 and AIR 1940 Nag. 1977 ref. Syed Muhammad Tayyab Gillani. A.A.-G. for the State. K. D. Khan for the Complainant
Judgment & Decree
2. The learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner contended that as petitioner has fulfilled the requirements of section 337, Cr.P.C., hence he is entitled to be acquitted. The learned counsel referring subsection (2) of section 339-A contended that it was within the powers of the Court to acquit an approver at any time after the trial begins if he admits and fulfils conditions of pardon. According to Advocate as the accused has fulfilled the conditions, he is entitled to be acquitted. The learned counsel placed reliance upon AIR 1938 PC 266, PLD 1956 FC 7 and AIR 1940 Nagpur Court 1977:
3. The learned Advocates appearing for the State and complainant contended that the accused cannot be acquitted unless the trial of the case is concluded. They further contended that the accused has changed his position as is evident from his applications sent through Jail Authorities, hence he is not entitled to any concession. They also referred to a judgment of the Shariat Court dated 1-4-2003 whereby bail is refused to him.
4. After hearing the learned Advocates for the parties I have gone through the record of the case, and law relied upon by the learned Advocates for the parties.
5. The petitioner was disallowed bail by the Shariat Court vide its order dated 1-4-2003 on the ground that under subsection (3) of section 337, Cr.P.C. he is to remain in custody till determination of the trial. The contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioner is that as the accused has admitted his earlier statement and he has complied with the condition on which he was tendered pardon, hence he is entitled to be acquitted. The relevant provision on which the learned Advocate relies is as follows:-- [339-A. Procedure in trial of person under section 339.
(1) The Court trying under section 339 a person who has accepted a tender of pardon shall, before the evidence of the witnesses for the prosecution is taken, ask the accused whether he pleads that he has complied with the conditions on which the tender of the pardon was made. (2) If the accused does so plead, the Court shall record the plea and proceed with the trial, and shall, before judgment is passed in the case; find whether or .not the accused has complied with the conditions of the pardon, and, if it is found that he has so complied, the Court shall, notwithstanding anything contained in this Code, pass judgment of acquittal.] Irrespective of fact that the petitioner changed his position from the statement on the basis of which he was tendered pardon in view of his application dated 2-6-2003 filed through Jail Authorities, the section hereinbefore quoted does not entitle him to the relief he seeks.
7. Under subsection (2) of sec tion 339-A, Cr.P.C. the approver is entitled to be acquitted before the final judgment is passed in. the case, if the trial Court is satisfied that he has complied with the conditions on which he was tendered pardon and after the evidence of the witnesses for the prosecution is taken, not before that.
8. All the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure regulating trial of a criminal case till the stage of judgment have to be complied with and acted upon in accordance with that spirit even in such-like case as the approver is otherwise an accused who has accepted to become witness of the occurrence against other accused persons being an accomplice in the case.
9. Under section 243, Cr.P.C. the Court is to take evidence of the prosecution and after examining him under section 342, Cr.P.C. pass an order of his acquittal or conviction as the case may be, under section 245, Cr.P.C. and pronounce the judgment under section 366., Cr.P.C. after the termination of the trial. Same , is the spirit of section 337(3) that the approver is to be kept in detention until the termination of the trial.
10. The approver remains an accused for all practical purpose till the trial is concluded in the case and he is entitled to acquittal within the terms of section 339-A. Cr.P.C. before the final judgment in the case for the reason of his being approver, not for the reason that he is not guilty.
11. Hence, the trial Court has not committed any illegality in passing the impugned order. The authorities of law referred by the learned. Advocate for the petitioner have no relevance in view of the facts of the present case.
12. In view of above this revision petition is hereby dismissed. Revision petition dismissed N.H.Q./58/Sh.C(AJ&K)