1988 PLP 129 (CLC)

Federation of Pakistan v. United Sugar Mills Limited Khairpur P L D 1977 S C 397; Devan Textile Mills Ltd. v. Pakistan and others P L D 1976 Karachi 1369; Khuda Bux v. Federal Land Commission 1984 S C M R 861 and Muhammad Aslam Khan v. Federal Land Commission P L D 1976 Pesh. 66 ref. (b) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)‑‑ ‑‑‑Art. 199, cl. (4‑A)‑‑Constitutional petition‑‑Interim order Once an interim order has remained in field for six months and it expired then in view of cl.(4‑A) of Art. 199 of Constitution, a second interim order, held, could not be passed which would have the effect of nullifying provisions of clause (4‑A) of Art. 199 of Constitution.‑‑ [Interim order]. Sharafuddin Ada for Petitioner. NASIR ASLAM ZAHID, J.‑‑This matter admittedly relates to an order passed under MLR 115 i.e. Land Reforms Regulation 1972. The order impugned is dated 25‑2‑1982 passed by the Federal Land Commissioner under paragraph 29 of that Regulation. This matter was first fixed before this Court on 5‑5‑1982 when on the interim application Misc. 825/82, a status quo order was passed by this Court. After about 2 years and four months when this application, i.e. Misc. No.825/82, was fixed for hearing on 24‑9‑1984, no appearance was made by or on behalf of the petitioner and as such the interim application (Misc. 825/82) was dismissed for non- prosecution. As a result, the status quo order which apparently remained in the field for about 2 years and four months came to an end. Now, after more than five years of the passing of the impugned order dated 25‑12‑1982 of the Federal Land Commission and after nearly three years of the dismissal of the interim application, a second application for interim relief i.e. C.M.A. No.668/81, has been filed. When this matter came up before us on 17‑9‑1987, it was observed by us that this application was apparently not maintainable in view of the provisions of clause (4‑A) of Article 199 of the Constitution. Learned counsel for the petitioner took time to address the Court on the maintainability of this application and at his request the matter was adjourned for today. We have heard at length the submissions of Mr. Sharafuddin Ada, learned counsel for the petitioner. Learned counsel frankly submits that in case this matter is covered by the restriction imposed on the continuity of interim orders beyond six months under clause (4‑A) of Article 199, the present application will not be maintainable. Learned counsel has referred to two reported judgments, one by the Supreme Court in the case of Federation of Pakistan v. United Sugar Mills Limited Khairpur P L D 1977 S C 397 and a Full Bench decision of Court in the case of Dewan Textile Mills Ltd. v. Pakistan and others P L D 1976 Karachi 1368. However, it is contended by the learned counsel that prima facie the impugned order dated 25‑2‑1982 is beyond the jurisdiction of the Federal Land Commission inasmuch as it has been passed after 30‑11‑1976 and as such this case does not come within the mischief of clause (4‑A) of Article

199. The learned counsel has referred to the leave granting order of the Supreme Court in the case of Khuda Bux v. Federal Land Commission (1984 S C M R 861) and the decision of the Peshawar High Court in the case of Muhammad Aslam Khan v. Federal Land Commission (P L D 1976 Peshawar 66.). We find no substance in the contention of the learned counsel. Admittedly in this matter an interim order had been obtained by the petitioner as far back as 5‑5‑1982 and though this interim order expired by an afflux of time on the expiry of six months from the date of the passing of the said interim order, in any case the interim application was dismissed for non‑prosecution by order dated 24‑9‑1984 and as such even if the said interim order of status quo had remained in the field, it came to an end on 24‑9‑1984. The submission made by the learned counsel on the basis of 1984 SCAR 861 and P L D 1976 Peshawar 66 is not relevant. The point being considered is the interpretation and application of clause (4‑A) of Article 199 of the Constitution. Admittedly the order that has been passed purports to be an order under a law specified in Part‑I of the First Schedule to the Constitution. As a result, clause (4‑A) of Article 199 is attracted and the interim order lost its efficacy on the expiry of six months of the order dated 5‑5‑1982. It is now settled that once an interim order has remained in the field for six months and it expires then in view of clause (4‑A) of Article 199 of the Constitution, a second interim order cannot be passed which will have the effect of nullifying the provisions of clause (4‑A) of Article 199 of the Constitution. C.M.A. 611/87 being not maintainable, is dismissed. M.Y.H./Z‑30/K Petition dismissed.