1996 PLP 651 (PLC)

Abdur Rauf Zahid for Respondent. This decision will also dispose of connected two Appeals bearing No.48/95 with C.Ms. Nos. 16/95 and 17/95 and No. 49/95 with C.Ms. Nos.18/95 and 19/95 as these appeals arise from one and same judgment dated 19‑12‑1994 of the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Mardan whereby the grievance petitions under section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, of the respondents were accepted and they were ordered to be reinstated in service with full back wages and benefits. The relevant background giving rise to these appeals are that respondents were employed as work‑charge in the Agricultural Development Authority. Their services were regularised by Order 3158‑64, dated 30‑5‑1991 and as such they attained the status of permanent workmen. Their services were terminated on 6‑4‑1993 by the appellant No. 1 on the ground that "their services were no more required". They being aggrieved by the aforesaid order of termination, served grievance notices on the employer which were rejected on 10‑5‑1993. Thereafter, they approached the Labour court by way of filing separate grievance petitions under section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance for their reinstatement in service with full back benefits and wages. The appellants contested the petitions by filing written statement. The learned Labour Court after recording of evidence of both the parties and affording them opportunity of cross‑examination, accepted the grievance petitions and reinstated the respondents in service with full back benefits. Feeling aggrieved by the said order of the learned Labour Court, the appellants have invoked the jurisdiction of this Tribunal by way of filing separate appeals under section 37(3) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, praying for setting aside of the order of the learned Labour Court dated 19‑12 1994. Learned counsel for the parties were heard and record perused. At the very outset learned counsel for the respondents raised a preliminary legal objection to the maintainability of the appeals and contended that the appeals were not filed within statutory period of 30 days as required under section 37(3) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, therefore, these appeals are liable to be dismissed being time‑barred on this score alone. On the other hand the learned counsel for the appellants vehemently opposed the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents and submitted that legal advice for filing of appeals was not received from the Law Department in time, therefore, the delay, if any, in filing of appeals may kindly be condoned. It is evident from the record that the appeals were not filed within the mandatory period of 30 days as required under the law but in fact these appeals were filed in this Tribunal after lapse of 90 days as memorandum of appeals were accompanied by applications for condonation of delay but no plausible reasons were given in these applications to satisfy the Court to condone inordinate delay. It is well‑settled principle of law that where an appeal is time barred the delay of each day is to be explained by cogent and reasonable ground as equity aids the vigilant and not the indolent. Mere ground of waiting for legal advice of the Law Department for filing of appeal is not enough to justify condonation of delay. In view of the above position I hold the appeals being time‑barred and accordingly dismiss all the three appeals with no order as to costs. H.B.T./208/N.‑W.F.P. Appeals dismissed.