1996 PLP 653 (PLC)

Competent Authority 4 Extent of Powers 5 12. 37 Dismissal and other punishment (a) President (b)Senior Executive Vice‑ President, Administration Head Office. (c)Heads of Circle Offices. (d) Heads of Zones. Full power up to Officer Grade‑I (i) Full powers up to Cate gory‑II. (ii) Punishments (a) to (d)mentioned in Rule 37 in respect of Officers Grades‑III, II and I. (i) Full powers up to Category‑II. (ii) Punishments (a) and (b) mentioned in Rule 37 in respect of Officers Grade‑III and II (i) Full powers up to Cate gory‑III. (ii) Punishments (a) and (b) mentioned in Rule 37 in respect of Category‑II. 14. 39 Appointment of Enquiry Officer or Enquiry Committee and issue of charge‑sheet etc. (a) President (b)Senior Executive Vice‑President, Administration Head Office. (c) Heads of Circle Offices. (d) Heads of Zones. Up to Senior Grade ‑I(SVP) Up to Officer Grade‑I Up to Officer Grade‑II Up to Officer Grade‑II. It would thus be noticed that under Item No.14 (ibid) for appointment of Enquiry Officer or Enquiry Committee, and issue of charge‑sheet etc. to Category‑II Officers as laid down in Column 3, therefore, Heads of Circle Offices and Heads of Zones were both competent to appoint Enquiry Officer and issue of charge‑sheet etc. Likewise under Item 12 for dismissal and other punishments of Category‑II Officer, as the appellant is, Heads of Circle Offices were competent. The two Labour Tribunals below seems to have incorrectly applied the Rules and by placing reliance on Efficiency and Discipline (Banks and Financial Institutions) Rules, 1975 erroneously held that the charge‑sheet was issued by an incompetent authority. The Rules of 1981 (ibid) had perhaps escaped the notice of the two Tribunals. The learned Judge in Chamber in the High Court had, therefore, the legal justification to have declared the impugned orders to this extent to be without lawful authority.

11. In view of the law laid down in the chain of authorities cited by us in para. 9 ante the learned Judge could not have upset the aforesaid findings of fact recorded by the two Tribunals particularly those of Appellate Tribunal which on re‑appraisal of evidence in its true perspective had correctly reached the conclusion on factual plane in para. 3 of its judgment which is as follows:‑‑ "The plea of the respondent was that the Cashier whose duty it was to receive the amount and to deposit it was not present and on the asking of the Manager, he received the amount. The Manager was examined by the prosecution in the inquiry and he denied that the Cashier was not present or that he had authorised the respondent to receive the amount. So, the fact that without authority the respondent received the electricity bill and its amount stood established. However, the fact that the amount of surcharge was deposited by the respondent on 8‑8‑1981 does not stand proved as the bank employee who had received the said amount on 8‑8‑1981 was not examined." The competent Authorities of respondents‑Bank and the learned Judge in Chamber . had not perhaps misconceived the concept of awarding proper punishment, namely, too harsh touching the rigours of cruelty nor too lenient to turn the disciplinary matter into sheer mockery. Viewed in this perspective, we are of the view that the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal, while directing the reinstatement of the appellant, had properly held him disentitled to back benefits. Terminus qua for disentitling the appellant to back benefits would obviously be date of order i.e. 12‑3‑1985.

12. Upon the peculiar facts of this case, we are satisfied that the impugned judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the operative part of the impugned order of the learned Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal dated 12‑3‑1985 is restored. The parties are, however, left to bear their own costs. A.A./H‑252/S Appeal accepted.