P L D 1959 Supreme Court (Pak (PLP)

S. A. RAHMAN, J.‑This is an appeal by special leave from an award given by the Industrial Tribunal Karachi on a reference made to it by the Central Government under subsection (1) of section 10 read with subsection (1) of section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947. The dispute was between Messrs Brooke Bond Pakistan Limited, Karachi, the appellants and the Brooke Bond Workers' Union, Karachi, the third respondent. Two issues were referee to the Tribunal for decision reading as follows: ‑ (1) Whether Allah Dad, the General Secretary of the Union, be reinstated and wages paid to him for the period of un employment. (2) Whether dearness allowance be given 7 to each workman at Rs. 10 per month with effect from the 1st January 1957. By a subsequent notification, the second issue was altered to read as below: ‑ Whether the existing rate of dearness allowance be enhanced by Rs. 10 per month for each workman with effect from the 1st January 1957. Issue No. 2 was not pressed before the Tribunal on behalf of the Union and it was, therefore, held that there was no ground for enhancing the existing rate of dearness allowance. On the first issue, the Tribunal referred to the two charges which formed the basis of the dismissal of Allah Dad and the finding was given that so far as the second charge was concerned, there was no evidence in support of it, and as for the first charge, there had been breach of the principles of natural justice in so far as Allah Dad had been prevented from cross‑examining the main witness in the enquiry. As a consequence, Allah Dad's reinstate ment in the Company was ordered but in view of his past unsavoury record, no compensation was allowed to him during the period of his forced unemployment consequent on his dismissal. That period was directed to be treated as leave without pay. Leave was granted to appeal in this case to consider whether the dismissal of Allah Dad could be set aside by the Tribunal and his reinstatement ordered. It is conceded by Mr. Fazlur Rahman on behalf of the appellants, that the dispute with regard to the dismissal of Allah Dad between the Company and the Workers' Union, fell within the definition of "industrial dispute" as given in section 2 (k) of the Act. It was clearly a dispute between employers and workmen, connected with the employment or unemployment of Allah Dad who was a worker of the Company. The appropriate Govern ment, therefore, had the jurisdiction to refer this dispute to the Tribunal. The only ground on which the learned Tribunal held that the enquiry on the first charge was vitiated, was that Allah Dad had not been given the opportunity to cross examine the principal witness examined in the enquiry and that this was contrary to the principles of natural justice. The Company's explanation was that Allah Dad was merely repeating certain questions in cross -examination and the enquiry officer was entitled to rule out such questions. The charge was one of wilful insubordination or disobedience and disorderly behaviour during working hours in the premises of the factory. Sufficient details of the alleged objectionable conduct of the respondent were given in the charge. There was a regular enquiry at which witnesses were examined. No material at ail was placed before the learned Tribunal to show that the questions disallowed during the examination of the relevant witness, were material or that they were not repetitions of other questions that had already been put.‑‑ Only one witness appears to have been called for the Union to make a statement before the Tribunal, in the person of Mr. B. T. Hayman, an executive of the Company, who bad held the impugned enquiry. He stated on oath that he had stopped Allah Dad from putting certain questions as they were being repeated. He explained that he felt that the questions would be of no assistance to the enquiry officer or to Allah Dad. But for this instance, he had not limited in any manner his right to cross‑examine the witness. This state ment was not challenged in any manner before the Tribunal and nothing was elicited from Mr. Hayman as to the nature or form of the questions that had been disallowed by him. The onus lay on the respondent Union to establish that material questions had not been allowed to be put to the witness to the prejudice of Allah! Dad. Even Allah Dad was not examined before the Tribunal to throw any light on this point. In the circumstances, it is difficult to see how any principal of natural justice was violated by the enquiry officer. Mr. Ghani, who appeared for the Union, did not contend that the enquiry officer was not entitled to shut out the questions which were merely repetitions of those already asked from the witness. It must, therefore, be held that the Tribunal misdirected himself in law when he took the view that there had o been a disregard of the principles of natural justice, on these facts. There was not the slightest foundation for such a finding on the record. The Tribunal's function was not to act as an appellate Court above the Company. It seems to us that the Company exercised its undoubted right properly in dispensing with the services of Dad after due enquiry. We need not discuss the question whether the finding of the Tribunal with regard to the second charge was correct or not, as, in our opinion, the enquiry on the C first charge was not vitiated by any irregularity or illegality, and the discretion exercised by the Company in consequence of the finding on that charge could not have been interfered with. No other point was argued in this case. The appeal succeeds and we allow it with costs and set aside the direction given in the award. A. H. Appeal allowed.