P L D 1965 Supreme Court 393 (PLP)

CORNELIUS, C. J.‑This appeal by special leave was admitted, on the ground that questions relating to the interpretation of the West Pakistan Board of Revenue Act, 1957 and the Rules framed thereunder arose for consideration. On hearing Mr. Karam Elahi Chauhan for the appellant Allah Ditta and Mr. Muhammad Shaft for the respondent Salamat Ali, we find that the appeal is liable to dismissal on the short ground that the order which the learned Judges in the ‑High Court made, setting aside the decision of a Full Board of the West Pakistan Board of Revenue whereby an earlier decision of a single Member of that Board was reversed, is completely justified by the plain fact that the revision petition was one which the Board under the Rules made under the Board of Revenue Act could not have entertained at all. Section 7 of the Act provided that from an order of a single Member of the Board, a revision should lie to the Full Board in such cases only as may be prescribed by Rules made under section

8. At the time when the revision petition was instituted, no Rules had been made, and the argument might) conceivably be raised that by the mere non‑promulgation of Rules, the right of an aggrieved person to apply for revision could not be defeated. But it would be contrary to the clear intention of the statute to treat revision applications against every order made by a Single Member as being competent before the Full Board during such period. The statute clearly required that the right of revision should be restricted, and a proper method of dealing with such applications before the rules applying the restriction were put into force was that which appears to have been adopted in this case, viz., to keep them ending until the rules should have come into force, and then to dispose of them as required by the rules. In May 1959, that is about 2J years after the institution of the revision petition before the Board, rules were made, of which rule 5 lays down specifically that an application for revision under section 7 (2) of the Act would lie only in cases where the order of the single Member was one reversing or modifying an order made or a decree passed by a Court, which must mean a Revenue Court. The Act itself in a number of cases differentiates expressly between Revenue Officers and Revenue Courts, and therefore the confinement of the right of revision to orders or decrees made by Revenue Courts is sufficient to exclude the competency of a revision against an order made by a Revenue Officer, in that capacity. There is no doubt whatsoever that the orders in this case relating to selection for a lambardari were made by Revenue Officers, namely, the Collector and on appeal by the Commissioner, in their capacity as Revenue Officers. Consequently, the revision petition before the Full Board was not competent, and the order of the Full Board reversing the decision of the single Member was one made without jurisdiction. It has been rightly set aside by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. We accordingly dismiss this appeal with costs. A. H. Appeal dismissed.