P L D 1965 Supreme Court 677 (PLP)

CORNELIUS, C. J.‑The facts of this ‑ appeal by special leave are simple. A Circle Revenue Officer, who was also Assistant Settlement Officer under the East Bengal State Acquisition and Tenancy Act on the 16th June 1961, made an order under section 480, Criminal Procedure Code against the respondent, A. S. M. Idris Ali Sikdar, imposing on him a fine of Rs. 200 or in default simple imprisonment for a month. The conviction purported to be made in respect of an offence under section 228, P. P. C. Under section 486, Cr. P. C. there is an appeal provided "to the Court to which decrees or orders made in such Court are ordinarily appealable". Orders of ‑the Assistant Settlement Officer being appealable to the Settlement Officer, an appeal 'was preferred which resulted, in the fine being reduced to Rs.50. The convicted person moved the Sessions Judge, who made a reference to the High Court recommend ing that the conviction should be set aside on the ground, inter alia, that the Circle Revenue Officer cum‑Assistant Settlement Officer was not a Court. The reference was accepted on that ground and the conviction and fine were set aside by a learned Single Judge, who relied mainly on the reasoning given by him in an earlier decision where the same question had arisen. In that case, the learned Judge had examined in some detail the nature of proceedings before a Revenue Officer, who is engaged, in preparing or revising a record‑of‑rights under section 19 of the Act aforesaid. It was noted that under rule 39 of the Rules under that Act, the Revenue Officer had power "to take down evidence in his own hand in .the English language in proceedings . . . . in which an appeal is ‑allowed, in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for the trial of suits". The learned Judge thought, however, that the mere facts of the power of recording evidence in the manner provided in the Civil Procedure Code, and of being able to administer oaths were not sufficient incidents to "garb him (i.e., the Circle Revenue Officer) with the cloak of a Court at all". He placed greater importance on the fact that all officers working under the aforesaid Act‑do so subject to the overall supervision and control of the Provincial Government. The learned Judge thought that an incident of a Court must be that its decisions should not be "subject to the supervision of the higher executive authority". The circumstances in which the alleged insult and interruption took place are stated in the convicting order as under. The Officer was engaged in disposing of an objection case, when the respondent appeared and attempted to plead in the case without being empowered to do so. When questioned, he said that he was the nephew of one of the opposite‑parties in the case, but the, Revenue Officer saying that he was "in the habit of appearing in my Court to plead for the parties" and despite having been restrained, had not stopped the practice, did not accept his plea, and took him to task, whereupon, the respondent retorted "do whatever you like. Don't talk nonsense". Thereupon, the Revenue Officer took cognizance of the offence under section 480, Cr. P. C. and convicted him under section 228, P. P. C. and imposed the punishment mentioned above. Against the order of the High Court acquitting the respondent, the State obtained special leave to appeal. to this Court to consider whether the functions of a Revenue Officer under the aforesaid Act were such as to qualify him for the description of a "Court". The learned Advocate‑General appearing on behalf of the State has stressed that a Revenue Officer when hearing objections under section 19 of 'the aforesaid Act ‑is empowered to take evidence as in a civil suit, that is on oath, and emphasised also that his orders were subject to appeal not only to an executive authority, namely; the Settlement Officer, but also to further appeal to a Special Judge. On this basis; he argued that a ‑Revenue Officer should be allowed the status of a Court for the purpose of exercising peremptorily and without trial, the power of punishment for contempt of himself. That is an extremely stringent power, which was originally reserved in the English jurisdiction to Courts of Record, and it i; in all respects desirable that where it is conferred upon authorities other than Courts of Record by express law, that law should be construed in the narrowest terms, in relation to the authorities so empowered. Reference to section 228, P. P. C., shows that the offence which the Revenue Officer in this case purported to punish is one of insult or interruption "to any public servant, while such public servant is sitting in any stage of a judicial proceeding". The Revenue Officer clearly satisfies the description of a public servant, and referring to the definition of "judicia: proceeding" in section 4(1)(f) of the Criminal Procedure Code, it may also be held that he was sitting in a stage of such a proceeding since by provision in the aforesaid Act and the Rule; thereunder, evidence could legally be taken on oath in such proceeding. But evidence may be so taken in a very considerable number of proceedings before public servants who are not Courts eo nomine, and a differentiation thus appears between the provisions of section 480, Cr. P. C and those of section 228, P. P. C. namely, that the power of immediate punishment of such an interruption or insult is not given to every public servant sitting to conduct a judicial proceeding, but is confined by section 480 to "any Civil, Criminal or Revenue Court". There are, laws in force in Pakistan relating to land revenue, which provide for Revenue Officers as well as Revenue Courts. Among such laws are the Punjab Land Revenue Act and the Punjab Tenancy Act. Proceedings under these Acts which are intended for the purpose of making entries in records of‑rights are held before Revenue Officers, while those before Revenue Courts are of truly judicial character, and are governed by the full procedure of the Civil Procedure Code. In the Act here in question, there is no such differentiation and the argument might be advanced that a Revenue Officer under the Act exercises the powers both of a Revenue Officer as well as of a Revenue Court. But the question still remains whether it is permissible,' by a process of construction, to extend the severe power of immediate conviction for insult and interruption offered to himself, to any public servant who is not actually designated as a Court by the law under which he is invested with the authority to take evidence on oath. It is clear that whether or not such a person be designated as a Court, he cannot be insulted or interrupted with impunity. The matter would always fall to be visited with punishment under section 228, P. P. C. with this difference that if such person or authority be by designation a Court, that punishment may be visited on the instant, under peremptory powers, by a short handed method, the ‑, convicting authority being both the prosecutor as well as the Judge, and there being no necessity for any of the formalities of a trial, but if he be merely a public servant sitting in a stage of a judicial proceeding, there would be need for a complaint and a proper prosecution would follow at which the accused person would be entitled to present a defence. In the present case; such a defence might well have been that the respondent was acting on behalf of a relation of his, who was a party to the case before the Revenue Officer. His plea to that effect is mentioned in the order of conviction, but there is nothing to show that it was enquired into. If there had been a proper trial, undoubtedly the truth of this plea would have been investigated, to the advantage of justice. But if by a process of construction, the Revenue Officer were to be invested with the peremptory power of a Court, such as he has‑purported to exercise, such a result as in the present case would necessarily follow. It is a question of great importance to the liberty of the subject whether the vast number of public servants who have power to take evidence on oath should all be regarded as possessing the peremptory power of instant punishment for insult or interruption to themselves that is conferred by section 480, Cr. P. C. expressly on Civil, Criminal or Revenue Courts. To make it a justiciable issue, to be determined by the incidents of the office, throws the matter into uncertainty, and tends to the prejudice of the power, in respect of immediacy. It would act as an encouragement to the exercise of the power by unauthorised persons, if they were enabled to establish status as Courts, ex post facto, by a process of construction as indicated already. It would place certain bodies, designated as Courts, in an invidious position. To give an example, section 480, Cr. P. C. does not empower an Industrial Court to impose such punishment for insult or interrup tion to itself. Bearing in mind that it is important to the liberty of subject that power of immediate commitment and punishment for the contempt should be confined within the very words of the statute by which it is conferred, we would hold that the power conferred by section 480, Criminal Procedure Code is not exercisable by any person or body other than a person or body who is designated as a Court. The Revenue Officer in this case was not so designated, and consequently, he could not exercise power under 'that section, and the conviction and sentence imposed by him upon the respondent were properly set aside. The appeal is dismissed. S. A. H./S. Q. Appeal dismissed.