1990 PLP 458 (PLC)

DECISION This is an appeal against order passed by the learned Sindh Labour Court No. VII at Sukkur, dated 26‑9‑1988. The only point raised by Mr. Manzar Alam, learned counsel for the appellant, is that the learned Presiding Officer had not framed the issues as required under Order XIV rule 1 and section 151, C.P.C. In support he had relied upon 1981 P L C 111, decided by Labour Appellate Tribunal Punjab. In the aforesaid case the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal Punjab only observed that the Labour Court was empowered under section 36 to frame issues and did not hold that non‑framing of the issues vitiated the trial or the decision of the case. The relevant provisions of section 36 (1) and (2) of the I.R.O., 1969, are reproduced as under:‑‑ "

36. Procedure and powers of Labour Court.‑‑(1) Subject to the provisions of this Ordinance, while trying an offence, a Labour Court shall follow as nearly as possible summary procedure as prescribed under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. (2) A Labour Court shall, for the purpose of adjudicating and determining any industrial dispute, be deemed to be a Civil Court and shall have the same powers as are vested in such Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 19(8) including the powers of: (a) enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; (b) compelling the production of documents and material objects, and (c) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents."

2. It will be seen that in subsection (1) the words used are `a Labour Court shall follow as nearly as possible summary procedure as prescribed under the Code of Criminal Procedure' whereas in subsection (2) it is not provided that Labour Court shall follow the procedure as laid down in Civil Procedure Code but only empowers the Labour Court to exercise the powers of Civil Court specially the powers enumerated in clauses (a), (b) and (c).

3. The plain reading of this provision would clearly show that the learned Labour Court does have powers to frame issues but non‑framing of issues would not be illegal which could vitiate the proceedings and would make the order null and void. In this view I am supported by a decision of Division Bench of the High Court of Sindh in the case of Brooke Bond (Pakistan) Ltd. v. Second Sind Labour Court, Karachi 1973 P L C 111, wherein their lordships observed that subsection (2) of section 36 does not confer on Labour Court all the powers of a Civil Court but only such of them as could be described as procedural. Confirment of powers would not mean non‑exercise of such powers would vitiate the proceedings. I have already pointed the difference of wordings used in subsections (1) and (2) of section 36 which makes the intention of the Legislature clear that it did not intend to convert Labour Court into Civil Court and make it binding for the Labour Court to strictly follow the procedure as laid down in the Civil Procedure Code.

4. For the aforesaid reasons I find no merit in this appeal which is dismissed in limine. The above are the reasons in support of short order passed on 23‑5‑1989. A.E./1455/Lb. S Appeal dismissed.