PLC 1994

1994 PLP 567 (PLC)

M. HAYAT & BROTHERS LIMITED through Managing Director Versus M. HAYAT & BROTHERS LABOUR UNION through President and General Secretary

Jurisdiction / Court
Labour Appellate Tribunal N.W.F.P.
Decided Date
Appeal No.14 of 1991, decided on 20th November, 1993.
Honorable Judges
Justice Abdur Rehman Khan, Chairman
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1994 PLP 567 (PLC)
Forum / Court Labour Appellate Tribunal N.W.F.P.
Bench Members Justice Abdur Rehman Khan, Chairman
Parties M. HAYAT & BROTHERS LIMITED through Managing Director Versus M. HAYAT & BROTHERS LABOUR UNION through President and General Secretary
Primary Law Industrial dispute‑‑‑
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1994 PLP 567 (PLC)?

This judgment primarily cites: Industrial dispute‑‑‑ as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1994 PLP 567 (PLC)?

The case was heard and decided by the Labour Appellate Tribunal N.W.F.P. bench comprising: Justice Abdur Rehman Khan, Chairman.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1994 PLP 567 (PLC) (M. HAYAT & BROTHERS LIMITED through Managing Director Versus M. HAYAT & BROTHERS LABOUR UNION through President and General Secretary). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Laws Cited

Industrial dispute‑‑‑

Representation

  • Muhammadullah Khan for Appellant.
  • Abdul Waheed for Respondent.
  • 2. The relevant background in which the appeal arises is that the respondents put up certain demands before the appellant which were, however, not acceded to. Therefore, instead of going on strike they resorted to the provisions of section 32(1‑a) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance for decision of the disputes which had thus arisen between the parties. It is to be stated at the outset that the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that he is aggrieved only of item No.20 of the Charter of Demands relating to providing education facilities to two children of workers by the appellant and would, therefore, press his appeal only to this extent. He, therefore, argued that the statement of R.W.1 wherein he accepted this demand of the respondent is not factually correct. He also stressed that the appellant contributed to the Social Security Scheme in shape of education cess and are, therefore, not bound to provide free education to any of the children of their employees. This argument was refuted by the other learned Advocate appearing for the respondent who was of the view that the clear and unequivocal statement of the appellant should be understood in its ordinary meaning.

Headnotes / Summary

‑‑‑‑ Demand raised by workers' union‑‑‑Question whether such demand was accepted by employers‑‑‑Employees' union contended that one of its demands relating to providing education facilities to two children of employees had been accepted by employers but employers had denied such acceptance‑‑‑One of witnesses of employers had clearly stated that employers had agreed to provide funds to two children of a worker for their education up to highest level instead of one which was provided in law‑‑‑Court acting upon such admission of employer's witness, made that demand as rule of Court‑‑‑Stand of employers that such statement of their witness was not correct, could not be accepted because employers could not be allowed to turn round and disown deposition of their own witness and that too without assigning any legal and valid reason‑‑‑Court, in circumstances had committed no illegality in relying on version of employers' own witness.

Judgment & Decree

Muhammadullah Khan for Appellant. Abdul Waheed for Respondent. This appeal has been filed by the appellants from the decision of the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Peshawar dated 6‑3‑1991 whereby certain demands raised by the respondent were made award/rule of the Court.

2. The relevant background in which the appeal arises is that the respondents put up certain demands before the appellant which were, however, not acceded to. Therefore, instead of going on strike they resorted to the provisions of section 32(1‑a) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance for decision of the disputes which had thus arisen between the parties. It is to be stated at the outset that the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that he is aggrieved only of item No.20 of the Charter of Demands relating to providing education facilities to two children of workers by the appellant and would, therefore, press his appeal only to this extent. He, therefore, argued that the statement of R.W.1 wherein he accepted this demand of the respondent is not factually correct. He also stressed that the appellant contributed to the Social Security Scheme in shape of education cess and are, therefore, not bound to provide free education to any of the children of their employees. This argument was refuted by the other learned Advocate appearing for the respondent who was of the view that the clear and unequivocal statement of the appellant should be understood in its ordinary meaning.

3. I studied the record in the light of submission so made.

4. The disputed Demand No. 20 reads as: Abdur Rashid was examined by the appellant as their witness whose statement is to the effect that "As regards Demand No. 20 the Management is paying education cess. We have offered that we can provide funds to the two children of a worker for their education up to the highest level instead of one which is provided in the law. The learned Labour Court has acted upon this admission of the appellant's witness while making this demand as the rule of the Court. The stance of the appellant's counsel that this statement is not correct cannot be accepted because the appellant cannot be allowed to turn around and disown the deposition of their own witness and that too without assigning any legal and valid reason. The trial Court has understood in the same way and given the same meaning to the statement of the appellant's witness which it conveyed. The said statement is so clear which cannot be interpreted in any other manner than the one in which it was done by the trial Court. The Labour Court has, therefore, committed no illegality in relying on the version of the appellant's own witness and, therefore, I find no merit in this appeal and accordingly dismiss it with no order as to costs. H.B.T./176/Lb.N Appeal dismissed.