1988 PLP 258 (PLC)

Asadullah Siddiqi for Petitioners. M. A. Javed for Respondents. Date of hearing: 3rd March, 1987. The three revisions captioned above report that the orders dated 17‑12‑1986 recorded by learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No.5, Faisalabad whereby the petitioners have been summoned to stand trial under section 25‑A(8) of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 is without jurisdiction and of no legal effect.

2. The respondents were directed to be re‑instated in service with back benefits by learned Labour Court No.5, Faisalabad vide its orders dated 25‑10‑1986. The orders were challenged in appeals before this Tribunal and partly accepting the appeals of the petitioners the order of learned lower Court was modified holding that Safdar Azeem was entitled to back benefits with effect from 22‑8‑1985 and the remaining respondents namely Muhammad Arshad and Abdul Sattar with effect from 2‑9‑1985. Complaining that the orders of the learned lower Court No.5 were not implemented, the respondents brought three complaints under section 25‑A(8) of Industrial Relations Ordinance.

3. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners that since no period was fixed for the implementation of the decision by the learned Labour Court No.5 the complaint could not be brought by the respondents themselves. On the other hand learned counsel for the respondents has argued that the respondents had a right to bring the complaint themselves. The line of the arguments of the learned counsel for the respondents is that words "within the period specified therein" occurring in clause (a) subsection (9) of section 25‑A of Industrial Relations Ordinance mean the period fixed in subsection (8) and not by the Court. He also made reference to section 35(5)(c) of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. There is no cavil between the parties about the criminal jurisdiction of the Labour Court. The point is whether the respondents could bring the complaint themselves or should have moved the Labour Court No.5 for the purpose. I do not agree with the learned counsel for the respondent, that the words "therein" used in clause (a) of subsection (9) of 25‑A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 refer to the period given in subsection (8) and not the period fixed by the Court. Subsection (8) only defines the offence. If the orders are not implemented either within 7 days or within the period prescribed in the order or decision the offence becomes complete. Subsection (9) places an embargo upon the right of the worker in bringing the complaint. Ordinarily any person can .set the criminal law in motion and if no restriction has been placed in subsection (9), the respondents or any other person could have brought the complaint. If the intention of the Legislature had been that the complaint can be brought by the worker concerned A irrespective of the fact whether the order is not implemented within a week or within the period specified in the order or decision, there would have been no necessity of inserting subsection (9) and in those circumstances even clause (b) would have been redundant. Since the right of the worker was to be restricted, therefore, clause was inserted providing that in other cases the Court or the Tribunal which passed the order could bring the complaint. The learned counsel argued that since subsection (8) is mentioned in subsection (9), therefore, the word "therein" refers to the said section. If subsection (8) had not been mentioned in subsection (9) then the restriction placed upon the worker would have applied even with regard to the offences which ?re covered by any other provision of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 such as sections 53, 54 etc. Since the intention was that restriction of bringing the complaint should be upon the worker only in respect of the offence defined in subsection (8) therefore, the said subsection was mentioned in subsection (9). The word "therein", therefore, refers to order or decision referred to in clause (9) and not subsection (8).

4. The other argument of the learned counsel for the respondent is that since the petitioners have not complied with the orders they are not entitled to ask for the exercise of suo moto revisional powers of this Tribunal given by section 38(3)(a) and that since section 249‑A CPC gives right to the petitioner to ask the learned Labour Court 'for the dismissal of the complaint, this Tribunal may refuse to exercise suo moto revisional powers. This argument too is without force. Since the complaint brought by the respondent is not competent, therefore, it appears necessary to exercise revisional jurisdiction. Section 249‑A, C. P. C. does authorise the Magistrate to refuse to adjudicate upon the case for the reason that it has no jurisdiction. According to said section an accused is to be acquitted if after hearing both 'the parties, the Magistrate finds that the charge is groundless. Only the Magistrate who is competent to hear the case can record order of acquittal and such an order cannot be recorded on the basis that the Court has no jurisdiction. The petitioner, therefore, cannot ask the learned lower Court under section 249‑A for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the said Court has no jurisdiction.

5. As a result the revisions, are accepted and setting aside the impugned orders the complaints are filed. M.Y.H/316/Lb. P???????? Petitions accepted.