(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)﷓﷓ (PLP)

‑‑‑Art. 203‑DD‑‑‑Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1 98), S. 561‑A‑‑‑Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance. (VII of 1979), S. 16‑‑‑Quashing of proceedings‑‑‑Contention that High Court could not quash proceedings initiated against accused for an offence falling under Ordinance VII of 1979 in view of Art.203‑DD, Constitution of Pakistan (1973)‑‑‑Held, Art. 203‑DD dealt with revisional powers of Federal Shariat Court in Hudood cases which did not bar inherent jurisdiction of High Court under S. 561‑A, Cr. P. C. pending against any one in a Criminal Court. Muhammad Ghani, Advocate Supreme Court instructed by S. Inayat Hussain, Advocate‑on‑Record for Petitioner. Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing: 12th June, 1989. JAVID IQBAL, J.‑‑This petition for leave to ‑appeal is directed against the order of the Lahore High Court Multan Bench dated 29 February 1988 whereby criminal miscellaneous petition under section 561‑A of the Code of Criminal Procedure filed by Muhammad Aslam respondent was accepted and criminal proceedings as against him were ordered to be quashed. Briefly the facts are that the present petitioner laid information at Police Station Multan Cantt. on 19 February 1986 to the effect that Muhammad Aslam respondent was an accused for an offence under section 16 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance (VII of 1979) registered on the complaint of Habibullah. It was stated in the FIR by him that he as co‑villager of Habibullah and being Zamindar of the Ilaqa had helped Habibullah complainant. In order to keep the petitioner away from helping Habibullah, respondent No.l levelled false allegations against the petitioner that he was illegally detaining his wife Mst. Parveen Akhtar and was committed criminal assaults on her. The police after investigation submitted a report against respondent No.l under section 173, Cr.P.C. in the Court of Additional Sessions Judge Multan. Thereupon respondent No.l filed an application under section 265‑K, Cr.P.C. seeking his acquittal from the charge but the trial' Court dismissed the application. Then the respondent filed criminal miscellaneous petition under section 651‑A, Cr.P.C. in the High Court praying for quashment of proceedings against him. The petition as stated above was accepted. Hence the present petition filed by the petitioner as supporter of Habibullah complainant. The finding of the learned Judge is that there was nowhere any allegation or hint that Mst. Parveen Akhtar was subjected to Zina or rape by anyone and that the use of words `criminal assaults' in the circumstances of the present case only meant that she had been chained and tortured. It was on the basis of these findings of fact that the proceedings against respondent No.l were ordered to be quashed. Learned counsel before us attempted to argue that the learned Judge of the High Court could not quash proceedings initiated against respondent No‑1 for an offence falling under Ordinance VII of 1979 and pending in the Sessions Court in view of Article 203‑DD of the Constitution. According to him in cases of this nature a petition under section 561‑A, Cr.P.C. was not entertain able. We have carefully considered this argument of the learned counsel. So far as the facts of this case are concerned there is no need to give a finding on this legal point. The words 'criminal assaults' were used in a babeas corpus petition by respondent No.l and in the narration of facts it was evident that these intended to mean physical torture and not Zina as had been interpreted by the petitioner. It was in the light of these facts that the proceedings pending against respondent No.l were ordered to be quashed. As for Article 203‑DD of the Constitution, it deals with the revisional powers of the Federal Sharialt Court in Hudood cases but evidently does not bar the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under C section 561‑A Cr. P.C. pending against any one in a court of criminal jurisdiction. Since this is the position no case is made out for interference. The petitioner is accordingly dismissed. . M.A.K./M‑1037/S Petition dismissed.