2009 PLP 1051 (YLR)

SYED ASGHAR HAIDER, J.

Mst. Miraj Begum widow of Bashir Ahmed sold the disputed land to the petitioner by oral mutation No.623 dated 26-5-2003 for a consideration of Rs.1,75,000 the respon dents' predecessor Kameer gained knowledge of the same on 6-7-2003 and as enunciated by section 13 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act IX of 1991 claimed superior right to the disputed land, and after fulfilling codal and legal formalities filed a suit for pre-emption. The petitioner/ defen dant filed a contesting written statement, on the divergent pleadings of the parties, issues were framed. After hearing the counsel for the parties, the suit was dismissed on issue No.3, rest of the issues became redundant and therefore were not touched by the trial Court. The respondent, aggrieved of the judgment and decree filed an appeal, which was allowed and the judgment and decree of the trial Court set aside, directing it, to decide the same on merits on each issue. Aggrieved thereof, the present petition.

2. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the suit was filed on 16-9-2003, it was listed for hearing on 17-9-2003 and as required by section 24 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, the Court directed payment of Zar-e-Soem within a period of 30 days. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner the needful was not done within the stipulated period, as the same was deposited on 17-10-2003, whereas the target date for deposit was 16-10-2003, thus there was a delay of one day, consequently, the impugned judgment is neither in consonance with the requirement of section 24 nor in accordance with law as declared in Nabi Ahmed and others v. Muhammad Arshad and others (2008 SCMR 1685). The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that Zar-e-Soem was deposited, as directed by the trial Court within the period as enunciated by section 24 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991, the target date in this respect was 17-9-2003 in accordance with section 8 of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act, 1956, as the first day on which any order is passed, is to be excluded from the period of limitation, prescribed by law. As the needful was done, the order qua deposit was duly complied with, therefore, the petition be dismissed.

3. Heard.

4. The controversy in hand, as argued by the learned counsel for the parties, is limited only to the proposition as to whether order dated 17-9-2003 passed by the learned trial Court qua deposit of Zar-e-Soem was complied with or not. As enunciated in section 8 of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act, 1956 the first day of passing of order is to be excluded from the period of limitation, therefore, the timeframe to deposit Zar-e-Soem as directed by trial Court ended on 17-10-2003, the said deposit was made on the stipulated date, therefore, the order has been complied with substantially. The plain reading of section 24 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act bestows upon the Court powers to direct the plaintiff to deposit Zar e-Soem which should not exceed 30 days and in case the needful is not done as mandated by section 24(2) of the Act, the suit shall deem to be dismissed. The proposition has been extensively examined in the precedent referred to by the learned counsel Nabi Ahmed and others v. Muhammad Arshad and others (2008 SCMR 1685) and it has been held that "proviso to section 24(1) makes it mandatory for a Court to issue a specific direction in the context," therefore, provisions of section 24 are required to be read together. The Court is required to pass a specific order, which normally should not be more than 30 days of filing of the suit, as required by dictates of section 24 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, but opening paragraph of section 24 also requires the Court, as stated earlier, that the deposit can be made only pursuant to a direction by the Court. The law on the subject has already been interpreted by the apex Court in the precedent referred to, therefore, the period of limitation begins to run from the date on which a specific direction is issued by the Court. In the instant matter the same was done on 17-9-2003, the deposit was made on the last day viz. 17-10-2003, the first day of passing of the order as required by section 8 of the General Clauses Act clearly stipulates that the day, the order was passed cannot be included for the purposes of computation of time and the respondents, therefore are entitled to the benefit of the same. Consequently, the deposit was made within the stipulated period, as such the impugned judgment and decree is unexceptionable. Consequently, this petition has no merits and is, therefore, dismissed. M.B.A./A-10/L Petition dismissed.