P L D 1965 Dacca 288 (PLP)

T. H. Khan for the Opposite‑Party. The petitioner, claiming to be the landlord of the opposite party, filed a suit for realisation of Rs. 700 arrears of rent for a period of thirty five months beginning from Sravan, 1367 B. S. to Jaishta, 1370 B. S. at the rate of Rs. 20 per month before the Union Committee. The opposite party admitted that he was inducted as a tenant in the shop room by the petitioner and paid rent accordingly up to the time from which the petitioner claimed the defendant to have defaulted in payment. But later on when he came to know that the petitioner's lessor had no subsisting title as decided between the two contesting Sebaits of the deity, he defaulted in payment of rent to the petitioner and instead paid to the present Sebait as per decree passed in that suit. The Conciliation Court by a majority of three to two found that the opposite‑party was liable to pay Rs. 700 as arrears of rent and accordingly decreed it. Whereupon the opposite‑party moved the District Judge under clause `b' to subsection (2) of section 8 of the Conciliation Courts Ordinance (XLIV of 1961). The learned District Judge allowed the revision petition and set aside the decision of the Conciliation Court as according to him, the case fell under Section B, Part 11 of the Schedule to the Conciliation Court's Ordinance and sent the case back to the Chairman of the Conciliation Court with a direction to issue a certificate to the petitioner stating that the conciliation had failed, as provided under subsection (3) of the section 8 of the Ordinance. Hence this Rule. It is contended by the learned Advocate for the petitioner that as the opposite‑party admitted to have been inducted as a monthly tenant in the shop premises by the petitioner the case comes under Part 1, Section $ of the Schedule to the Ordinance, Section B, Part I provides: Union Councils will have jurisdiction to entertain suit for recovery of money due on contracts, receipts or other documents. Now, the question is whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the present case comes under the above provision. In my opinion, the monthly rent payable by a tenant for use and occupation of a shop as a monthly tenant is nothing but money payable under a contract. Hence the Conciliation Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit under clause 1, Section B of Part I of the Ordinance and pass a decree and the learned District Judge was wrong in holding that the case came under Part II, Section B of the Schedule to the Ordinance and the Conciliation Court had no jurisdiction to pass a decree. Mr. Khan the learned Advocate for the opposite‑party has contended that though his client, at the initial stage, admitted that he was the tenant under the petitioner and paid rent accordingly but as soon as the petitioner's lessor's title was not found in the civil Court his client (the opposite‑party) was justified in raising the plea of absence of title in the opposite party's lessor and that as such as the case involves a question of title the case comes under Part II, Section B of Schedule to the Ordinance. I do not find any substance in this contention. The dispute in the civil Court, as pointed out by Mr. Khan, was between two persons who claimed to be Sebaits of the deity, to whom the properties belong. The persons who have been found not to be legally entitled to be the Sebaits, let out to the petitioner three rooms in 1957 and in that way the petitioner has been claiming his title in them and has been enjoying, being in occupation in part and also by letting out one room to the opposite‑party. Further in that suit between the alleged Sebaits it was not decided that the lease created in favour of the petitioner by the defacto Sebait who, had been found not to be the legal Sebait of the deity, was void. At least that has not been pointed out by Mr. Khan nor it has been stated in his affidavit‑in‑opposition. Then again the opposite‑party was admittedly inducted by the petitioner and he had been paying rent to the petitioner and as such he should have paid rent regularly to the petitioner though there might have been some decree in favour of another person holding him to be the Sebait in a suit to which the petitioner does appear to have been a party, but that did not bind the petitioner in any way. Be that as it may, the petitioner admittedly, being the landlord and to have inducted the opposite‑party as a tenant on a contract to pay Rs. 20 as a monthly rent for the use and occupation of the room as a monthly tenant no question of title is involved and accordingly only a simple suit for recovery of money on contract would lie. Hence I find that the facts, as disclosed, show that the present case falls under Part I, Section B to the Schedule' of the Ordinance and so the learned District Judge acted illegally and with material irregularity in holding that the Conciliation Court had no jurisdiction to pass a decree. The learned District Judge has not found that the decision of the Conciliation Court is otherwise wrong. I accordingly, make the Rule absolute, set aside the order passed by the learned District Judge and restore the decision of the Conciliation Court. Having regard to the facts of the case. I make no order as to costs. K. B. A. Rule made absolute.