PLC 1978

1978 PLP 345 (PLC)

ABDUL REHMAN Versus MESSRS SHAHEEN CINEMA, HYDERABAD

Jurisdiction / Court
Labour Appellate Tribunal Sind
Decided Date
N/A
Honorable Judges
N/A
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1978 PLP 345 (PLC)
Forum / Court Labour Appellate Tribunal Sind
Bench Members N/A
Parties ABDUL REHMAN Versus MESSRS SHAHEEN CINEMA, HYDERABAD
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1978 PLP 345 (PLC)?

This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1978 PLP 345 (PLC)?

The case was heard and decided by the Labour Appellate Tribunal Sind bench comprising: N/A.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1978 PLP 345 (PLC) (ABDUL REHMAN Versus MESSRS SHAHEEN CINEMA, HYDERABAD). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Representation

  • Memon Abdul Latif for Respondent.
  • 4. On the other hand, Mr. M. A. Latif, the learned Advocate, appearing on behalf of the respondent hid plainly admitted his guilt and, therefore, in view of his admissions made by him in his reply to the charge‑sheet., as well as in his evidence in the Labour. Court no inquiry is necessary. The learned Advocate has relied upon a judgment reported in 1970 P L 359 where at page 365 Mr. Musbtaq Hussan Munir, Chairman, Industrial Court, West Pakistan, has held that where the petitioner in his reply to the charge‑sheet had admitted his guilt no further inquiry was called for. Mr. Latif has also argued that the Standing Orders relied upon by the appellant's Representative have no application to this case as the number of employees at the Cinema is less than twenty in number. He has further shown that the West Pakistan Shops and Establishments Ordinance, 1969 is also of no avail to the appellant for the reasons that any violation of section 19 thereof is punishable under section 27 of the same Ordinance and not justice able by the Labour Court. He has further contended that the onus lay on the appellants to prove that the number of the employees at the Cinema were twenty or more if they choose to take advantage of the Standing Orders.
  • 5. I have heard both sides in this case at great length and I have also, perused the record placed before me. To me it is plain that there is no substance in the contentions advanced by the learned Representative appearing on behalf of the appellant. Every point made by him was successfully replied to and demolished by the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent. In the result, therefore, I came to the conclusion that there was no force in this appeal and I passed a short order in Court dismissing this appeal. This judgment contains the reasons for that order.

Judgment & Decree

1970 P L C 359 ref Wasiullah Qureshi for Appellant. Memon Abdul Latif for Respondent. Date of hearing: 29th October 1977. The appellant Abdul Rehman son of Mohammad Ibrahim a former employee of Shaheen Cinema. Hyderabad. has preferred this appeal against the order of the Labour Court No. VI, Hyderabad upholding the respon dent's notice to the appellant whereby they terminated his services with one month's notice with effect from the 8th April, 1976 and also allowed him one month's salary in lieu of notice.

2. The brief facts giving rise to this matter are that the appellant was employed by the Shaheen Cinema, respondent, as a Booking Clerk and it was his duty as he himself admitted in his crossexamination in the lower Court to deposit in the Bank on the next day the money collected by him on behalf of the Cinema. In this he failed and it appears that thus a total sum of Re. 2,290 that be had received under the beads of 'Show Tax' and `News Reel', which should have been deposited in the Bank, had not so been done. Accordingly the Cinema on 5.4‑1976 served the appellant with a charge‑sheet to this effect, to which he replied on 4‑4‑1976. His reply was found unacceptable by the Cinema authorities who accordingly, terminated his service on 8‑4‑1976, as mentioned above.

3. On behalf of the appellant his learned Representative, Mr. Wasiullah Qureshi Vehemently argued this appeal raising a number of points of law. He complained that no inquiry had been held period to the order of termination of service and that this was in violation of section 15(4) of the Standing Orders. He submitted that the employees at the Cinema numbered more than twenty and that the respondents had led no evidence to show precisely how many employees they had on their rolls. They had produced neither the attendance register nor the payment resister. He further relied an section 19 of West Pakistan Shops and Establishments Ordinance, 1969 submitting that even a temporary employee requires notice and should be beard before his services are terminated.

4. On the other hand, Mr. M. A. Latif, the learned Advocate, appearing on behalf of the respondent hid plainly admitted his guilt and, therefore, in view of his admissions made by him in his reply to the charge‑sheet., as well as in his evidence in the Labour. Court no inquiry is necessary. The learned Advocate has relied upon a judgment reported in 1970 P L 359 where at page 365 Mr. Musbtaq Hussan Munir, Chairman, Industrial Court, West Pakistan, has held that where the petitioner in his reply to the charge‑sheet had admitted his guilt no further inquiry was called for. Mr. Latif has also argued that the Standing Orders relied upon by the appellant's Representative have no application to this case as the number of employees at the Cinema is less than twenty in number. He has further shown that the West Pakistan Shops and Establishments Ordinance, 1969 is also of no avail to the appellant for the reasons that any violation of section 19 thereof is punishable under section 27 of the same Ordinance and not justice able by the Labour Court. He has further contended that the onus lay on the appellants to prove that the number of the employees at the Cinema were twenty or more if they choose to take advantage of the Standing Orders.

5. I have heard both sides in this case at great length and I have also, perused the record placed before me. To me it is plain that there is no substance in the contentions advanced by the learned Representative appearing on behalf of the appellant. Every point made by him was successfully replied to and demolished by the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent. In the result, therefore, I came to the conclusion that there was no force in this appeal and I passed a short order in Court dismissing this appeal. This judgment contains the reasons for that order. Appeal dismissed.