1993 PLP 68 (PLC)
ALLAH RAKHA CHOWDHERY Versus M/s. KARACHI SHIPYARDAND ENGINEERING WORKS LTD., KARACHI
| Citation | 1993 PLP 68 (PLC) |
| Forum / Court | Labour Appellate Tribunal Sindh |
| Bench Members | N/A |
| Parties | ALLAH RAKHA CHOWDHERY Versus M/s. KARACHI SHIPYARDAND ENGINEERING WORKS LTD., KARACHI |
| Primary Law | (b) Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑‑, (c) Industrial dispute‑‑‑ |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1993 PLP 68 (PLC)?
This judgment primarily cites: (b) Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑‑, (c) Industrial dispute‑‑‑ as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1993 PLP 68 (PLC)?
The case was heard and decided by the Labour Appellate Tribunal Sindh bench comprising: N/A.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1993 PLP 68 (PLC) (ALLAH RAKHA CHOWDHERY Versus M/s. KARACHI SHIPYARDAND ENGINEERING WORKS LTD., KARACHI). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- Mirza Muhammad Kazim for Appellant.
- Ch. Muhammad Latif Saghar for Respondent.
- Date of hearing: 27th May, 1992.
Headnotes / Summary
(a) Industrial dispute‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑Promotion‑‑‑Promotion depended on so many considerations, subjective and objective in nature and nobody could claim it as of right‑‑‑Promotion could never be a subject‑matter of a petition under S.25‑A of Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969). Roshan Ali v. State Bank of Pakistan Appeal No. SUK‑384 of 1988 ref. ‑‑‑‑S. 25‑A‑‑‑Promotion could never be a subject‑matter of a petition under S.25‑A of Ordinance, 1969. ‑‑‑‑Pay‑scale‑‑‑Once there was a finality about pay of employee, pay scale of employee, could not be brought lower thereafter.
Judgment & Decree
Date of hearing: 27th May, 1992. The circumstances giving rise to this appeal, succinctly stated, are as under:‑
2. The appellant was appointed as an Estimator in 1963 and was promoted as a Senior Estimator in 1964. On 1‑9‑1973 he was re‑designated as Technical Assistant Grade‑II. On 4‑9‑1977 . he was dismissed by the respondents on the ground of absence for more than ten days without proper leave.
3. This order of dismissal came to be challenged before the Labour Court and it resulted in an order for fresh enquiry. The appellant was reinstated in service and as a result of the fresh enquiry was dismissed once again.
4. The petition before the Labour Court came to be dismissed but the Tribunal, by order, dated 13‑1‑1983 ordered reinstatement with fifty per cent back benefits. This order of the Tribunal came to be challenged in a writ petition before the High Court. It appears that it was during the pendency of the writ petition and on the Court's order that the back benefits of the appellant came to be paid up.
5. Finding no relief from the High Court the respondent had taken the matter to the Supreme Court but eventually it came to be dismissed as withdrawn on 1‑12‑1985.
6. It was, thereafter, that the appellant had filed an application under section 51 of the I.R.O. The Labour Court admitted the entire claim as presented by the appellant and the Revision before this Tribunal also came to be dismissed on 24‑3‑1988.
7. Evidently there has been a spate of litigation between the parties and the present appeal calls in question the order of the Labour Court which had dismissed the petition which? had been filed by the appellant under section 25‑A. The case of the appellant as given in the grievance notice was in the following words:‑‑ "There were TA. I, TA. II and TA. III in 1977, as estimator and senior estimators were re‑designated as T.A. III and T.A. II respectively. Management decided to abolish posts of T.A. I, II and III by the arrangement that T.A. III were only re‑designted as TA. Those working as T.A. II were first promoted as T.A. I were re‑designated as Supervisor (Selection Grade), in the year 1980. I was not on duty in 1980, but was engaged in litigation otherwise I would have been also promoted TA. I and then re‑designated as Supervisor (Selection Grade), but injustice is my fate as I have been kept as TA. and not promoted as TA. I, and re‑designated as Supervisor (S.G.), as was done in the case of those TA. II? s who were junior to me." In the petition he had however asked to be absorbed in the scale of Senior Supervisor Selection Grade in the Scale of Rs.1,000‑60‑1,600 with effect from 4‑9,1980.
8. The petition was resisted on behalf of the respondent, the main contention being that it was not "in respect of any right guaranteed or secured??.by or under any law or any award or settlement for the time being in force".
9. The learned Presiding Officer, agreeing with the contention raised on behalf of the respondents, dismissed the petition.
10. Admittedly the appellant was away from his duty for a number of years as a result of the earlier dismissal and his efficiency might have been impaired on that account to some extent. Otherwise too promotion depends on so many considerations, subjective and objective in nature, and nobody can claim it as of right. It is a trite proposition of law that it can never be a subject‑ B matter of a petition under section 25‑A of the I.R.O.
11. Since Mr. M. Latif Saghar has chosen to refer to a citation I might refer to the same, being Roshan Ali v. State Bank of Pakistan Appeal No. SUK‑384 of 1988. It is a decision from this Tribunal.
12. Mr. Mirza Muhammad Kazim during the arguments contended that the salary of the appellant may be fixed according to the quantum decided by the High Court. Since that would fall beyond the scope of the pleadings of the grievance notice it is not possible to go into the same. But it goes without saying that once there was a finality about the pay of the appellant as stated by the learned counsel, the scale simply could not be brought lower thereafter. The appeal with these words stands dismissed. H.B.T./2073/Lb.S? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Appeal dismissed.