1983 PLP 289 (PLC)

This appeal arises from the decision dated 9‑3‑19714 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No. 4, Faisalabad, whereby the petition instituted by the appellant union under section 32 (I‑A) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 was dismissed alongwith demand No. 7 for the reason that in the subsistence of an earlier settlement demand No. 7 could be made. Several demands were made which had been settled between the parties out of Court by means of settlement but regarding demand No. 7 it was agreed that the finding of the Court would be binding. The demand was :‑ " Since the employer has established a provident fund scheme, the amount of gratuity be paid in cash." The learned lower Court disallowed the demand on the ground that the earlier settlement dated 10‑1‑1976 copy of which is Exh, R. 1 was still sub sisting and no notice of its termination had been given by any of the parties to the other and in its subsistence new demand could not be raised which involved financial implications.

2. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that since the period for which the settlement, copy of which is Exh. R 1, dated 16‑1‑1976 was to .remain effective for one year, on the expiry of the said period it came to an end. He says that the provision that notice of termination of settlement should be given, does not apply to such settlement in which the period has been fixed by agreement. I do not find any force in the argument. Section 40 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 is clear on the point. It provides that settlement should continue to remain binding on the parties after the expiry of the aforesaid period till the expiry of two months from the date on which either party informs the other party in writing of its intention no longer to be bound by the settlement. The words `aforesaid period' are significant. The words cover both kinds of periods the one agreed upon between the parties at the time of settlement or the period of one year given in section

40. If the intention of the Legislature had been otherwise instead of the words `aforesaid period ', the words `one year ' would have been written. Admittedly, till the new demands were raised, none of the parties had served upon the other party any notice of termination of the settlement of 1976. ‑ So demand No. 7 could not be made.

3. The other thing is that at present the appellant union is not C.B.A. It has ceased to remain as C.B.A. and the new C.B.A. has not come forward to peruse the appeal. The union being no longer agent of the workers has no locus standi to go with the appeal. The same kind of view was taken by the Karachi High Court in N L R 1980 Labour 87 (?).

4. As a result of the observations made above, I do not find any ,force in the appeal and dismiss it. Appeal dismissed,