1994 PLP (C (PLC(CS))
MUKHTAR AHMED Versus THE SUPERINTENDING ENGINEER, MULTAN CIRCLE, WAPDA, MULTAN and another
| Citation | 1994 PLP (C (PLC(CS)) |
| Forum / Court | Federal Service Tribunal |
| Bench Members | Misbah Ullah Khan and Ch. Hasan Nawaz, Members |
| Parties | MUKHTAR AHMED Versus THE SUPERINTENDING ENGINEER, MULTAN CIRCLE, WAPDA, MULTAN and another |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1994 PLP (C (PLC(CS))?
This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1994 PLP (C (PLC(CS))?
The case was heard and decided by the Federal Service Tribunal bench comprising: Misbah Ullah Khan and Ch. Hasan Nawaz, Members.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1994 PLP (C (PLC(CS)) (MUKHTAR AHMED Versus THE SUPERINTENDING ENGINEER, MULTAN CIRCLE, WAPDA, MULTAN and another). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Representation
- Ch. Ghulam Hasan Gulshan for Respondents.
Judgment & Decree
(1) The official is hereby censured. (2) Three Annual Increments of the official are hereby stopped without future effect. (Sd.) (CH. SADIQ ALI), Superintending Engineer (E), ?WAPDA 1st Circle, Multan." ?
4. Reliance in support of appellant's case has been placed by the learned counsel on the following provisions of Fundamental Rule 54: "F.R. 54: ‑When the suspension of a Government servant is held to have been 6ojustifiable or not wholly justifiable; or when a Government servant who has been dismissed, removed or suspended is reinstated the revising or appellate authority may grant to him for the period of his absence from duty ‑‑ (a) if he is honourably acquitted, the full pay to which he would have been entitled if he had not been dismissed, removed or suspended and, by an order to be separately recorded, any allowance of which he was in receipt prior to his dismissal, removal or suspension; or (b) if otherwise, such proportion of such pay and allowances as the revising or appellate authority may prescribe. In a case falling under clause (a), the period of absence from duty will be treated as a period spent on duty. In a case falling under clause (b), it will not be treated as a period spent on duty unless the revising or appellate authority so directs.
5. The argument is that since the appellant has been honourably acquitted in the criminal case, he is entitled to full pay of the period of suspension and that the impugned order is not legally sustainable. There is no doubt about the fact that he has been acquitted in the criminal case on benefit of doubt. But the circumstance of this acquittal alone is not sufficient to entitle him to the relief claimed; which is because he has been penalised in the disciplinary proceedings against him.
6. We have already taken notice of order dated 30‑6‑1985, whereby penalty of censure and stoppage of three annual increments without future effect was awarded against him by the competent authority. This being so, he is not entitled to full emoluments of the period of suspension. The provisions of Fundamental Rule 54 could be attracted to his case only if he had also been exonerated of the charge made against him under the Disciplinary Rules. For an entitlement to full pay, acquittal should not only be in the criminal case but also in the proceedings under the Efficiency and Discipline Rules. 7.???????? Merits apart, an objection has been raised by the appellant's learned counsel that the impugned order of 7‑6‑1992 was not competent as it has neither been passed by the revising nor by the appellate authority. We hold that there is no force in this objection. As we see from the explanation under Rule 54, the "revising authority" means the "authority" or "authorised officer" as defined in the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, who passes the final order on the case and not the authority who passes an order on appeal. In view of these provisions, we feel no hesitation in saying that the impugned order of 7‑6‑1992 was passed by the competent Authority and that there is nothing legally wrong with it. .
8. For these reasons, the appeal is dismissed as being without any force. The parties are left to bear their own costs. Parties are to be informed. A.A./878/Sr.F ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Appeal dismissed.