2003 PLP 777 (PTD)

Aziz A. Shaikh for Appellant. M. Fariduddin for Respondents. In this appeal under section 36‑C of Central Excises Act, 1944, the following questions of law have been proposed by the appellant: "(1) Whether learned CEAST has misapplied the Special Procedure for collection of CE duty on supply and distribution of gas prescribed under Rule 96 ZZO of CE Rules 1944? (2) Whether learned CEAST has acted contrary to provision of section 3(1) of the CE Act, 1944 read with heading 9817.0000 of S.R.O. 456(I)796, dated 13‑6‑1996 by changing character of appellant as consumer to as producer/manufacturer merely of gas supplies to its labour colony? (3) Whether proceeding impugned initiated on 31‑5‑1999 for transactions concluded during November, 1996 to June, 1998 is barred by time under Rule 10(1) of CE Rules, 1944 read with S.R.O. 539(I)/94, dated 9‑4‑1994?" A perusal of the impugned order, with the assistance of learned Advocates shows that, the points sought to be raised before us have not been decided by the learned Tribunal. Mr. Aziz A. Shaikh, learned counsel for the appellant has shown us the grounds of appeal, raised before the Tribunal and has contended that, all these points were raised before the Tribunal but the learned Members of the Tribunal disposed of the appeal by a slipshod order, without considering all the facts and points of law raised before them. We find, substance in the contention of Mr. Aziz A. Sheikh. In such cases the difficulty before the High Court arises in deciding the actual point of law, for the reason, 'that, under the provisions of section 36‑C of the Central Excises Act, 1944, and under the analogous provisions of Customs Act and Sales Tax Act, only such questions of law can be raised before the High Court as arise out of the order of the Tribunal. Thus, if the learned Tribunal fails to pass proper judicial order by considering all the facts and points of law raised before it, it amounts to negation of justice. Every judicial order should be a speaking order and particularly in tax matters, where the scope of appeal/reference before the High Court is very limited. The Tribunal is always required to dilate upon all the questions of facts and law agitated before it, so that, the High Court is not handicapped in deciding the questions of law. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned order is set aside and the appeal is remanded back to the Customs, Excise and Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal Karachi Bench, with the direction to rehear the appeal after giving reasonable opportunity of being heard to the parties and decide all the issues of facts and law raised by the parties before the Tribunal, by an elaborate and speaking order. We further direct that, in future no appeal should be disposed by the Tribunal by a summary and slipshod order. The Tribunal is a final forum for deciding facts, and as already observed, the scope of appeal before the High Court is limited to the question of law arising out of the order of the Tribunal, therefore, the Tribunal should not merely dispose of the appeals but should decide the same, meaning thereby, that, each and every point of fact and law should be given due consideration and be decided by speaking order. The appeal stands disposed of as above. S.A.K./E‑19/K Appeal disposed of.