1999 PLP 1604 (YLR)

Mahmood Khan and Rashid Ali, petitioners have sought quashment under section 561‑A, Cr.P.C. of the F. I. R. No. 19, dated 15‑1‑1996 Police Station, West Cantt. and the proceedings initiated thereunder.

2. As per F.I.R. lodged by Muhammad Zamin, respondent No.1, he was owner of the Tractor which was given to the petitioner No.1 who undertook to pay him earnings to be earned on it. For some time he was paid some amount but later on it was stopped on the pretext that. the Tractor had met an accident. The complt:/respondent No. l probed into the matter and came to know that petitioner No. l has sold the Tractor to one Rashid (petitioner No.2 herein).

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the report is mala fide one and could not be registered at Peshawar as the Tractor was given to petitioner No. 1 on hire for Swat and the same was recovered by the police from Swat. He also stated that the police is interested and in collusion with the complainant/respondent No. l is not investigating the case properly and honestly.

4. On the other hand learned counsel for respondent No. l and the Law Officer for the State contended that the application is not competent as the case has not yet been put in Court and the process of the Court has not yet been started, therefore, there is no question of the abuse of the process of the Court.

5. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and going through the record of the case I am of the opinion that the F.I.R. or investigation initiated therefrom cannot be quashed under section 561‑A, Cr.P.C. It has been held by the apex Court of the Country in "Ahmed Saeed v. The State and another" (1996 SCMR 186) as under:‑‑ "We have carefully attended to the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the parties. We feel persuaded to agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner that the High Court, in exercise of its powers under section 561‑A, Cr.P.C., was not competent to quash the F.I.R. We find that the investigation was not complete and no challan had been submitted in the Court when petition for quashment of the F.I.R. was filed in the High Court. The High Court, under its inherent powers, may quash judicial proceedings, if it was of the view that the proceedings amount to an abuse of the process of Court. Since no proceedings were pending in the Court by the time the quashment petition was filed in the High Court, the question of preventing the abuse of process of any Court did not arise in this case. A plain reading of section 561‑A, Cr.P.C. shows. that nothing in the Criminal Procedure Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to given effect to any order under the Criminal Procedure Code, or to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In the instant case neither any order was made by any Court nor any process was issued by any Court. So, the question of making such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Criminal Procedure Code or to prevent abuse of process of any Court does not arise. We are afraid that the High Court under section 561‑A, Cr.P.C. could not quash F.I.R. on the ground of mala fide or on the ground that F.I.R. discloses civil liability. Since we have held that the High Court had no powers to quash the F.I.R. under section 561‑A, Cr.P.C. we need not examine correctness of the reasons given by it for quashing F. I. R." In view of the above, this application for quashment under section 561‑A, Cr.P.C. is not maintainable, as such it is rejected. However, the investigation of the case is directed to be entrusted to the C.I.A. for impartial investigation who should complete the case within a month and thereafter, challan be put in the Court of competent jurisdiction. H.B.T./438/P Application rejected.