1994 PLP 1132 (SCMR)
THE BOARD OF INTERMEDIATE AND SECONDARY EDUCATION, SARGODHA and 2 others‑‑‑Petitioners Versus MUHAMMAD NASIR ALI KHAN and another‑‑‑Respondents
| Citation | 1994 PLP 1132 (SCMR) |
| Forum / Court | Supreme Court of Pakistan |
| Bench Members | Muhammad Afzal Zullah, CJ. and Wali Muhammad Khan, J |
| Parties | THE BOARD OF INTERMEDIATE AND SECONDARY EDUCATION, SARGODHA and 2 others‑‑‑Petitioners Versus MUHAMMAD NASIR ALI KHAN and another‑‑‑Respondents |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1994 PLP 1132 (SCMR)?
This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1994 PLP 1132 (SCMR)?
The case was heard and decided by the Supreme Court of Pakistan bench comprising: Muhammad Afzal Zullah, CJ. and Wali Muhammad Khan, J.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1994 PLP 1132 (SCMR) (THE BOARD OF INTERMEDIATE AND SECONDARY EDUCATION, SARGODHA and 2 others‑‑‑Petitioners Versus MUHAMMAD NASIR ALI KHAN and another‑‑‑Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Representation
- Riazul Hassan Gillani, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Imtiaz Muhammad Khan, Advocate‑on‑Record for Petitioners.
- Nemo for Respondents.
- Date of hearing: 7th October, 1992.
Headnotes / Summary
(On appeal from the judgment dated 19‑4‑1992 of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi, in Civil Revision No. 146 of 1992). (a) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑S. 5‑‑‑Time‑barred appeal ‑‑‑Condonation of delay‑‑‑Appeal dismissed as time‑barred‑‑‑Validity‑‑‑Petitioners had not been able to show with reference to specific events and elements in the case, that there was good cause for condonation ‑‑‑Petitioners had failed to rely on any material which might have been ignored, misread or misinterpreted‑‑‑Petitioners were not entitled to condonation of delay in filing time‑barred appeal. (b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑S. 22(1)‑‑‑Constitution of Pakistan 1973), Art. 185(3)‑‑‑Time‑barred appeal filed before lower Appellate Court, was dismissed‑‑‑Petitioner's argument in petition for leave to appeal was that Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education was an institution independent of persons who control, run and manage it and because it was not a party independently arraigned before Trial Court, therefore, it had a special position and thus, time‑barred appeal filed b~ it should have been entertained notwithstanting the examination of limitation‑‑‑Such argument was fallacious for the reason that interests of Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education were fully safeguarded, there being no clash between its functionaries inter se‑‑‑Chairman of the Board and Controller of Examination, had in fact acted in the best interest of the Board‑‑ Petitioner's argument being hypertechnical would not furnish enough justification for interference‑‑‑Leave to appeal was refused in circumstances. WAPDA v. Alain Khan PLD 1991 SC 374 rel.
Judgment & Decree
MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, CJ.‑‑‑The defendants' side in a suit for correction of birth entry recorded in the papers of the petitioners, has called in question the dismissal by the High Court of their Civil Revision. Earlier they had lost throughout.‑ One consideration which prevailed with the High Court was that the petitioners' appeal before a lower Court was time‑barred. Learned counsel admits that the appeal was time‑barred but has advanced two arguments to overcome this point. One, that the Government and similar other institutions should like ordinary litigants be permitted to satisfy the Court with regard to the normal human errors and elements due to which sometimes innocent delay occurs and the subject of condonation should be dealt with without any discrimination against the Government or semi‑Government Institutions. In so far as the pure theoretical position is concerned, learned counsel is absolutely right. When questioned; as to whether, the petitioners have been able to show with reference to specific events and elements in this case that there was good cause for condonation, he has failed to rely on any material which might have been ignored, misread or misinterpreted. This argument has, therefore, no force. Secondly, the learned counsel stated that the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education who is the first petitioner herein is an institution independent of the persons who control and run and manage it and because it was not a party independently arraigned before the trial Court, therefore, it had a special position and thus a time‑barred appeal filed by it should have been entertained notwithstanding the examination of limitation. We do not agree with him. The Institution is today represented through him. Earlier it was represented before the trial Court through petitioners Nos.2 and 3 as well as their lawyers. The interests of the Institution were fully safe guarded. There was no clash between the petitioners' interests inter se. It is unimaginable that the Chairman of the Board who is petitioner No.2 and the Controller of Examinations who is petitioner No.3 could not have, if they so wished, acted in the best interest of the Board itself. The argument being hypertechnical does not furnish enough justification for interference‑‑‑See WAPDA v. Alam Khan (PLD 1991 SC 374). There being no ground for interference leave to appeal thus is refused. AA./B‑223/S Leave refused.