P L D 1959 W (PLP)

The dispute between the parties relates to a registered deed of gift dated 25‑4‑

50. Initially, mutation No. 166 was recorded for purposes of incorporating the gift in the Revenue records. The mutation was sanctioned by an Assistant Collector of the II Grade, but the Collector cancelled his order on the, ground that he did not possess territorial jurisdiction. The fresh pro ceedings of the Assistant Collector were taken on a newly‑entered mutation No.

170. The Collector's order had been passed on 9‑11‑

53. The Assistant Collector rejected this mutation on 29‑6‑

54. An appeal to the Collector was unsuccessful. A petition for revision before the Commissioner, however, resulted in the mutation being sanctioned in favour of the donee. One of the reasons why the Assistant Collector refused in 1954 to incorporate the gift was that the donor had in the meantime executed another deed purporting to revoke the gift. This revocation deed had been registered at his instance in December 1953. I have no hesitation in deciding that the Assistant Collector should have disregarded the deed of revocation which was executed more than three years subsequent to the date on which the original gift deed had been registered. The Revenue authorities should find the execution and the registration of a regular deed of gift adequate for incorporating the gift in the Revenue records if the following two conditions are satisfied:- (1) That the deed should state that possession had been made over to the donee ; and (2) That the donor should admit that he executed the document. My attention has been invited to Mr. Latif's decision in Nazar Hussain v. Ghulam Muhammad (1935 Lah. Law Times, page 5). A gift had been recorded on 15‑3‑33, and a deed of revocation in respect of that gift had been executed on 16‑5‑

33. The Assistant Collector's order rejecting the mutation was dated 30‑9‑31 Mr. Latif decided that a unilateral recital in a registered deed, which was negatived by a recital in another deed registered before the Revenue Officer was seized of the case, should not bind the donor. The present case is distinguishable, because a Revenue Officer had actually dealt with the mutation before the revocation deed was executed. In any case, I am not in agreement with Mr. Latif's decision and would like that the deed of gift should be given effect to in the Revenue records, even if the donor decides to execute a deed of revocation. Such a deed of revocation can be utilized by the donor for requesting the Revenue Officers to record a fresh mutation. In the above circumstances, I need not go into the question whether the gift in dispute was a simple gift or it was a `Hiba Bil‑Iwaz,' nor into the question of the quantum of evidence needed for proving that possession had in fact been transferred to the donee. A Revenue Officer is not constituted so that he may be able to examine such matters in detail. The proper forum for obtaining decisions on such points is to be found in a competent Civil Court. I, therefore, hold that the Commissioner was justified in deciding to incorporate the gift in the Revenue records. I accord ingly dismiss this petition for revision. K. M. A. Petition rejected.