1971 PLP 594 (SCMR)

WAHEEDUDDIN AHMAD, J.‑This order will dispose of Civil Petitions Nos. K‑94, K‑95, K‑96 and K‑97 of 1971, in which common questions of facts and law, are involved. In 1964, the respondent applied to the Chairman of Union Committee No. 3 at Shahdadpur under section 4 of the Conciliation Courts Ordinance, 1961 and claimed decrees for various amounts in the above‑mentioned matters. The Chairman did not notice that the claim of the respondent was barred by time and proceeded to constitute a Conciliation Court. The Conciliation Court passed decrees of various amounts against the petitioner. The respondent applied to the Court of Civil Judge at Shahdadpur in Execution Applications Nos. 19, 18, 20 and 17 of 1964 respectively for the execution of the decrees obtained against the petitioner. The petitioner contested the said execution applications, amongst others, on the ground that the claim before the Conciliation Court being barred by time and it had no jurisdiction to execute the decrees. The learned Civil Judge, Shahdadpur, dismissed the execution applications holding that the decrees being for a patently time‑barred claims were nullities and were not executable. Respondent challenged these orders in various appeals filed by him which were dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, Sanghar. The matter was then taken in the High Court of Sind and Baluchistan, Karachi, in second appeals which were dismissed by the High Court on the 30th November 1965. The respondent challenged these orders in L. P. As. which were heard by a Division Bench of the High Court. The Division Bench of the High Court accepted the appeals by order dated the 17th February 1971 and set aside the order of the Subordinate Courts. It directed the executing Court not to decline to execute the decrees of the Conciliation Court merely on the ground that the claims decreed were time‑barred. The petitioner seeks permission to file an appeal against the said orders. In support of the petitions, Mr. Noor Mohammad learned counsel for the petitioner, has contended that a decree passed on a time‑barred claim is a nullity and, therefore, the executing Court is competent to go behind the decree and refuse to execute the same. In support of the contention, the learned counsel has referred to the cases of Messrs Grain & Fodder Agencies v. Mohammad Swaleh and another (P L D 1962 Kar. 9), Piroj Shah & Co. v. Qarib Shah (A I R 1926 Lah. 379) and Islamic Republic of Pakistan v. Mohammad Saeed (P L D 1966 S C 192). None of these decisions support the contention of the petitioner. In the first mentioned case, a learned Single Judge of the West Pakistan High Court, Karachi held that wrong decision that suit is not time‑barred amounts to wrong assumption of jurisdiction. He further held that the decision, however, stands until set aside in appeal, revision or review. In the second case, a learned Single Judgle of the Lahore High Court held that it is a case of illegal assumption of jurisdiction within section 115 where a Court grants in favour of the applicant a prayer contained in a time‑barred application for which the law does not permit extension of time. In the case of Islamic Republic of Pakistan v. Mohammad Saeed, it was held as under:‑ "Questions relating to the excitability of an order or decree can be raised even in execution proceedings and it is open to the party against whom it is sought to be executed to show that it is null and void or had been made without jurisdiction or that it is incapable of execution." The point in the present case is entirely different here. The question is whether a decree passed in a time‑barred claim is null and void or not. In our opinion, it is not a nullity in the eye of law and the Letters Patent Bench was perfectly justified in holding that the executing Court cannot go behind it. There is no force in the petitions. The petitions are dismissed. Leave refused.