1973 PLP 206 (SCMR)

Ch. Ismat Khan Anan, Advocate Supreme Court instructed by Ghulam Mujtiba, Advocate‑on‑Record for Petitioner. Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing : 13th March 1973. ANWARUL HAQ, J.‑The petitioner's suit for possession of certain agricultural land by pre‑emption was dismissed by the trial Court on the ground of limitation, as the sale had been registered on 18‑5‑1962, whereas the suit was filed on 12‑2‑1969. This finding has been upheld in first and second appeals respectively, by the learned District Judge, Sialkot and a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court. It is submitted by the learned counsel that all the Courts below have fallen in error in not allowing to the petitioner the benefit of section 18 of the Limitation Act, although the petitioner had pleaded fraud on the part of the vendee inasmuch as the transaction of sale had been kept concealed from the plaintiff for nearly seven years. It is contended that the petitioner was gravely prejudiced by the failure of the trial Court to frame a specific issue on the question of fraud, and that in any case mere registration of the sale did not operate as a notice to the petitioner in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case. In support of this last submission, Mr. Ghulam Mujtiba has placed reliance on Tilakdhari Lai and another v. Khedan Lai and others (A I R 1921 P C 112) and Mst. Zamrut v. Abdul Wahid (P L D 1964 Pesh. 224). After hearing the learned counsel, we are of the view that there is no merit in these submissions. The suit was undoubtedly barred by time, as the period of limitation provided under Article 10 of the 1st Schedule to the Limitation Act, is one year from the date of registration of the instrument of sale. As already stated, the suit in this case was filed nearly seven years after the date of registration. The only question, therefore, is whether the petitioner was entitled to the benefit of section 18 of the Limitation Act which provides that the time limited for instituting the suit against the person guilty of the fraud or accessory thereto, shall be computed from the time when the fraud first became known to the plaintiff. In order to take advantage of this section, it was necessary for the petitioner to give particulars of the fraud com mitted by the vendee in connection with the registration of the instrument of sale, and keeping it secret for seven years. Ordinarily, the registration of sale would be notice to all and sundry. The only fraud alleged by the petitioner was that in ‑the revenue records the vendee continued to be described as' a lessee and not as a vendee. It will be seen that the wrong description of the vendee in the revenue records could not amount to fraud on the part of the vendee, as he was not the person who had to make the necessary entry of sale in the revenue records. Nothing was alleged in the plaint or at the trial to show that the vendee had in any manner falsified the revenue record. It is common knowledge that once a sale has been registered, the duty lies upon the Registrar of documents to send the necessary intimation to the Collector of the district who is then responsible for incorporating the sale in the revenue records of the village concerned. If these processes were not carried out by the official functionaries, it could hardly be said that their omissions amounted to fraud on the part of the vendee. In the light of what we have said above, the Courts below were clearly right in holding that the particulars of fraud had not been given by the petitioner, and he had failed to establish the commission of any fraud by the vendee. The petitioner was therefore, not entitled to the benefit of section 18 of the Limita tion Act, and his suit was rightly dismissed as being barred by time. The petition therefore, fails and is hereby dismissed. Petition dismissed.