P L D 1982 Supreme Court 256 (PLP)
Mufti SANAULLAH AND ANOTHER‑Appellants Versus DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, SARGODHA AHD 8 OTHERS‑
| Citation | P L D 1982 Supreme Court 256 (PLP) |
| Forum / Court | ‑‑ S. 31 as amended by Punjab Local Government (Amendment) Ordi nance (IV of 1981)‑No‑confidence motion‑Word "interval" in subsections (2) & (3) of S. 31‑To be read with second and subsequent motion of no‑confidence and not with initial period of six months‑Con tention as to interval of six months having to be added by a period of 30 days by virtue of subsection (3) of S. 31, held, fallacious for reason of no‑confidence motion having not been second or subsequent motion but first motion.‑Words and phrases. |
| Bench Members | Single Bench |
| Parties | Mufti SANAULLAH AND ANOTHER‑Appellants Versus DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, SARGODHA AHD 8 OTHERS‑ |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in P L D 1982 Supreme Court 256 (PLP)?
This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case P L D 1982 Supreme Court 256 (PLP)?
The case was heard and decided by the ‑‑ S. 31 as amended by Punjab Local Government (Amendment) Ordi nance (IV of 1981)‑No‑confidence motion‑Word "interval" in subsections (2) & (3) of S. 31‑To be read with second and subsequent motion of no‑confidence and not with initial period of six months‑Con tention as to interval of six months having to be added by a period of 30 days by virtue of subsection (3) of S. 31, held, fallacious for reason of no‑confidence motion having not been second or subsequent motion but first motion.‑Words and phrases. bench comprising: Honorable Judges.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: P L D 1982 Supreme Court 256 (PLP) (Mufti SANAULLAH AND ANOTHER‑Appellants Versus DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, SARGODHA AHD 8 OTHERS‑). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Representation
- M. Hussain A wan Advocate, Supreme Court, instructed by Rana Maqbool Ahmad Qadri, Advocate‑on‑Record (absent) for Appellant.
- Mujibur Kahman, Advocate Supreme Court, instructed by Imtiaz Muhammad Khan, Advocate‑on‑Record for Respondent No. 2.
- Muhammad Nawaz Abbasi Advocate Supreme Court, instructed by M. Aslam Chowdhry Advocate‑on‑Record (absent) for Appellant.
- Date of hearing : 13th April, 1982.
Headnotes / Summary
(On appeal from the judgment and order dated 29th January and 23rd January, 1982 of the Lahore High Court in Writ Petitions Nos. 5520 of 1981 and 273 of 1982, respectively). Punjab Local Government Ordinance (VI of 1979)‑ ‑‑ S. 31 [as amended by Punjab Local Government (Amendment) Ordi nance (IV of 1981)]‑No‑confidence motion‑Word "interval" in subsections (2) & (3) of S. 31‑To be read with second and subsequent motion of no‑confidence and not with initial period of six months‑Con tention as to interval of six months having to be added by a period of 30 days by virtue of subsection (3) of S. 31, held, fallacious for reason of no‑confidence motion having not been second or subsequent motion but first motion.‑[Words and phrases]. Civil Appeal No. 11/82 Civil Appeal No. 12i82
Judgment & Decree
M. BURHANUDDIN KHAN, J.‑By Civil Appeal No. 11‑1982 Mufti Sanaullah seeks to set aside the order of the Lahore High Court in writ petition No. 5520 of 1981, dated 29‑11‑1981 and by Civil Appeal No. 12‑1982 Ghulam Ali seeks to set aside order of the same High Court in writ petition No. 273 of 1982. Both these writ petitions were dismissed by the impugned orders of the High Court.
2. The facts of Civil Appeal No. 11‑1982 briefly stated are that the appellant was a member of the Town Committee. Miani, Tehsil Bhalwal, District Sargodha and was elected as Chairman on 20‑12‑1979. He took oath of his office on 1‑1‑1980. He received an intimation on 7‑10‑1981 from the Deputy Commissioner, Sargodha respondent No. 1 for convening a special A meeting to consider the Motion of no‑confidence against him. A meeting was fixed for 15‑10‑1981 which was to be presided over by the A. C, Bhalwal, District Sargodha. In pursuance of the aforesaid order of respondent No. 1 the meeting was convened on the said date and the Motion was carried out by votes of 9 out of I1 which constituted the requisite 2/3rd majority. To fill up the vacancy a bye‑election' was held on 19‑11‑1981 wherein respondent No. 2 was elected unopposed. The appellant challenged the resolution dated 15‑10‑1981 and the order of his removal from the office of Chairman through writ Petition No. 5520 of 1981 which was dismissed in limine vide the impugned judgment.
3. In Civil Appeal No. 12‑1982 the facts briefly are that the appellant was elected Chairman, Local Council No. 77, Tehsil Chiniot, District Jhang, and took over the charge as Chairman on 17‑1‑1980. A resolution for a vote of no‑confidence was moved by respondents Nos. 2 to 8 on 17‑1‑1982 and respondent No. 1 directed the Project Manager to preside over the meeting of no‑confidence fixed for 27‑1‑1982. Before that date the appellant moved the High Court through writ petition No. 273 of 1982 which was dismissed vide the impugned order dated 23rd January, 1982.
4. Leave was granted by this Court vide order dated 2‑2‑1982 in Civil Petitions Nos. 1134‑1981 and 62‑1982 of the aforesaid two appellants, for interpretation of section 31 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979 as amended by Ordinance IV of 1981.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 11‑1982 contended that the appellant took oath of office as Chairman on 1‑1‑1980 and assumed charge of his office on 17‑1‑1980. The motion of No‑Confidence and resultant decision of his removal from the office, in a meeting held on 15‑10‑1981, was not competent after the expiry of 30 days beyond the interval of six months from the date of assumption of the office.
6. Considering the contention of the learned counsel we find that section 31 of the Ordinance read with the amendments which came into force on 29‑3‑1981, subsection! (2) (of section 31) clearly provides that the first motion has to be moved after six months from the date of assumption of office but in the instant case more than six months and 30 days had passed when the resolution was moved and the Motion was carried against the appellant. The argument that intervals of over six months have to be added by a period of 30 days by virtue of subsection (3) of section 31, is fallacious for the simple reason that it was not a second or subsequent Motion. For reference section 31 of the Ordinance (in original language) is reproduced below; "
31. Vote of no‑confidence.‑A Chairman or Vice‑Chairman shall vacate office if a vote of no‑confidence is passed against him in the manner prescribed, by two third majority of the total number of members of the local council electing him Provided that (a) a motion of no‑confidence shall not be moved before the expiry of six months of his assumption of office as Chairman or Vice Chairman, and (b) where a motion of no‑confidence against a Chairman or a Vice Chairman has been moved and has failed to secure the requisite majority of votes in its favour at the meeting, no similar motion will be moved against him before the expiry of six months from the date such motion was moved." In juxtaposition section 31 as amended by Ordinance IV of 1981 is also reproduced below "
31. Vote of no‑confidence.‑(1) A Chairman or Vice Chairman shall vacate office if a vote of no‑confidence is passed against him in the manner prescribed, by two third majority of the total number of members of the local council electing him. (2) A motion of no‑confidence against a Chairman or Vice‑Chairman shall not be moved before the expiry of six months from the date of his assumption of the office, and a second or subsequent motion shall not be moved except with an interval of six months between the first and the second motion or any two subsequent motions. (3) A motion of no‑confidence shall not be competent after the expiry of thirty days beyond every interval of six months provided under subsection (2) and in such a situation it shall be deemed to have been moved and rejected for the purpose of subsection (2)."
7. Learned counsel stressed on the language of subsection (3) wherein it had been laid down that no motion will be competent after the expiry of 30 days beyond every interval of six months while in the instant case, no confidence motion was moved and passed on 15‑10‑1981 i. e. beyond the period "30 days after the expiry of six months" from the assumption of charge. Therefore, it was illegal, inoperative and void. This argument has not impressed us because the wording of subsection (3) would show that the limit of 30 days is for the second or subsequent motions, and this has a reason behind it, i. e. if the second or subsequent motion of no con fidence are allowed without any period of limitation then the Chairman holding the office will be under a constant fear of a no‑confidence motion without any 'time limit like a sword of Damocles hanging over his head 'B indefinitely, but as regards the first six months which cannot be termed as `interval' because it is the first period after the assumption of office, there is no such limit placed for moving a resolution beyond a period of 30 days. This appeal, therefore, has no merit, and is accordingly dismissed.
8. In Civil Appeal No. 12‑1982 the learned counsel contends that the appellant was elected as Chairman of Local Council No. 77, Tehsil Chiniot, District Jhang, and took over the charge of his office on 17‑1‑1980 ; the resolution for vote of no confidence was moved by the respondents Nos. 2 to 8 on 17‑1‑1982 and respondents No. 1 directed the Project Manager to preside over the meeting of No‑Confidence which was fixed for 27‑1‑1982 well over a period of two years, and, therefore, no‑confidence motion could not be moved against the petitioner on the ground that the period under the law had expired and the resolution not being in conformity with section 31 read with subsections (2) and (3), of the Ordinance is, therefore, liable to be quashed.
9. For the reasons given in the foregoing paragraphs we cannot agree with the learned counsel regarding the interpretation of subsections (2) and (3) of section 31 of the aforesaid Ordinance because the word `interval' is to be C read with second and subsequent motion and not with the initial period of six months. This appeal has no merit and the same is also `dismissed. s. A. H. Appeal dismissed.