P L D 1982 Supreme Court 460 (PLP)

ZAFFAR HUSSAIN MIRZA, J.‑This is an appeal by special leave, arising from the judgment of a Division Bench of the Sind High Court, dated 19‑9‑1975, dismissing the Constitutional Petition filed by the appellant seeking to challenge the order passed by the Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal, Karachi. While considering the petition for special leave to appeal, the leave granting Bench of this Court noticed inconsistency of view of a question of law in two earlier decisions of this Court, Punjab Road Transport Corporation v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal (1) and Muhammad Shamim v. Pakistan Tobacco Co. Ltd. (2). The question of law in these two decisions related to the interpretation of Standing Order No. 15 (4) contained in the Schedule to the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. While in the first mentioned decision, the view taken was that "it was necessary and consistent with the principles of natural justice that not only the respondent should have been furnished with a copy of the inquiry report but also he should have been given an opportunity to show cause why the order of dismissal should not be passed against him". In the second decision referred to above, the principle laid down in the first decision was held not attracted because the petitioner did not ask for a copy of the inquiry report to be supplied to him. Leave was, therefore, granted to resolve the inconsistency of view in these two decisions. The facts briefly are that three workers of the appellant were dismissed following an inquiry into charges of misconduct against them. The inquiry was preceded by a show‑cause notice and replies made by the dismissed employees. The respondent Union thereupon raised an Industrial dispute under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. Eventually the Provincial Government referred this dispute under section 32 of the said Ordinance, to the Fifth Sind Labour Court, Karachi. The Labour Court gave an award in favour of the respondent Union, directing the re‑instatement of the workers concerned, with full back benefits. The appellant being, dissatisfied with the award, filed an appeal before the Sind Appellate Court and the decision of the Fifth Sind Labour Court was set aside. Thereupon, the respondent Union filed a Constitutional petition before the erstwhile High Court of Sind & Baluchistan, Karachi, which was allowed by the impugned judgment by a Division Bench of that Court. The decision of the High Court was based on the ground that inasmuch as admittedly no second show‑cause notice had been given to the three dismissed workers, their dismissal was without lawful authority. Support was sought for this view by the learned Judges from the decision of this Court in Punjab Road Transport Corporation's case above referred to. Since the date of the leave granting order in this case, however, a larger Bench of this Court had occasion to examine the precise question of law raised in this case, namely, whether Standing Order No. 15 (4) prescribes the giving of a second show‑cause notice after the inquiry is completed and after considering the question at length in the light of relevant case‑law was answered in the negative, in the case of Dawood Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Guftar Shah (3). The case of Punjab Road Transport Corporation was also duly noticed by the Court and it was held that the said case does not lay down the broad principle that furnishing of a copy of the inquiry report and service of a second show‑cause notice, form part of the rules of natural justice or for that matter to be spelled out from the provision under consideration. Similar view was held in another recent case of this Court, as Muhammad Rauf v. Messrs Makram Fisheries Ltd. (4). (1) 1973 S C M R 455 (2) 1975 S C M R 46 (3) P L D 1981 S C 225 (4) 1981 S C M R 631 These decisions, in our view, are sufficient to dispose of this appeal, as is also conceded by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent Union He, however, urged that the view taken in these decisions requires to be re‑examined as certain aspects of the question of law had not been brought to the notice of the learned Judges who decided these cases. He submitted that on a proper reading of Standing Order No. 15, it will appear that four types of punishments can be awarded to a workman found guilty of mis conduct, namely, fine, withholding of increment or promotion, reduction to a lower post, and dismissal from service, but it is only in the case of last mentioned punishment that clause (4) of Standing Order No. 15, provides for mandatory requirement of notice in writing to be issued to a workman intend ed to be so punished. The contention of the learned counsel was that the proper interpretation of this provision would be that notice has to be served on the accused employee in terms of this clause after the employer has made up his mind to inflict the punishment of dismissal upon the employee, which will necessarily be after the completion of the inquiry into his misconduct. We find no force in this contention and do not think it furnishes a ground for re‑examination of the view taken in Dawood Colton Mills' case _ by a larger Bench of this Court. The question, if we may say so with respect, has boon examined thoroughly keeping in view all relevant consider ations and the provisions in question and it has been found that the' language of the enactment does not spell out the requirement to serve a further notice after the inquiry is completed. The precise argument was repelled in the case of Muhammad Rauf, referred to above, and it was observed :‑ "Now, although leave has been granted to examine the validity of the A construction which learned counsel seeks to place upon Standing Order 15 (4), this provision, for example, is quite different from Standing Order 12 (3). And, a unlike Standing Order 12 (3), Standing Order 15 (4) does not in terms refer to a second show‑cause notice." We are fully in agreement with the view expressed in this passage and the contention does not merit further consideration. It was then feebly contended that the Inquiry Officer had taken into consideration matters extraneous to the charges levelled against the employees, and, therefore, this was a ground for furnishing a fresh show‑cause notice This plea does not seem to have been raised before the High Court and also is not sustainable on merits. The inquiry report does not appear to us to contain any extraneous matter by which the employees could have been possibly prejudiced. In view of the foregoing reasons, we allow this appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court, dated 19‑9‑1975, in Constitutional Petition No. 469 of 1974, with the result that the order, dated. 7‑2‑1974, passed by the Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal, Karachi, shall stand restored. In the circumstances of this case, there will be no order as to costs. s. A. H. Appeal alto wed.