P L D 1958 (W (PLP)

Where, therefore, a person, in possession of an evacuee house who was a mere licensee of the allottee of the house was asked by the latter to vacate the house, it was contended that the house being an evacuee property the allottee had no power to require him to. vacate the house in view of the provisions of section 29 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilita tion) Act, 1958. Held, that the dispute, being exclusively between him and the allottee of the house had. nothing whatever to do with the manage ment of evacuee property, he was not entitled to invoke in his favour any provision either of the Displaced Persons Act or of ally other evacuee law. Malik Muhammad Akram, for Petitioner. Date of hearing : 29th July 1958. Admittedly the house in question was allotted to, or placed at the disposal of, the respondent No. 1, Commander, Military Engineer Services, Lahore Cantonment, by the Rehabilitation Department. The respondent No. I permitted the petitioner, an officer in the Engineering Services under the respondent, and another military officer to occupy, each, a half portion of the said house. The petitioner has now resigned from military service and has been asked by the first respondent to vacate the portion of the house in his occupation. The petitioner contends that the house being an evacuee property the first respondent has no power to require him to vacate the house in view of the provisions of section 29 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, I have little doubt in my mind that the position taken up by the petitioner is wholly misconceived. Section 29 of the Displaced Persons Act is inapplicable because the petitioner is not being required by either the Custodian or any Rehabilitation authority to vacate the house. Section 29 says : "* * * * * * * no order of ejectment passed on or after the 17th day of February 1958 by any authority in respect of any house * * * * shall be given effect to." In the entire context of the Act, the expression "order of ejectment" clearly indicates that the person in possession is protected against only an order passed by an authority having the power to make it in respect of evacuee property. Such an order under the Evacuee Laws can be passed only by a Rehabilitation authority in respect of an evacuee property. In the present case, the petitioner was not let into possession of the property by any Rehabilitation authority either expressly or impliedly. He is, therefore, neither an allottee nor a licensee of the Rehabilitation Department. Admittedly he is in possession as a mere licensee from the first respondent. The military authori ties decided to provide the petitioner with accommodation and they gave half portion of the house to him. The petitioner was not concerned with the nature of the title of the first respondent to that house. It did not matter to the petitioner as to how the military authorities had got the house. The dispute being exclusively between the petitioner and an authority who has nothing whatever to do with the management of evacuee property, the petitioner is not entitled to invoke in his favour any provision either of the Displaced Persons Act or of any other evacuee law. As between the first respondent and the petitioner the latter has no right, legal or moral, to resist the claim of the former. Section 29 is also inapplicable because (a) no "order for ejectment" has been passed against the petitioner, and (b) the first respondent is not an "authority" within the meaning of that section. The petition is dismissed. A. H. Petition dismissed.