2001 PLP 364 (PLC)

Muhammad Ozair Qureshi v. Chairman, National Construction Co. Ltd., Karachi and others 1982 PLC 17 ref. Ghulam Nabi for Appellant. Muhammad Jamil for Respondent. Date of hearing: 9th January, 2001. Muslim Commercial Bank Limited through its General Manger, N.‑W.F.P. has tiled this appeal under section 37(3) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 against the judgment, dated 24‑3‑1998 of the learned Labour Court Peshawar whereby Muhammad Ashfaq Ali alias Goggy, an Ex‑Cashier of the Bank was reinstated on acceptance of his grievance petition dated 12‑6‑1996 against his dismissal from service dated 6‑2‑1996.

2. The factual background of the case is that by delivering cash on production of a fake token, the respondent had brought a huge loss to the Bank and also was guilty of fraud. An F.I.R. was registered against him on 5‑11‑1995 by F.I.A. after which the Banking Tribunal released him on bail. On his reporting arrival, he was dismissed from service on 6‑2‑1996. According to the respondent, he served grievance notice on 5‑5‑1996 and filed grievance petition on 12‑6‑1996. The record shows that a proper charge‑sheet was served upon the respondent after a preliminary inquiry in which he was held guilty. Thereafter, a regular inquiry was conducted and Mr. Mazullah Khan was appointed as Enquiry Officer: The respondent did participate throughout the proceedings and never raised any objection against the partiality of the Enquiry Officer. At the end, he was again held guilty and so dismissed from service.

3. Learned Presiding Officer of the Labour Court had accepted the grievance petition on two grounds as apparent from his findings. Firstly, that due to rush hours and due to close similarity of fake token with the real one he could not discern and hence made payment, which can be dubbed as a mere negligence and not misconduct. I totally disagree with the learned Labour Court because the banking business essentially is a matter of great trust reposed by the public in the system in general and in the Bank in particular. In these circumstances, the people dealing with cash do have an extremely sensitive matters to deal with and thus, should take great caution in discerning between a genuine and counterfeit token. The excuse of rush hours is no excuse at all because in such situation the Employees of the Bank are supposed to be overcautious. The omission of the respondent, therefore, was much more than a mere negligence. It seems that the payment was intentional.

4. The second ground of the learned Presiding Officer was that there was no previous charge of misconduct or such negligence against the respondent and that the allegations of the Bank that the respondent even previously was involved in such‑like matters and inquiries were held against him, could not be made a genuine cause for dismissal. I again disagree with the learned trial Court because the previous negligent conduct of the respondent was never a cause for his dismissal. I believe that the previous conduct might have resulted in the non‑exhibition of leniency by the Bank' towards the respondent. In the instant case, it was not very important for the Bank to have had proved the previous conduct. It was just the knowledge of the Bank which could not be avoided and in the presence whereof no leniency could be shown. It is a matter of trust between the employer and the employee which, if once betrayed, cannot be restored and should not be restored in matters that refer ultimately to the trust of the public in general. If the Bank doubts the conduct of an employee who subsequently got involved in a serious case of fraud and embezzlement, such employee should not be trusted upon an unwilling master.

5. Another most important fact of the case is that the respondent was dismissed on 6‑2‑1996 against which he filed a departmental appeal on 2‑3‑1996. As, no specific format for a grievance notice is provided in law and as an appeal even otherwise is supposed to be self‑contained, it by all means would be considered a grievance notice. Under section 25‑A(2) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 the respondent should have waited for a period of fifteen days for the reply and if no reply was received, he should have filed a grievance petition after the passage of two months thereafter. In these circumstances, the grievance petition could at the most have been filed within seventy five days after the departmental appeal filed on 2‑3‑1996 but in the instant case admittedly it was filed after one hundred and eleven days which was hopelessly time‑barred.

6. Though the respondent had served a second grievance notice but in the presence of his appeal dated 2‑3‑1996, the second notice was immaterial. Same is observed in Muhammad Ozair Qureshi v. Chairman, National Construction Co. Ltd. Karachi and others (1982 PLC 17). where the first appeal tiled by the employee concerned was held to be a perfect grievance notice. I hold that the aforesaid findings were based on logic and sound reasonings.

7. Consequently, the case of the respondent is neither tenable with reference to the said facts nor with reference to the law which makes the grievance petition hopelessly time‑barred. The appeal is accepted, the impugned judgment, dated 24‑3‑1998 of the Labour Court Peshawar is set aside and the grievance petition filed by the respondent is hereby dismissed. H.T.B./2/Lab(N.-W.F.P.) Appeal accepted.